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Abstract 
 
 
 
Enchanted Objects: Agency in the Magic Act and Contemporary Art Practice 
 
 
In my research project I examine some of the ways in which the objects, 
strategies, and concepts of conjuring—or what Simon During has called ‘secular’ 
magic—might be seen to converge with those of contemporary art practice. 
 
The theoretical concepts that I employ derive principally from Alfred Gell’s 
(anthropological) theory of art and agency. In Gell’s theory, an index/artwork is a 
mediatory (or secondary) agent, but an agent nonetheless, through which the 
(primary) agency of a social other can be communicated.  Gell’s concept of 
enchantment, but also his interpretation of the status of the artwork as provisional 
and problematic, rather than aesthetically or semiotically determined, is deployed 
as a means of creating a productively meaningful relationship between art and 
magic, both of which can be said to occlude the ‘abduction’ of agency in 
distinctive ways.  Finally, Gell’s concept of agency provides a robust yet fluid set 
of paradigms for exploring the mobile, tripartite relationship between artist, 
artwork, and spectator.   
 
This relationship is explored in the studio-based work by reproducing some of the 
forms and strategies associated with the magic act within the context of a ‘gallery’ 
setting, and considering how the effects of the magic illusion might position the 
viewer in relation to a set of beliefs about the world.  In this sense the magic act 
(and/or object) operates as a kind of fulcrum between the work and the viewer, 
signposting a particular orientation towards the work, but simultaneously 
destabilizing any straightforward response in favour of a more complex set of 
reflections.  
 
In the thesis I explore these themes through four discrete but interrelated chapters, 
each of which spring from elements of my practice, and can be seen to represent 
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different aspects of agency: the liminal nature of performance, the ‘enchanted’ 
object, the ‘magic’ of moving image technology, and the concept of the cognitive 
‘trap’. 
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Introduction 
 
 
 
A circular parlour table is suspended in mid-air, apparently kept afloat by a 
bouquet of large white balloons.  However, rather than the predictable visual 
image conjured by this description—of a table hanging from a bunch of helium-
filled balloons—it is the balloons themselves that suspend from, and appear to 
anchor, the apparently floating, inverted table.  The title of the piece, Gravitation 
Effect, reinforces this less obvious reading, openly declaring the earthbound 
gesture that the assemblage itself reveals.1  In SFX-1, a length of turkey foil is 
unrolled from the floor up to a wall-mounted shelf.  On the floor in front of it, and 
of equal width, are spread two sheets of A1 paper—partially overlapping each 
other, and in contrasting tones of blue—upon which sit a rotating desk fan and an 
orange table lamp.  The fan and lamp point towards the foil in such a way that it 
undulates in the breeze from the fan, throwing out a succession of orange and blue 
rippling reflections.  The susurration of the foil completes the putative illusion of 
a sunset over sea; but in fact this illusion is barely sustained, and continually 
threatens to break down through the sheer poverty of its means. 2 
 The above two examples encapsulate some of the themes at the heart of 
my research project in a number of ways.  Both pieces take as their foundation, a 
magical view of the world in which objects appear to act in unpredictable or 
counter-intuitive fashion.  The particular magical worldview that they embody is 
derived principally from theatrical, or ‘secular’, magic—the realm of the conjurer.  
Its concepts, strategies and materials are here reconstituted for the purposes of 
producing an effect that, though not strictly performative, mirrors the magic act’s 
moment of shock, during which intuitive notions of cause and effect are disrupted.  
At the same time the disposition of the works is such that the mechanisms by 
which these effects are produced is, at least partially, revealed.  Thus the works 
develop around a series of key strategies.  Firstly the production of a magical 
illusion that (partially) reveals itself: in the case of Gravitation Effect, this is 
achieved through a process of inversion—the fact that the assemblage seems the 
                                                 
1 Jonathan Gilhooly, Gravitation Effect (2007), shown at Grey Area, Brighton (see appendix). 
2 Jonathan Gilhooly, SFX-1 (2006), shown at Phoenix Gallery, Brighton (see appendix). 
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‘wrong way round’ (i.e. upside down) immediately suggests that there is a ‘right 
way’ against which it can be tested.  The title, Gravitation Effect, subliminally 
provides its counterpart, ‘Levitation Effect’; the rupturing of spectatorial 
expectation that results from this inversion, is central to the piece and is a second 
key component.  Third, is the concept of an illusion which, although self-
sustaining up to a point, also threatens to break down with the merest shifting of 
position or perspective.  Linked to this is the suspicion that these pieces might 
have been created for the chief purpose of simultaneously concealing and 
disclosing the means by which their illusory qualities have been realized. 
 These key strategies have emerged in my practice through a sustained 
engagement with the theoretical and strategic framework of the art of conjuring, 
or what Simon During has called ‘secular magic’.3  Initially this manifested itself 
through the complementary concepts of concealment and revelation, central to the 
conjurer’s act, but also, it seemed to me, characteristic techniques of the artist.  
My point of departure in the research has been the work with which I have been 
engaged as an artist over the past few years.  Put simply, this began with an 
attempt to reproduce some of the forms and strategies associated with the magic 
act within the context of a gallery setting, as a means of testing a set of 
hypothesized questions concerning the nature of representation, its mode of 
reception, and the tricky relationship between the artist, artwork and spectator.  At 
the beginning I wanted to demonstrate what I thought of intuitively as a 
connection between the role of the artist and that of the conjurer: that somehow 
what, at the time, I called a ‘contract of deception’ existed between each of these 
key figures and his audience, and that magic in some way crystallized a certain 
kind of questioning of reality that was also a prerequisite for much post-
Duchampian art.  The studio-based work, rather than being constrained by a 
particular medium, therefore centres on objects and strategies associated with the 
magic act, usually, but not exclusively, in terms of theatrical magic or conjuring.  
  In the thesis I explore this subject through four discrete but interrelated 
chapters, each of which spring from aspects of my practice: the liminal nature of 
performance, the ‘enchanted’ object, the ‘magic’ of moving image technology, 
and the concept of the cognitive ‘trap’.  The theoretical concepts that I employ 
                                                 
3 Simon During, Modern Enchantments: The Cultural Power of Secular Magic, (Cambridge, Mass. ; London: 
Harvard University Press, 2002). p. 1. 
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derive principally from Alfred Gell’s (anthropological) theory of art and agency; 
Gell’s concept of enchantment, and his interpretation of the status of the artwork 
as provisional and problematic, rather than aesthetically or semiotically 
determined, is ideally suited to my intention to bring together a productively 
meaningful relationship between art and magic.  Finally, Gell’s theory of agency 
provides a robust yet fluid set of paradigms for exploring the mobile, tripartite 
relationship between artist, artwork, and spectator. 4 
 Throughout the thesis my choice of artists is determined neither by their 
propensity to utilize explicit magical tropes and strategies within their work, nor 
on the basis of obvious theatrical magical affinities (although this has not 
necessarily excluded them either); rather I have used the work of artists who, it 
seems to me, adopt a certain position towards their materials and practices, 
whereby notions of agency are foregrounded in a provocative fashion.  These 
artists, among them Yves Klein, Martin Creed, Ceal Floyer, are often located 
nominally under the rubric of conceptual art—an already unwieldy category into 
which many different types of practice are usually lumped together—but might 
more usefully be thought of as problematizing and illuminating a particular 
approach to the post-Duchampian art object, as well as opening up a liminal zone 
of uncertainty between artist, artwork and spectator.  There are of course artists 
whose practices can be seen to reflect a magical sensibility in a more 
straightforward manner: one such is the German artist Joseph Beuys, whose self-
styled shamanic role was notionally presented as a genuine proposition—a means 
towards transforming society through both the creativity of the individual and the 
magical power of base materials.  However, the shamanic position of an artist 
such as Beuys was not where I wished to place the emphasis in my thesis, 
preferring instead to examine the work of artists who demonstrate a more 
reflexive and ambivalent relationship with their practice.  Whereas Beuys’ work is 
already concerned with the magical, I want to use magic as a prism through which 
to explore certain aspects of contemporary art practice. 
 
 
 
                                                 
4 Alfred Gell, Art and Agency: An Anthropological Theory, (Oxford: Clarendon, 1998). 
  
12 
 
Fig. 1.  Jonathan Gilhooly, Gravitation Effect (2007). 
 
 
 
Fig.  2.  Jonathan Gilhooly, SFX-1 (2006). 
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Chapter One  
Art and Magic as Technologies of Enchantment 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
In this chapter I present an account of the potential connections that exist between 
art and magic, and some of the ways in which these connections might be and 
have been expressed.  The chapter also serves as an explanatory introduction to 
the analytical and theoretical concepts that I make use of throughout the thesis, 
and offers a brief survey of the status of theatrical magic within modernity, in 
order to create a backdrop against which the rest of the thesis can figure.  By 
doing this I hope to clear a path for my own methods of tackling the subject—the 
particular relationship between art and magic that I feel is both productive in a 
general sense, and which describes and accounts for, or parallels, my own 
practice. 
 Although magic in a broad sense has been a subject of serious 
investigation since the mid-19th century, particularly in the field of anthropology, 
surprisingly little has been written about theatrical magic.5  Ironically, a huge 
body of magic literature does exist, but it has been either produced specifically for 
the magic community—and is therefore of a recondite and mostly instructional 
nature—or is broadly biographical and anecdotal, rather than critical.  James W. 
Cook’s The Arts of Deception, Simon During’s Modern Enchantments, and more 
recently, in the field of performance studies, Michael Mangan’s Performing Dark 
Arts are recent exceptions.6  All three volumes provide insightful introductions 
and interesting interpretive accounts of the history of conjuring, and I shall refer 
to them both by way of a general account of the subject of magic and, where 
appropriate, as a support for more specific thematic concerns that emerge 
throughout the thesis. 
                                                 
5 Anthropologists E.B. Tylor (1832-1917), James Frazer (1854-1941), Marcel Mauss (1872-1950), and 
Bronislaw Malinowski (1884-1942), all considered the subject of magic, in this broader sense. 
6 James W. Cook, The Arts of Deception: Playing with Fraud in the Age of Barnum, (Cambridge, Mass. ; 
London: Harvard University Press, 2001). During, Modern Enchantments, Michael Mangan, Performing 
Dark Arts: A Cultural History of Conjuring, Theatre and Consciousness, 1753-3058 (Bristol: Intellect Books, 
2007). 
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 Each of these book’s authors also, to varying degrees, touches upon the 
relationship between magic and modernity, and upon theories of enchantment that 
include modernity rather than seek to set magic in opposition to it.  Each presents 
a view of magic as generally marginalized or excluded during the modern period, 
not, according to the authors, necessarily due to any rationalist instinct, but 
because magic has been deemed jaded, clichéd and trivial; or occasionally 
because it has been judged negatively in association with fraud and with the 
activities of the con-man (this is Cook’s primary perspective in The Arts of 
Deception).7  Finally, each author, especially During and Mangan, makes a case 
for the important influence of magic upon the development of modern culture, 
and During explicitly argues for an interpretation of particular categories of 
modern art and fiction that allows for the influence of some of the conceptual and 
material strategies of the conjurer.  This sense that magic might somehow be 
central to the unfolding of modernity is also pursued in an essay by Michael Saler, 
Modernity and Enchantment, which begins with the provocative line: ‘Specters 
are once again haunting Europe and America.’8  Essentially an overview of 
contemporary criticism around the theme of enchantment, Saler’s thesis 
challenges the orthodox view that modernity is disenchanted through its 
demystification by science, secularism, and bureaucracy.  Saler examines the 
possible ways of presenting the interrelationship of the (admittedly rather vague) 
categories of enchantment and modernity, offering three dominant methods of 
analysis: the binary, the dialectical, and the antinomial.  The binary model 
positions enchantment as rational modernity’s ‘residual, subordinate “other”’, 
thereby necessarily relegating it from the status of delight to that of delusion’.9  
The dialectical approach sees modernity itself as irrational: ‘a mythic construct no 
less enchanted than the myths it sought to overcome.’10  Saler cites the writings of 
Karl Marx, but also Horkheimer and Adorno’s Dialectic of Enlightenment, which 
charges that modernity’s rational self-image is itself a form of enchantment.  In a 
memorable passage its authors compare the self-legitimizing instrumentalism of 
modernity with the magician’s self-inscription for the purposes of incantation: 
                                                 
7 Cook, The Arts of Deception, pp. 201-203 
8Michael T. Saler, 'Modernity and Enchantment: A Historiographic Review', The American Historical 
Review 111 (2006), 26. p. 692 
9 Ibid. p. 694 
10 Ibid. p. 697 
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‘[t]he mastery of nature draws the circle in which the critique of pure reason holds 
thought spellbound.’11  Finally, Saler describes the antinomial model, as a 
container for necessarily conflicting tensions and oppositions, a model that is 
truer to ‘lived experience’, whereby enchantment ‘depends upon its antinomial 
other, modern disenchantment, and a specifically modern enchantment might be 
defined as one that enchants and disenchants simultaneously: one that delights but 
does not delude’.12  Broadly speaking, I have embraced this latter model, in both 
theory and practice, as one that seems to me to reflect more accurately the diverse 
character of the magic assemblage, and which seeks to avoid the potentially 
reductive characteristics of the binary and dialectical approaches.  Saler’s claim 
that this more complex model is somehow truer to the spirit of modernity, is 
echoed by During, who asserts magic’s ‘relationship with the fictional and the 
emergence of show business’.13  He comments on the convergence of the rise of 
secular magic as part of an industry of entertainment, with that of the genre of the 
realist novel, and claims that they share a ‘cultural logic’.14  It is to this fictive 
nature of magic that I now wish to turn, as a touchstone to a brief account of the 
cultural status of magic within the modern period. 
 
 
The Status of Magic in Modern Culture 
 
Simon During’s 2002 publication Modern Enchantments: The Cultural Power of 
Secular Magic, is an academic study of the history and influence of magic, 
something which, as During himself acknowledges, has barely been attempted, as 
nearly all historical surveys of the subject have been written anecdotally, by 
magicians themselves.15  What During refers to as secular magic, i.e. conjuring, 
can be seen both as a sophisticated form of, and in contradistinction to, real 
magic.  The author’s definition of real magic is particular, and forms part of a 
lexicon of denotations employed throughout the book as a means of distinguishing 
                                                 
11 Max Horkheimer, Theodor W. Adorno, and Gunzelin Schmid Noerr, Dialectic of Enlightenment: 
Philosophical Fragments, Cultural Memory in the Present, ([Stanford, Calif.]: Stanford University Press, 
2002). p. 19, cited in Saler, 'Modernity and Enchantment', p. 698. 
12 Saler, 'Modernity and Enchantment', p. 699. 
13 Sina Najafi and Simon During, 'Modern Enchantments: An Interview with Simon During', Cabinet, 26 
(2007), 88-95. (p. 88). 
14Ibid. p. 93. 
15During, Modern Enchantments, p. 74. 
  
16 
between different magic types.16  Real magic, for During, is such that the magic 
itself—its method, as distinct from the effects it produces—pretends, or claims, to 
be real (regardless of whether or not one believes it), emanating as it purports to, 
from non-physical, supernatural forces.  Real magic, then, is notionally the magic 
of witches and shamans, and During contrasts this with secular magic, which, in 
spite of its efficacy, always proclaims its falsity, its reliance on methods and 
technologies—whether sleight of hand or elaborate stage apparatus.  Secular 
magic is therefore the magic of the conjurer and showman.  During’s 
nomenclature may not be entirely satisfactory, particularly as it conflicts with that 
of other writers on the subject; but it is a systematic attempt comprehensively to 
define the conjurer’s art in terms of its distinction from and disparity with the 
historical practices of witchcraft or sorcery.17 
 During also distinguishes magic from religion, in that the latter can never 
be secularised—its relationship to the sacred is a sine qua non of its identity.  This 
is not true of magic: the complex historical relationship between real 
(supernatural, in every sense) and secular magic is predicated, from a modern, 
enlightened point of view, on the ultimately illusory nature of both.  In this sense 
the entertainment sort of magic can be seen as a kind of historical whistle-blower 
on the supernatural sort, exposing its non-efficacy by revealing its methods.18 In 
spite of this, the two sorts of magic have historically retained an uneasy alliance (a 
confederacy that may be useful to the stage magician who, even while distancing 
himself from the supernatural, can benefit from any residual suspicion that real 
sorcery is the cause of the apparent miracles his audience witness).19    It is worth 
examining this overlap a little further for, whilst During is clearly attempting to 
demarcate the boundaries between real and secular magic, there are evidently 
ways in which the two have remained interdependent, even throughout the 
modern period.  In Performing Dark Arts, Michael Mangan likens the relationship 
                                                 
16 In addition to real and secular magic he refers to natural magic—that which is a precursor of, or aligned 
with, science. During, Modern Enchantments, pp. 17-21. 
17 Helen and Pier Giorgio Varola, for example, in their introductory essay to the Site Gallery’s exhibition, 
Con Art, refer to the art of the conjuror as ‘natural’ magic.   (Magic/Object/Action in H. Varola, C. Maund, 
and P. G. Varola, Con Art (Sheffield: Site Gallery, 2002).) 
18 At least since the end of the 18th century, when magic began to appear as a form of mainstream 
entertainment (See Cook, The Arts of Deception.) 
19 Many magicians have traded on this supposition (images of demons in early 20th century magic posters 
testify to this), and some, such as Uri Geller, embrace it completely, thereby committing a cardinal sin in the 
eyes of the magic fraternity.  Geller distances himself from ordinary magicians, claiming real powers.  (See 
Nicholas Humphrys’ Behold The Man, in Nicholas Humphrey, The Mind Made Flesh: Essays from the 
Frontiers of Psychology and Evolution, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002). pp. 206-231).  
  
17 
between conjuring and the occult to a ‘braid’, an intertwining of the two practices, 
one with the other. 20  This image is presented in opposition to an orthodox ‘linear, 
chronological model’ in which supernatural, or shamanistic, practices give way, 
over time, to more secular forms of entertainment: Mangan cites the theoretical 
works of Victor Turner and Richard Schechner (both of whom I refer to in chapter 
two) as exponents of this interrelated model of ritual and theatre.  Ritual ‘involves 
an expectation of results’ and is linked to the notion of efficacy, whereas the 
object of theatre is entertainment and fun; for both Turner and Schechner these 
notional extremities of a ‘continuum of performance’ are never entirely separate, 
but are always to some extent imbricated with one another, thus offering a more 
complex ‘interplay between efficacy and entertainment’.21  Throughout his book 
Mangan echoes this refusal to make easy distinctions between real and secular 
magic, in favour of a more complex, multi-faceted reading. 
 In her book ‘Artful Science’, Barbara Stafford explores this more 
complicated reading by means of the relationship between science and conjuring 
in early modernity.  Stafford focuses upon the ‘exciting ways of doing science by 
stimulating the eyes’, which were common in 18th century Europe, and which 
utilized aspects of the expanding leisure industry of the period.22  However, the 
‘enlightened entertainment’ that served to instruct as well as to delight, relied 
upon the same ocular stimulation employed by conjurors, ‘jugglers’ and other 
tricksters, whose covert aim was that of delusion.23   
 
 On the one hand, the competitive leisure industry pressured the informing 
 philosophical illusionist to distinguish himself from the deluding conjuror.  On 
 the other hand, popular educators relied on the same battery of stunning 
 newfangled devices to attract the consumer’s gaze.24 
 
Thus a kind of epistemological anxiety emerged out of the tendency for both 
instructors and conjurors—using similar instruments, but to very different ends—
to attempt to make visible a hidden realm.  According to Stafford, this became 
                                                 
20 Mangan, Performing Dark Arts, p. 16 
21 ibid 
22 Barbara Maria Stafford, Artful Science: enlightenment, entertainment and the eclipse of visual 
education (MIT Press, 1994), p. xxi 
23 ibid, p. 73 (‘juggler’ was a catch-all term, from the middle-English jogelen, meaning to entertain with 
tricks) 
24 ibid, p. 73 
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further compounded by the uncontrollable acquisition of such devices—lanterns, 
mirrors, projectors—by a growing consumer society.  Furthermore, a decidedly 
moral dimension grew out of a deep-seated suspicion of certain ostentatious forms 
of public display, whether instructional or entertaining: 
 
 When the viewer felt irresistibly magnetized by the visible invisible, especially in 
 the presence of unreadable optical effects, then the technologist was condemned 
 as a cheap trickster and his product judged as sophisticated flimflam.25 
 
This intersection of science and magic continued into the 19th century with the 
establishment of the London (later ‘Royal’) Polytechnic in 1838.  The Polytechnic 
featured public exhibitions and demonstrations of a scientific and technological 
nature, whereby the visitor might gain a ‘general knowledge of the processes by 
which the wonders of art and manufacture are produced’.26  The optical effect 
known as ‘Pepper’s Ghost’ was first demonstrated at the Polytechnic, but in the 
form of a dramatic interlude—a scene from Charles Dickens’ The Haunted 
Man—rather than as part of a scientific lecture; this phenomenon, whereby a 
ghostly figure could be produced on stage through subtle lighting and the exact 
positioning of a sheet of glass (invisible to the audience), was quickly seized upon 
by magicians in both Britain and France during the 1860s.  In fact magicians 
have, throughout the modern period, taken advantage of public disquiet, 
scepticism and anxiety instigated by unfamiliar scientific discoveries, as a means 
of framing their performances, thereby further complicating the relationship 
between scientific truths, supernatural forces, and downright charlatanry. 
 In a recent paper Karl Bell has also explored the interplay between 
technological rationality and magical beliefs, critiquing what he sees as the 
reductive bifurcation of real and secular magic advocated by During (and alluded 
to earlier in this chapter), in favour of a more complex reading.27  Bell examines 
the performances of John Henry Anderson, the self-styled ‘Wizard of the North’, 
a magician at the forefront of the promotion of magic as a form of mass 
entertainment.  He demonstrates how Anderson’s ‘blending of “magic” and 
                                                 
25 ibid, p. 79 
26 During, Modern Enchantments, p. 144 
27 Karl Bell, Remaking Magic: The “Wizard of the North” and Contested Magical Mentalities in the Mid-
Nineteenth Century Magic Show, Magic, Ritual and Witchcraft, Vol 4, No. 1 (2009), pp. 26-51. 
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science’ can be seen as an extension of earlier forms of ‘natural’ magic, whereby 
modern forms of science such as chemistry and astronomy had emerged in part 
from the experiments of alchemists and astrologers.  Anderson’s shows were 
advertised as deriving from the ‘“sciences of chemistry, dynamics, hydraulics, 
acoustics, optics, electricity, Galvanism, electro-magnetism”’, and, according to 
Bell, were a way of ‘sugaring the pill of useful instruction’, his comments 
converging in spirit with those of Stafford. 28 
 Two modern magicians who reflect this notion of hybridity, each from a 
different end of the performance spectrum, are Uri Geller and Derren Brown.  The 
Israeli born Geller made his name in the 1970s as a ‘paranormalist’ by performing 
feats such as spoon bending and telepathy, often on live television shows.  Geller 
became a newsworthy figure when viewers of his shows claimed to have 
experienced psychic phenomena (bent cutlery, stopped watches) within their own 
homes.  In spite of this Geller has been denounced as a fraud by many within the 
magic community; the magician and debunker James Randi claims that all of 
Geller’s feats are easily replicable by any decent stage magician.  Conversely, the 
British performer Derren Brown makes no direct claims to the supernatural, but 
nevertheless employs strategies which evoke or are framed by such phenomena.  
In ‘Séance’, first aired on Channel 4 in 2004, Brown brought a group of 
University students together for a live séance.29  The event was staged at Elton 
Hall in East London, and Brown claimed the location had a history of paranormal 
activity after 12 people killed themselves in a suicide pact in 1974.  He then 
proceeded to demonstrate some of the methods employed by spiritualists—
including the use of a ouija board—in contacting the dead, much of the event 
being filmed in near darkness using night-vision cameras.  Brown, much in the 
manner of John Henry Anderson, was exploiting and problematizing the 
perceived gap between psychic phenomena and their modern scientific 
explanation through such concepts as 'ideomotor movement'—unconscious 
movements we make when we expect motion to occur.  Although ostensibly a 
debunking exercise (one of the supposed suicide victims was introduced to the 
group at the end of the experiment, and the methods used were apparently 
explained) what the show demonstrated was the propensity for participants to be 
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caught up in the effects produced, when the context that framed them was a 
supernatural, rather than a theatrical event.  On other occasions Brown has 
implied the use of forms of subliminal suggestion and ideas derived from neuro-
linguistic programming—concepts that have contemporary currency, but of which 
his audience probably have scant knowledge; despite these cryptic references, 
much of the time they are themselves forms of misdirection, Brown relying 
instead upon tried and tested conjuring strategies. 
 These uneasy overlaps between different magic types are also evident in 
further distinctions in scholarly preoccupations with the idea of magic within 
modernity, whereby magic is defined either as the visible strains of already 
identifiable forms of practice which have become marginalized within an 
otherwise rational culture (witchcraft and other occult practices), or the kind of 
approach which views aspects of modernity itself as enchanted.  An example of 
the former is Susan Greenwood’s recent book The Anthropology of Magic, in 
which the author attends to an exploration of occult practices from the ‘inside’, 
participating in witchcraft rituals and working with shamans.30  An example of the 
second approach is Raymond Williams’ 1961 essay Advertising: the Magic 
System, in which the author posits, in an extension of Marx’s commodity 
fetishism, advertising as a form of magic whereby ordinary objects are 
transfigured into enchanted signifiers (so the motor car becomes, for example, a 
symbol of masculinity).31  During touches upon the example of Williams and 
upon other forms of ‘Modern Magic’ in the early pages of Modern Enchantments: 
Marx’s commodity fetish, Freud and the unconscious, Kenneth Burke’s notion of 
the magical function of naming in language, all are considered here as the residual 
strains of magical thinking within modern culture.  However, During’s central 
claim is set out in the opening pages of Modern Enchantments: he suggests that, 
from the point of their commercialisation and absorption into the mainstream, 
magic shows have influenced the trajectory and formation of modern culture, and 
its conception of itself.  Beginning in the late 1700s, modern performance magic 
enjoyed an ambiguous status: rejecting its former association with sorcery and 
witchcraft, magic became a respectable form of mass entertainment.  At the same 
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time the modern magician was tacitly engaged in a form of deception that, in a 
somewhat different incarnation, was coincidentally becoming a newsworthy 
phenomenon: that of the criminal pickpocket or con-man.32  It is not my intention 
here to give a detailed account of the history of magic, but some of During’s 
speculations in the chapter Enchantment and Loss: Theorizing Secular Magic, are 
worth examining.  During suggests that, once magic’s role as cultural agent is 
understood, ‘our sensitivity to the play of puzzlement, fictiveness, and 
contingency in modernity will be heightened’.33  He argues that the history of 
magic is intertwined with the history of fictionality, ‘the category in relation to 
which fictions are written, circulated, and received as fictions’, and he illustrates 
this with reference to three such fictions which represent magic performances; of 
these, Walter Benjamin’s Rastelli Erzahlt is perhaps the most instructive.34  The 
story concerns a juggler, The Master, who performs a graceful ball routine, the 
secret of which is the concealed presence of a dwarf inside the ball, and who 
controls its movements.  According to the story, the juggler was condemned (he 
faced certain death in the event of failure) to perform in front of an autocratic 
Eastern ruler.  Fortunately the performance is a huge success but, as The Master is 
leaving the theatre, he receives a letter saying that the dwarf is ill and so cannot 
perform that night; from this we infer that the performance must have been truly 
magical!  However, there is a twist to the story: the dwarf’s letter may have been a 
ruse, and the Master himself, tricked.  For During, Benjamin’s story symbolizes 
the ambiguous epistemic status of secular magic and demonstrates ‘an anxiety 
about the status of history whenever it meets (as it often must) the secret, the 
unfathomable, and the tricky, for which the history of entertainment magic stands 
as a type’.35  During concludes that secular magic can be thought of as a site 
where history and fiction collide, the one splintering and transmuting into the 
other.   
 Once again, the uneasy affiliation between real and entertainment magic is 
made clear.  One possible interpretation is that modern culture nurtures magic as a 
surrogate for the erosion of the supernatural; this is what During terms the 
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‘compensation’ theory, and he cites the French Lacanian literary critic Max 
Milner, whose La Fantasmagorie examines the technologies of secular magic in 
terms of compensation for (or lack of) the supernatural within modern culture, and 
of an ‘other space’ in which the boundaries between reality and dream are 
blurred.36  During ultimately rejects this position, however, as a plausible way of 
explaining the cultural power of magic, on the grounds that it does not adequately 
describe the kinds of pleasures—often trivial and silly, and by no means 
exclusively desirous of the supernatural—sought by magic audiences.  He is 
equally dismissive of the dialectical approach of Adorno, in which Western 
modernity itself is seen (negatively) as enchanted and self-justifying—a position 
which, for During, does not allow for the capability of modernized individuals to 
be simultaneously enchanted and disenchanted.  Ultimately the inherent 
ambiguity at the heart of Benjamin’s story points to this double bind response 
experienced by the observer of a magic trick: the (rational) knowledge that the 
effect is a trick, and the simultaneous suspension of disbelief for the purposes of 
(fictional, or magical) enjoyment.  This is a concept frequently alluded to by 
During throughout his book, in which he posits a paradoxical—a both/and, rather 
than an either/or—approach to his subject; it coincides with Michael Saler’s 
succinct description of modern enchantments’ propensity to ‘delight rather than 
delude’.37 
 Joshua Landy expands upon this notion of a magical orientation within 
modernity in a recent book (co-edited with Saler) exploring the cultural 
significance of magic and enchantment.38  Landy argues that it was the 19th 
century French magician Jean Eugene Robert-Houdin who provided his audiences 
with the potential to ‘reinforce an aptitude of detached credulity’, thereby 
contributing to the possibility of a re-enchanted quotidian existence.39  Robert-
Houdin presented himself as an actor playing the part of a magician, and in certain 
of his illusions, employed a pseudo-scientific form of presentation.  In one of 
these—a levitation trick entitled Ethereal Suspension—the magician claimed to 
have discovered a ‘marvellous new property of ether. If one has a living person 
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inhale this liquid when it is at its highest degree of concentration, the body of the 
patient for a few moments becomes as light as a balloon’.40  Using his own son as 
guinea pig, Robert-Houdin would wave a vial of ether under his nose in order to 
put him into a trance (the bottle was empty, but backstage ether was poured onto a 
hot iron, filling the theatre with its vapour).  After a complex series of 
manoeuvres, the magician used his little finger to raise his son—now supported 
only by a thin cane resting on a stool—into a horizontal position, where he 
remained, apparently levitated by the power of the ether.  Landy describes the 
way in which, here, the public curiosity in science was exploited for magical 
effect: Robert-Houdin’s audience knew about ether, and of its ‘marvellous 
applications’, and so might be prepared to grant it ‘magical’ powers.  
Furthermore, Landy says, certain sections of the audience were sophisticated 
enough to respond more ambivalently: 
 
 In the Ethereal Suspension, Robert-Houdin provided his audience with a model 
 for the construction of a belief system that recognizes itself as illusory; even 
 science can be a religion, he seems to have been hinting with a sly wink to those 
 in the know, if you lucidly wish to believe in one.41 
 
The author here counters the commonly held notion that science has been 
instrumental in disenchanting the modern world, arguing instead that, 
paradoxically, it produces new wonders, even in the process of explanation; 
furthermore, the inherently counter-intuitive nature of scientific explanations of 
certain phenomena can seem more mystifying than our common sense realism 
would have them.  Landy is also suggesting that Robert-Houdin’s ostensibly 
disenchanting theatrical productions produced or enabled the very homme d’esprit 
of whom the magician spoke so enthusiastically.42  The urbane and rarefied 
atmosphere of the little Robert-Houdin theatre permitted and encouraged an 
equally rarefied and sophisticated response, the kind that was, after all, only one 
of several possible responses at that time. Landy’s interpretation of magic 
suggests therefore, like During’s, a both/and rather than an either/or type of 
response on the part of the spectator. The assertion made by Landy—that the 
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deployment by Robert-Houdin of a scientific approach in the presentation of his 
illusions produced hybrid and ambivalent forms of response—is a line of 
argument pursued by both Cook and During in their books.  It is also worth 
remembering that towards the end of the same century a spiritualist revival in 
America and Britain was parasitic upon the development of another ‘scientific’, 
visual form—that of photography—and that it produced similarly ambivalent 
responses.  
 It is worthwhile expanding here upon the complex position of the spectator 
within the modern period.  Several recent volumes have attempted to deal with 
this slippery concept: in Techniques of the Observer, Jonathan Crary discusses the 
shift in the role and status of the observer during the early part of the 19th century, 
using the camera obscura as a model of earlier modes of observational habitus, 
and citing other, later optical instruments (such as the stereoscope) as 
paradigmatic of its transfigured status.43  In so doing Crary intends to give an 
account of the history of vision in which the emphasis is placed less upon the 
notion of a set of evolving representational practices but instead on the ‘no less 
problematic phenomenon of the observer’, who constitutes ‘the field on which 
vision in history can be said to materialize, to become itself visible.’44  Crary’s 
thesis revolves around an assertion that, for a period of over two hundred years, 
the camera obscura had represented and embodied a set of fixed relations between 
an observer and the external world; it had effectively functioned as a model (both 
philosophical and technological) of vision which was essentially passive, as well 
as operating transparently, and which was predicated upon the ‘radical distinction 
between interior and exterior, between the subjects and objects of perception.’45  
By contrast, 19th century optical ‘toys’ (the stereoscope, praxinoscope, and 
others) originated in a ‘new empirical knowledge of the physiological status of the 
observer and of vision’ that was far less rooted in any notion of truth status.  This 
new knowledge included clearly subjective phenomena, such as Goethe’s 
discovery of the after-image, that were not susceptible to explanation by the 
classical model of vision.  A highly problematized model of vision therefore 
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emerged during the 19th century, and Crary’s modern ‘observer’ is a more 
physiologically constructed and embodied individual as distinct from the passive 
onlooker of the 17th and 18th centuries; this is evidenced by his use of the word 
‘observer’—with its connotations of assimilation ‘within a prescribed set of 
possibilities’—as opposed to the more detached ‘spectator’.46 
 Crary’s account performs two important functions: the theoretical 
displacement of vision itself from discrete entity into a multiplicity of activities 
and processes, and the situating of the modern observer as the site of a complex 
nexus of social, aesthetic and technological processes.  Crary’s model of vision 
has however come under some critical scrutiny, partly for its overly linear 
narrative, but also because, as David Phillips has pointed out, it fails to account 
for the way that ‘modernist perception was also premised upon the denial of the 
embodied observer – a denial which had been so integral to the camera obscura’.47  
Certainly for the first half of the 20th century the notion of a distanced observer 
acquired a kind of orthodoxy, particularly in the writings of influential art critics 
such as Clement Greenberg and Michael Fried. The implicit theatricality 
characteristic of much postmodern art is at odds with the explicit aestheticization 
at the heart of the modernist project.  Fried himself, in an essay from 1967, 
declared theatricality the enemy of art: remarking on the tendency of minimalist 
(or as he called them, ‘literalist’) artists to espouse ‘objecthood’, Fried called it 
‘nothing more than a plea for a new genre of theatre; and theatre is now the 
negation of art’.  Although he was referring specifically to minimalist art, Fried’s 
objection was to the very activation of the gallery space (and, by extension, the 
incorporation of the beholder) upon which the work of much contemporary art 
depends.  Referring to the work of Robert Morris he says: 
  
 ‘Literalist sensibility is theatrical because, to begin with, it is concerned with the 
 actual circumstances in which the beholder encounters literalist work.  Morris 
 makes this explicit.  Whereas in previous art “what is to be had from the work is 
 to be had strictly within [it],” the experience of literalist art is of an object in a 
 situation – one which, virtually by definition, includes the beholder.’48 
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Martin Jay has also alluded to a ‘plurality of scopic regimes’ during the period of 
late modernism.49  In Downcast Eyes, Jay discusses Derrida’s opposition to 
notions of aesthetic purity, whereby the French philosopher argued against the 
idea of the integrity of the artwork on the grounds that ‘any purely aesthetic 
discourse cannot itself avoid intermingling with those it tries to exclude—ethical, 
cognitive, or whatever.’50 
 These discursive accounts of modern spectatorship point to a 
complexifying relationship between artwork/event and audience that itself 
parallels a proliferation of forms, materials and technologies, as well as a 
dissolving of disciplinary borders that would have been anathema to critics such 
as Greenberg and Fried.  Some of the examples I discuss in chapter two display a 
further splintering of the hitherto discrete boundaries separating performer and 
audience, artwork and observer. 
 
 
The Marvellous and the Miraculous 
 
It was the Surrealists who, during the 1920s and 1930s, pursued the notion of the 
marvellous as a category of the irrational.  André Breton’s first Manifesto of 
Surrealism describes the marvellous in terms of a ‘sort of general revelation’ the 
fragments of which might include ‘the romantic ruin, the modern mannequin, or 
any other symbol, capable of affecting the human sensibility for a period of 
time’.51  Simon During rightly observes that, as a metaphysical notion designed to 
resist the rational, the Surrealist concept of the marvellous has little in common 
with the technologies of performance magic.  The (Surrealist) marvellous is to be 
reached through altered states, the unconscious, dreams, or strange encounters; a 
magical experience, by contrast, is conscious, requires the willing suspension of 
disbelief, and consists of the witnessing of (apparent) miracles.  The distinction is 
a subtle but important one: in describing Matthew Lewis’s 18th century gothic 
novel The Monk, Breton admires the way it ‘exercises an exalting effect only 
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upon that part of the mind which aspires to leave the earth’.52  Surrealism’s 
marvellous is fantastical; magic’s miraculous is inexplicable.53  
 For During the 20th century artist whose work comes closest to the 
condition of secular magic is Marcel Duchamp.  Duchamp’s works are fragments 
(in the tone of Breton’s manifesto) but not symbols, in that they ‘dissolve art and 
the marvellous in play, teasing mysteries, technique, and fun’.54  In the chapter 
Magic and Literature, During discusses the central role of Duchamp in the 
context of his exposure to the writing and dramatic output of Raymond Roussel.  
Roussel, the rich son of a successful Paris stockbroker, courted controversy by 
virtue of the vast sums of money that he lavished on the publication and 
production of his texts and plays.  During sees him as a precursor of the avant-
garde, in that he de-humanized art by using a repertoire of mechanistic literary 
devices (word-play, puns, homophones, rebuses, etc) to generate his bizarre 
narratives.  In May 1912 a second production of his play Impressions d’Afrique 
opened in Paris; a month later, on 10th June, Duchamp attended a performance 
with a group of friends, describing it as ‘the madness of the unexpected’.55  At the 
heart of Roussel’s story is a series of disconnected spectacles featuring a 
succession of primitive machines, whose function is the production of artworks.  
One of these, a mechanical easel with a variety of complex accoutrements, is 
described in great detail:  
 
 The [automatic] arm slowly extended towards the palette, while the horizontal, 
 rimless wheel, created on the end of it by the star of brushes, was gradually raised 
 to the top of a vertical axle, wound upwards by a cogged ring which was directly 
 connected to the sphere by a highly elastic driving bolt […] Immediately  
 the brush, impregnated with the delicate shade, automatically drew a narrow, 
 vertical  strip of  sky down the side of the future picture.56 
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Duchamp later acknowledged that his readymades (as well as his reputed 
masterpiece, The Large Glass) had been directly influenced by Roussel: ‘Roussel 
showed me the way’ he proclaimed, and ‘it was fundamentally Roussel who was 
responsible for my [Large] Glass’.57  For Duchamp however, all art objects, 
including paintings, are readymades: ‘Since the tubes of paint used by the artist 
are manufactured and ready-made products we must conclude that all paintings in 
the world are “readymades aided” and also works of assemblage.’58  During 
remarks on Duchamp’s tendency, in his post 1912 production, to prioritize a 
certain apparent lightness, jokiness even, in his work, and to attempt to place it 
somehow outside of the limiting factors of tradition and taste.  He quotes Michel 
Leiris who, in his essay on Duchamp, describes the artist’s constructions as 
embodying a ‘physics (or logic) of fun’, and During explicitly ties in this assertion 
with the practices and sensibilities of the ‘magic assemblage’.59  Duchamp’s 
works are therefore marvels, but marvels that, through their archness, undermine 
the very tradition and essence of the marvel.  Of course Duchamp was also 
instrumental in testing the distinction between the aesthetic and the non-aesthetic; 
During concludes Modern Enchantments by revisiting Large Glass, a work in 
which he claims the artist attempted to ‘aestheticize a form of magic visibility, or 
rather, to de-aestheticize “art” by miming magic’.60 
 The cultural approach to magic, During’s in particular, is an attempt to 
create a vivid, heterogeneous picture of the history of magic and magicians from 
the 17th century onwards.  Supplementary to this however, is During’s suggestion 
that a ‘discourse of disenchantment’ paradoxically produced new categories of 
enchantment, this time directed at the imagination.61  The self-conscious and 
reflexive illusions of modern magic are but one expression of the centrality of 
illusions in modern mass culture.  While Cook associates such ‘artful deceptions’ 
with the growth of a capitalist market economy and middle-class anxieties 
concerning the status of truth, During places more emphasis on how the discourse 
of disenchantment itself fostered secular and rational enchantments aimed at the 
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imagination—and at how the imagination itself has become a central source of 
modern enchantment.62  The early romantics turned to the imagination for this 
purpose, and During utilizes Samuel Taylor Coleridge's notion of experiencing 
fictional wonders through the ‘willing suspension of disbelief’.63  In a compelling 
analysis, During contends that a specifically modern enchantment is to be found 
via the prevalence of fictions in the modern world, and the ways in which these 
fictions become interiorized within the modern imagination; modern magic is a 
part of this turn to self-reflexive fictions, but so too are works of avant-garde art, 
literature, the cinema, and show business in general, all of which receive some 
analysis in his account.  During defines all of these as magical assemblages that 
delight one's reason and imagination without deluding them.  His understanding 
of the modern efflorescence of representations departs in interesting ways from 
the more disenchanted views of certain postmodernists.  While figures such as 
Jean Baudrillard maintain that representations and reality have become virtually 
indistinguishable, rendering modernity almost impervious to critical analysis, 
During contends that the prevalence of illusions in modern culture has effectively 
trained its audiences to distinguish the real from the fictional.  Modern magic 
affirms the concept of the real in the process of appealing to the imagination, for 
‘consumers of modern culture learn to accept one set of propositions in relation to 
the domain of fiction, and another in relation to the everyday world’.64 
 Ultimately, although useful for an analysis of the cultural significance of 
magic, the perspectives discussed above are too broad to provide much purchase 
specifically within the area of artistic practice.  Only Simon During makes a 
purposeful case for certain categories of visual art as having magical (in the strict 
sense of what he terms the secular magic assemblage) connotations.  His 
designation of the work of Marcel Duchamp as an attempt to ‘de-aestheticize “art” 
by miming magic’, provocatively removes Duchamp from the reductive category 
of conceptual artist, and links him with the much more unofficial and 
marginalized world of theatrical magic.65   
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Magic as Science 
 
A very different perspective of magic has emerged from the fields of psychology 
and cognitive science.  In fact I began my research by focusing upon the 
psychology of magic through the work of, among others, Richard Wiseman, Peter 
Lamont, and Gustav Kuhn.  Ultimately, the drawback with this approach from my 
perspective is that it focuses (necessarily, from the point of view of the authors) 
upon the motivations and strategies of the conjurer, at the expense of the broad 
experience of the spectator or recipient of the magic effect, whose responses are 
measured in carefully circumscribed, positivist terms.  Gustav Kuhn’s work in 
particular successfully adumbrates the magician’s art in terms of perceptual and 
cognitive processes; he uses an eye tracker, a head-mounted device that monitors 
saccades—rapid eye movements within a limited range—in order to objectively 
determine where a spectator’s gaze is directed whilst viewing a magic trick.  By 
asking participants to view the trick on a TV monitor, the eye tracker 
simultaneously records their eye movements, and the extent to which they 
unconsciously respond to ‘social cues’.  However, this process assumes, as part of 
its methodology, a positivist ontological framework for the processing of its 
experimental data.  Kuhn ignores, or brackets out, for example, the technological 
mediation (TV monitor, eye-scanner) through which some of his results are 
produced, thus excluding the possibility of a ‘magical’ or ‘enchanting’, mediatory 
role that technology itself might bring to bear upon the process.  In his essay, 
jointly written with Ronald A. Rensink and Alym A. Amlani, Kuhn makes a plea 
for magic to be used by cognitive science as ‘an important source of insight into 
the human mind’.66  This is undoubtedly a bold and intriguing proposition, and it 
contains many important insights into the magician’s methodology, in particular 
the ways in which performers might manipulate ‘innate’ human cognitive 
tendencies.  Yet by focusing on the techniques of magic, and in order to test them 
scientifically, the study effectively reduces magic to these very techniques at the 
expense of the broader, framing technologies of the magic act, and the extent to 
which it might rely upon a conscious suspension of disbelief on the part of a 
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socially complicit audience.  From my point of view the eminently scientistic 
viewpoint (again, de rigeur for the authors) seemed limiting: the experience of 
magic is almost a footnote at the end of their essay.67  In a certain sense then, 
Kuhn, Rensink and Amlani are using magic as a scientific tool—in fact treating 
magic as scientific—a curious mirror image of Robert-Houdin’s use of science as 
a magical tool, as described earlier by Joshua Landy.68 
 Similarly, Wiseman and Lamont give a thorough account of the various 
categories of magical transaction, a kind of taxonomy of the principles of 
conjuring.  They also outline a distinction between the magician and the ‘pseudo-
psychic’, in an attempt to mark off these two categories in relation to each other.69  
Here magic becomes a rational enterprise that declares its hand, in contrast to the 
irrational pursuit of the pseudo-psychic who feigns access to the supernatural—a 
pursuit deemed out of bounds by Wiseman and Lamont.  Broadly speaking, what 
each of these accounts does is to describe how magic effects are produced, by 
focusing on the various methods employed by magicians—misdirection, 
dissimulation, and so forth—and how they might affect the cognitive functions of 
the observer: how, for instance, the psychological concept of ‘object permanence’ 
can cause us to believe that objects still exist even when they cease to be visible to 
us.70  In both accounts (Kuhn, Rensink & Amlani, and Wiseman & Lamont) there 
is a tacit assumption that magic is a technology for disrupting the perceptual and 
psychological mechanisms of the viewer, but that this must also be seen against a 
background of a scientifically rational and sensible version of reality, that magic 
itself helps to reinforce.  In fairness, it is not really within the remit of either of 
these accounts to engage with the question of what it is that magic does in the 
world, how it is culturally situated, and how it acquires or creates meaning.  
Instead, its authors focus on psychological questions—the perceptual expectations 
of the spectator and the ways in which these can be tactically exploited by the 
magician.  So while the particular strategic and material components of magic are 
subjected to forensic analysis, these accounts ignore its broader cultural 
                                                 
67 ‘Care should be taken in using these techniques as a way of investigating the mind without destroying the 
necessary mysteries and secrets that give us so much joy.’ Ibid, (p. 354). 
68 Kuhn is a semi-professional magician, while Robert-Houdin was an amateur scientist. 
69 Peter Lamont and Richard Wiseman, Magic in Theory: An Introduction to the Theoretical and 
Psychological Elements of Conjuring, (Hatfield: University of Hertfordshire Press, 1999). 
70 Object permanence, the understanding that objects continue to exist even when they cannot be seen, or 
touched, is a ‘skill’ learned in infancy, and is instrumental in differentiating the self and the world. 
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implications: that theatrical, or ‘secular’ magic can provide an eminently 
crystalline prototype of a certain kind of image of modernity—one in which a 
shadowy, contingent and ludic zone of play operates alongside and in relation to 
the more rationalist and progressive aspects of the modern. 
 Rather than employ a (reductive) psychological perspective, I want to 
consider theatrical magic as a component of a much broader conception of magic, 
one in which the notion of deception is one component among many: that of an 
assemblage of technologies, from which the rational element of conjuring (pace 
Wiseman and Kuhn) cannot so easily be disentangled.  This is not to say that I 
have rejected a psychological approach completely (particularly in chapter 4, in 
relation to the concept of the cognitive trap); merely that it is not used as a 
primary epistemological tool, and where it is used it is within a broader (non-
classical) conception of the psychological and cognitive, wherein ‘mind’ is 
conceived of as embedded and embodied, distributed and context-dependent.  
Recently, there have been attempts to forge links between neuroscientifically-
driven theories of mind, and more broadly philosophical, social, and arts-based 
perspectives, as in philosopher Michael Wheeler’s Reconstructing the Cognitive 
World (in which the author adopts a Heideggerian framework as a means of re-
positioning the philosophical foundations of cognitive science), and Barbara 
Maria Stafford’s Echo Objects: The Cognitive Work of Images.71  These insights 
chime with Alfred Gell’s own proposition in Art and Agency, that ‘cognition and 
sociality are one’, and have proved useful in supplementing an analysis of art 
objects, in so far as they converge with the notions of agency that I employ in a 
primary theoretical role throughout the thesis, and to which I now turn.72 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
71 Michael Wheeler, Reconstructing the Cognitive World: The Next Step, (Cambridge, Mass. ; London: MIT, 
2005).  Barbara Maria Stafford, Echo Objects: The Cognitive Work of Images, (Chicago ; London: University 
of Chicago Press, 2007). 
72 Gell, Art and Agency, p. 71. 
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Alfred Gell: Art, magic, and agency 
 
Primarily, I want to examine the relationship between artistic practice and magic 
performance in terms of its effect upon the spectator.  In order to do this I intend 
to focus on the ideas of the anthropologist Alfred Gell and, principally, his 1998 
(posthumous) publication Art and Agency: an Anthropological Theory.73  It 
seemed possible, and indeed productive, to use Gell’s notion of agency as a means 
of exploring the relationship between art and magic that had become central to my 
recent practice.  One of the advantages of Gell’s approach is the way in which, as 
an anthropologist, he studiously avoids adopting a theory of art that begins with, 
or prioritizes, a consideration of artworks as a class of aesthetically revered 
objects.  Although he is doing this for sound, anthropological reasons, it means 
that his perspective also offers a challenge to orthodox art historical accounts in 
which the aesthetic viewpoint is privileged; his position represents a refusal to 
treat art as a category of mute objects awaiting evaluative appraisal.74  Instead he 
considers art objects as persons, possessing agency and able to ‘change the world 
rather than encode symbolic propositions about it’.75  Gell views art as essentially 
a magical system, able to enchant and captivate the viewer, but glossed (in post-
enlightenment cultures) as the preserve of ‘genius’ or as the subject of a distanced, 
aesthetic appreciation.  This is a somewhat counter-intuitive approach that 
positions enchantment at the foreground of an inherently action-centred art 
system; art and magic are both intended to change things in the world.  Now it 
could be argued that in doing this Gell transforms art into a form of technology (a 
‘technology of enchantment’), therefore defining it in somewhat positivistic 
terms.  Similarly, although his aim is to formulate a theory of art, one that is 
serviceable universally, Gell’s art nexus—essentially a diagrammatic device for 
organizing sets of relations orbiting the art object—is ‘undoubtedly a Western 
representational apparatus’.76  However, I am more concerned with the ways in 
which Gell’s theories offer up a functional and productive framework for the 
analysis of art objects from the point of view of an artist-practitioner already 
                                                 
73 Ibid. 
74 ‘Evaluative schemes, of whatever kind, are only of anthropological interest in so far as they play a part 
within social processes, through which they are generated and sustained’. Ibid, p.3. 
75 Ibid, p. 6. 
76 Matthew Rampley, 'Art History and Cultural Difference: Alfred Gell's Anthropology of Art', Art History, 
v. 28  (2005), p. 524-51. (p. 549). 
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working within that Western tradition, and, additionally, how those theories 
generate useful parallels between the ‘technology’ of art and the ‘technology’ of 
magic, as defined within the theory.  Besides, Gell’s definition of technology is 
far broader than the one that is commonly ascribed to it, i.e. the production and 
use of tools: in Technology and Magic, he describes the technical as ‘a 
roundabout means of securing some desired result’, but broadens the definition to 
include not only the kinds of knowledge required for the making and use of tools, 
but also ‘the forms of social relationships which make it socially necessary to 
produce, distribute and consume goods and services using “technical” 
processes’.77  Furthermore, and crucially, for Gell technology and magic are not 
opposed to one another; rather they are mutually constitutive, because technology 
‘sustains magic, even as magic inspires fresh technical efforts’.78 
 Gell’s ideas about the agency of the art object spring partly from two key 
sources: firstly David Freedberg’s defence of a consideration of the artwork as 
possessing power over the beholder.  Freedberg develops this thesis in his book 
The Power of Images, in which he addresses a range of issues including 
censorship, pornography and iconoclasm, as examples of images that arouse and 
motivate a response from the viewer.79  Gell adopts this action-centred stance 
towards the artwork, partly as a means of collapsing orthodox distinctions 
between ‘religious and aesthetic exaltation’; he goes on to claim that ‘art-lovers 
[…] actually do worship images in the most relevant senses, and explain away 
their de facto idolatry by rationalizing it as aesthetic awe’.80  Second, Gell’s ideas 
about the distinctive relationship between social agents and artworks echo those 
of Pascal Boyer’s work in the field of cognitive psychology; Boyer’s notion of an 
intuitive psychology with which the human agent makes inferences about the 
world, forms the basis of Gell’s concept of ‘abduction’.81  The term abduction is 
used by Gell to designate a particular kind of probabilistic, non-linguistic semiotic 
inference, brought to bear upon indexical signs and social others alike (he gives 
the example of a smile connoting friendliness, whether in a painting or from a 
                                                 
77 Alfred Gell, 'Technology and Magic', Anthropology Today, 4 (1988), 6-9. (p. 6.). 
78 Ibid, (p. 9).  
79 David Freedberg, The Power of Images: Studies in the History and Theory of Response, (Chicago; London: 
University of Chicago Press, 1989). 
80 Gell, Art and Agency,  p. 97. 
81  The reference to Boyer as Gell’s closest source is from Robin Osborne and Jeremy Tanner’s introduction 
to Robin Osborne and Jeremy Tanner, Art's Agency and Art History, New Interventions in Art History 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 2007), p. 11. (Gell himself cites Pierce (by way of Eco)). 
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person).  The particular type of abduction pertinent to the category of indexes 
qualified as artworks is the abduction of agency, for which the index itself is seen 
as the outcome. 
 The definition of ‘art object’ is also, for Gell, problematic, and he refuses 
not just an aesthetic categorization but also, more contentiously, a semiotic (or at 
least narrowly semiotic) one, on the grounds that ‘visual art objects are not part of 
language […] nor do they constitute an alternative language’.82  Gell’s definition 
is theoretical and grants the art object ‘no “intrinsic” nature’, other than as a 
‘function of the social-relational matrix in which it is embedded’.  Ultimately 
then, for Gell, aesthetic and symbolic considerations are adduced only as part of a 
system of analysis that prioritizes ‘social agency and perceptual cognition, rather 
than culture and symbolic meaning’.83  What Gell also does, via his art ‘nexus’, is 
to provide a supple and adaptable schematic for the analysis of a set of 
relationships centred upon the artwork, and emanating from the idea of agency.  
This framework is flexible because it is not taxonomic or classificatory, but 
relational: it is contingent upon context.  So the position of agent (according to 
Gell’s scheme) can vary from one given instance to another.  The four agent 
‘positions’ that Gell supplies are index, artist, recipient and prototype; these 
provide ‘the “canonical” nexus of relations in the neighbourhood of art objects’.  
Although Gell’s ‘nexus’ provides a useful conceptual framework, I have 
employed it within the main chapters of the thesis strategically rather than as an 
exhaustively delimiting analytical tool.  One brief example will suffice here in 
order to give a flavour of the rigorous structure of Gell’s system, and of its 
algebraic extrapolation into linear and arboresque structures, or ‘Gellograms’.84  
In the chapter The Involution of the Index, Gell articulates a number of possible 
sets of relationships between his four designated agent ‘positions’; in addition, he 
illustrates how each of these can themselves be in the (meta)-position of either 
agent or patient.  In one example—Joshua Reynolds portrait of Samuel Johnson—
Gell suggests that it is the eminent and intellectual figure of Dr. Johnson himself 
(the prototype) who has motivated both the artist’s manner of his portrayal, and, 
ultimately, our own (the viewer, or recipient) abduction of his (Johnson’s) agency 
                                                 
82 Gell, Art and Agency, p. 6.  
83 Osborne and Tanner, Art's Agency and Art History, p. 6. 
84 A term coined by Whitney Davis: Whitney Davis, Abducting the Agency of Art, in Ibid.pp. 199-219. 
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as iconic figure and ‘culture hero of the English’, via the painting (index).  The 
resulting diagram nests the artwork/index within a sequence of relationships that 
unfolds from left to right, with respect to the roles of agent and patient: 
 
[[[Prototype-A]  Artist-A]  Index-A]                  Recipient-P 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 3.  Samuel Johnson, by Reynolds.   Fig. 4.  Leonardo’s ‘Mona Lisa’. 
 
Gell then proceeds to employ a minor shift to indicate a different relational 
structure—that represented by Leonardo da Vinci’s portrait, the Mona Lisa.  Here, 
it is the artist himself who is the primary agent ‘seen as responsible for the Mona 
Lisa’s appearance’, whose features mediate (again, via the index/artwork) our 
awareness of Leonardo’s ‘genius’ as painter:  
 
[[[Artist-A]  Prototype-A]  Index-A]                  Recipient-P 85 
 
Although superficially complex, these formulae provide an original and effective 
method for tracing the sets of relationships between Gell’s four agent positions.  
Where I do employ them (although not in this formal, diagrammatic format) it is 
in an attempt to account for situations where agency might be (or might be seen to 
                                                 
85 Gell, Art and Agency, p. 52. 
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be) occluded or subverted in some way—as is often the case in the magic act, as 
well as in my own art practice. 
 Gell’s conception of enchantment is framed quite specifically in terms of a 
kind of resistance, on the part of the art object, to being ‘grasped’ by the viewer, 
such that the viewer becomes overwhelmed and attributes the basis of the artwork 
as magical.  Artworks are therefore, for Gell, ‘cognitive traps’ that directly affect 
or ‘captivate’ the viewer in ways that might range from a slowing down of 
perception, through to a sense of awe, desire, or fear.  It is worth pointing out that 
Gell doesn’t necessarily limit his definition of ‘technical skill’ to what we in the 
West might think of as virtuosic skill, and is prepared to bestow the same 
descriptor upon works, such as those by Picasso or Duchamp, that display 
conceptual, rather than artisanal, skills.86  Nor does he limit ‘artworks’ to 
conventional Western-type conceptions of that term (paintings, sculptures, etc); in 
fact in an essay from 1996 entitled Vogel’s Net: Traps as Artworks and Artworks 
as Traps, he includes actual hunting traps within his notionally expanded 
definition of art.87  I am particularly interested in this idea of cognitive traps and 
employ it as a theoretical device for uncovering and extending some of the more 
apparently intractable aspects of the magic assemblage (its status as a uniquely 
constructed technology for the motivation of astonishment), as well as for the 
apprehension of works of art.  It is worth expanding here upon Gell’s concept of 
‘enchantment’, a concept that has enjoyed renewed critical attention in recent 
years: Jane Bennett’s The Enchantment of Modern Life, and Landy & Saler’s The 
Re-enchantment of the World, are two examples, both of which adopt anti-
Weberian positions, and that seek, in their different ways, to offer a 
(re)interpretation of modernity as already enchanted.88  Although I shall refer to 
these works where appropriate, it is important to distinguish Gell’s notion of 
enchantment as a more singular and finely tuned concept, one with specific 
relevance for the apprehension of artworks.  For Gell, enchantment is a form of 
captivation experienced within the vicinity of (art) objects, and caused by a 
combination of ‘technical expertise and imagination of a high order’, which 
                                                 
86 Alfred Gell, The Technology of Enchantment and The Enchantment of Technology, in Alfred Gell and Eric 
Hirsch, The Art of Anthropology: Essay and Diagrams, London School of Economics Monographs on Social 
Anthropology; V.67 (New Brunswick, N.J. ; London: Athlone Press, 1999) , pp. 159-186 (p. 174). 
87 Alfred Gell, Vogel’s Net: Traps as Artworks and Artworks as Traps, in Ibid, pp. 187-214. 
88 Jane Bennett, The Enchantment of Modern Life: Attachments, Crossings, and Ethics (Princeton, N.J. ; 
Chichester: Princeton University Press, 2001).  Landy and Saler, The Re-Enchantment of the World. 
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exploit the intrinsic mechanisms of visual cognition; thus enchantment here 
converges with Gell’s ideas about the abduction of agency, and situates itself 
within a framework of cognitive and social relations.89  Matthew Rampley has 
offered a useful exposition of Gell’s ‘technology of enchantment’, one that 
defends its emphasis upon the technical against the possible charge that it is a 
Kantian aesthetic theory in disguise.  Rampley proposes instead, that Gell’s 
category of enchantment can be seen to invoke Althusser’s notion of 
interpellation, which might account for Gell’s deep interest in ‘art-like situations’ 
in which the subject is enmeshed.90  Additionally, Gell’s theory of enchantment is 
not intended as a description of a specific kind of experience, more as an account 
of its social function—in particular the creation of asymmetrical power relations.  
In any case, Gell hardly rejects the aesthetic response out of hand; rather, he 
refuses its deployment as a primary constitutive factor for an anthropological 
theory of art. 
 Agency, in this formulation, is also meticulously articulated, and it is 
important to note that Gell does not seek a definition of agency that is necessarily 
philosophically tenable.  What matters here is that agency is ‘attributable to those 
persons (and things[…]) who/which are seen as initiating causal sequences of a 
particular type, that is, events caused by acts of mind or will or intention’ (Italics 
added).91  This particular (broadly externalist) conception of agency allows for the 
possibility that material objects—including artworks—can be agents.92  It also 
places magic in an interesting position in so far as the theatrical magician may 
appear to obscure the boundary between agency (as inferred intended action) and 
‘natural’, or physical, (albeit disrupted or subverted) cause and effect occurrences.  
That is, in response to an illusion which, to all intents and purposes, appears to 
contravene the laws of cause and effect (an object disappears, reappears 
somewhere else, floats unaided, etc), the magician may claim agency himself, or 
may do so on behalf of the object, or even attribute it to hidden ‘forces’.  In Gell’s 
theory, an index/artwork is a mediatory (or secondary) agent, but an agent 
                                                 
89 Gell, Art and Agency, p. 68. 
90 Rampley, 'Art History and Cultural Difference', p. 540.  It is worth pointing out that Gell’s account lacks 
the Althusserian dimension of ideology as a mode of analysis for his enquiry. 
91 Gell, Art and Agency, p. 16. 
92 ‘externalist’ in so far as it constitutes a conception of mind, not as internal and delimited, but as extended 
and distributed into the social milieu. 
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nonetheless, from which the (primary) agency of a social other (often, but not 
always, the artist) can be inferred. 
 Before completing this brief summary of Alfred Gell’s ideas it is worth 
mentioning a critical observation that has been raised in relation to them.  In his 
appraisal of Art and Agency, Matthew Rampley has drawn attention to the level of 
abstraction at which the theory of the art nexus operates, suggesting that this 
might present difficulties for an ‘analysis of concrete practices’.93  As an artist 
researcher, my own solution to this potential drawback has been to employ other 
theoretical models commensurate with Gell’s own, where appropriate, and where 
they might reinforce or help sustain a reading of a particular work.  This trans-
disciplinary approach seemed preferable to what might otherwise have produced a 
rather forced and straitjacketed analysis of works and practice, through an over-
reliance on the particularities of Gell’s nexus of relations.94  In general however, 
Gell’s theories have enabled me to adopt a more flexible framework towards the 
analysis of magic, than the scientifically-oriented ones referred to earlier.   
 Rather than assume a polarised position in relation to magic (conjuring) in 
which it could be used as, on the one hand, a tool for the purposes of debunking or 
demystifying, or, on the other hand, simply the appropriation of a set of tropes 
that might be employed to create an ‘aura’ of the magical or mystical, I have 
instead attempted, in both writing and practice, to examine how the effects of the 
magic illusion might position the viewer in relation to a set of beliefs about the 
world.  In this sense the magic act (and/or magic object) operates as a kind of 
fulcrum between the work and the viewer, signposting a particular orientation 
towards the work, but simultaneously destabilizing any straightforward response 
in favour of a more complex set of reflections.  In this respect, the works I have 
produced attempt to enact, rather than simply illustrate, the concepts that they 
adumbrate. 
 
 
 
                                                 
93 Rampley, 'Art History and Cultural Difference', p. 548. 
94 In fact, Gell himself draws attention to this apparent deficiency, suggesting that the anthropology of art 
should ‘focus on the social context of art production, circulation, and reception, rather than the evaluation of 
particular works of art, which, to my mind, is the function of the critic’. Gell, Art and Agency, p. 3. 
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Magic and Art: ‘Shared imaginations and Strategies of deception’95 
 
Some eight or nine years ago I began to examine some of the strategies, concepts 
and objects of performance magic (conjuring), and the responses that magic 
elicited from an audience.96  I became fascinated by the notion that the spectator 
of a magic show could enjoy the experience of having been fooled, disbelieving 
the evidence of his own eyes (as, in most cases, the magic performance is 
predicated upon a contract of deception between performer and spectator), yet 
simultaneously suspending that disbelief in the interests of enjoying a magical 
experience.  It seemed to me at the time that certain parallels might be drawn 
between this kind of experience and the experiencing of artworks: the relationship 
between magic and art from the point of view of a tacit contract between magician 
and audience/artist and spectator; also notions of illusion and its relation to ideas 
of spectatorship and perception (connecting to cognitive theories of attention and 
distraction), which might be seen as central to concepts of the art object, as well 
as to magic theory.  In 2002 I saw an exhibition at the Site Gallery, Sheffield, 
which helped consolidate these ideas: entitled Con Art, and comprising works by 
artists such as Jonathan Allen, Keith Tyson and Mark Wallinger, its stated aim 
was to explore ‘the convergence of art and magic in contemporary practice’, and 
‘magic and art’s shared imaginations and art’s conspicuous affinity with strategies 
of deception’.97   In her introduction, director and curator Carol Maund proposed 
the link between art and magic as ‘the willing participation of the viewer in an act 
which they know to be an illusion’.98  I also wanted to use some of the strategies 
of magic in my own practice, as a means of modelling the perceptual processes 
entailed in viewing works of art, at the same time staging or enacting these 
processes, rather than simply reflecting upon them.  At the Site Gallery a work 
that seemed to encapsulate this paradigm was Values for a New Age by Kyprianou 
and Hollington.99  In this piece the viewer observes, via a pair of screen monitors, 
a wine glass moving around unaided, on the surface of a table; close by, the real 
glass can be viewed through a spy-hole, but now it is stationary.  The only proof 
                                                 
95 Helen and Pier Giorgio Varola, Magic/Object/Action, in Varola, Maund, and Varola, Con Art.  p. 8. 
96 The word ‘conjure’ has its origins in the Latin conjurare, meaning ‘to conspire’ or ‘to swear together’. 
97 Helen and Pier Giorgio Varola, Magic/Object/Action, in Varola, Maund, and Varola, Con Art.  p. 8. 
98 Ibid. p. 5. 
99 Kyprianou and Hollington, Values for a New Age, in CON ART, at Site Gallery, Sheffield, 2002. 
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of the glass’s apparent movement is via its relay to the monitors, but whenever the 
viewer returns to the spy-hole the wine glass is in a different place.  Alluding to 
the spiritualist trappings of the séance, this work also framed technology as 
magical, simultaneously questioning its status as mediator of truth. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Fig. 5.  Kyprianou and Hollington, Values for a New Age (2002).  
 
 In order to pursue this idea, I want to describe two magic tricks from the 
world of theatrical magic, and a work of art that, together, seem to encapsulate the 
spirit of ambivalence central to my research.  Both illustrate and embody the 
creation of a magical experience, and its simultaneous deconstruction through 
comedy, demonstration or misdirection.  Tommy Cooper began his career in the 
early days of television broadcasting and became a comic-magician when he 
noticed that audiences preferred his performances when the tricks failed.  After 
his debut in 1948, he soon began starring in his own shows, most notably with 
Thames Television from 1968 to 1980, and these half-hour programmes—a 
mixture of zany sketches and apparently ad hoc magic tricks—proved immensely 
popular to British television audiences.  A typical Tommy Cooper routine consists 
of a series of well-known magic tricks subverted for comic effect: one example, a 
transportation illusion, will suffice to give a flavour of his act.  A small clock is 
placed in a box, on a table, with a second container positioned nearby, the aim of 
the trick being magically to cause the clock to travel from one box to the other.  
After muttering some (completely incoherent) magic words Cooper peers into the 
second box and, without showing it to his audience, assures us that the clock has 
indeed been transported.  Now—and this of course is the joke—he will magically 
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send it back again, upon which the first box is opened to reveal the ‘reappeared’ 
clock, to the sound of huge applause.  This apparently absurd routine retains the 
essence of a magical experience by playing on the audience’s knowledge of how 
it should, if properly executed, proceed, and by concealing its method of 
production.  In fact by removing the method—the actual business of getting the 
clock from one place to another—what we are left with is pure effect, albeit in 
degraded, bathetic form. 
 The second example is the version by the American duo Penn and Teller 
of a classic routine, possibly the oldest in magic, the cups and balls.  The 
traditional version of this trick (which, though it might be accompanied by a 
narrative, never varies much in substance) consists of a number of balls being 
placed under three cups, which are then lifted to reveal that the balls have either 
disappeared, multiplied, or have mysteriously switched places.  Penn and Teller 
are known for their subversive deconstructions of magic tricks, and in their send-
up of the cups and balls they appear to break a cardinal rule, by performing the 
routine using transparent plastic cups.  The ostensible point of this deviation from 
tradition is to reveal how the trick is done: instead, what happens is that, partly 
because of the rapidity of their performance, the whole routine is still completely 
bewildering to the spectator.  Magician and writer Eugene Berger describes Penn 
and Teller’s routine in this way: 
 
 I find the transparent cup routine that they do pretty magical, even though the 
 ‘outer frame’ is about exposing it: all they’ve exposed is the obvious – except for 
 that small percentage of the population who thought that the balls magically 
 appeared under the cups for some strange reason.100 
 
By exposing the method—by making it, literally, transparent—Penn and Teller 
foreground other elements of the routine: performance skills, dexterity, 
misdirection, as well as its sheer dazzling complexity.   
 Both of the above examples encapsulate two of the key elements of magic, 
method and effect, but it is the aspect of deconstruction that is key for my 
                                                 
100 Eugene Berger, The Mysteries of Magic, Discovery Channel (2002). Mysteries of Magic, 
3 x 1 hour Documentary Series1998 - The Learning Channel, Discovery. Communications USA. 
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purposes: it is a peculiarly self-conscious and almost postmodern adaptation of the 
magic trick that does not normally feature in more traditional performances.101  Its 
purpose is to simultaneously undo or subvert the illusion even as it is in the 
process of being constructed, and the result is a more knowing and arch 
demonstration that seems to acknowledge its own constructedness and falsity.  
However, even as it apparently reveals these elements, it simultaneously 
redoubles its illusory nature, ironically covering up its own revelatory tracks. 
 
‘An Oak Tree’ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 6.  Michael Craig-Martin, An Oak Tree (1974). 
 
In 1974 the British artist Michael Craig-Martin exhibited an artwork called An 
Oak Tree as part of his solo show at the Rowan Gallery, London.  Comprising a 
glass of water set on a glass shelf roughly nine feet from the floor, An Oak Tree 
was accompanied by a leaflet containing an interview in which the artist was 
interrogated about the origination of his artwork.  An Oak Tree functions very 
                                                 
101 The ‘method’ is how the trick works; the ‘effect’ is what the spectator perceives. Lamont and Wiseman, 
Magic in Theory: An Introduction to the Theoretical and Psychological Elements of Conjuring, p. 1. 
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much like a magic trick, presenting the effect, or outcome, of a transformation; the 
interview enacts this change, which the viewer is then invited imaginatively to 
reconstruct.  But it is the concept of belief as an ineluctable essence of both magic 
and art, which underpins this ‘performance’.  I have employed Craig-Martin’s 
iconic artwork within both my theoretical and practical research as a talisman of a 
particular modus operandi towards the triangular relationship between artist, 
artwork and viewer, which is at the heart of my project.   An Oak Tree constitutes 
a locus within the thesis, a useful point of return, and a means of re-examining 
this crucial relationship.  I believe it is a work whose richness has perhaps not 
fully been mined—regularly and complacently assigned, as it has been, to the 
realm of conceptual art—and I intend to use it as a leitmotif around which certain 
themes can be re-oriented and re-examined.  This deployment reflects the 
ambiguous and equivocal status of the artwork itself, which shifts—a glass of 
water masquerading as an (fictive) oak tree, or an oak tree camouflaged as a 
(illusory) glass of water—depending on the viewpoint.  The work shares certain 
characteristics with the two magic routines described above, simultaneously 
sustaining and undoing its own fictions, and positioning the viewer in a state of 
uncertainty regarding its ontological status.   
 How might the three examples described above be accounted for in terms 
of Alfred Gell’s theory of agency, and the abduction of agency?  In Art and 
Agency Gell, whilst discussing the motivation of abduction of agency from an 
artefact, notes that the attribution of manufacture of an object may sometimes 
reside with some sort of divine agency; or that the object may be believed to have 
made itself in some mysterious way.  Furthermore, ‘the origins of art objects can 
be forgotten or concealed, blocking off the abduction leading from the existence 
of the material index to the agency of the artist.’  This concealment, or occlusion, 
is of particular relevance for the magic act and for magic objects, for magic can be 
described as a technology of occlusion, in so far as the sum total of its technical 
apparatus—the lighting, staging, patter, objects, methods and narratives—all 
conjoin to effect a kind of ‘blocking off’ of origins.102  For this reason it seems 
more appropriate to speak of magic as a technology of occlusion, rather than a 
technology of deception, because deception is the result, rather than the means, of 
                                                 
102 I use the word occlusion deliberately here, to suggest a blockage, something that requires ‘unblocking’ (by 
a spectator). 
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its technological provision.  What is exceptional in the above examples is the way 
that a partial revealing is provided as a counterpart to this occlusion.  In the first, 
Tommy Cooper’s agency as a comic ‘buffoon’ is seen as responsible for the 
somewhat ludicrous outcome of the trick, the objects mediating this agency in 
mute fashion.  However, another, highly contrasting reading seems equally 
plausible: that the trick is happening to the hapless magician, who is not really in 
control but who is just as bemused as we (the audience) are by the unfolding 
events.  In this alternative reading, the objects (clock, boxes, table) themselves 
acquire agency in acting upon the performer, and in appearing to not quite do 
what he wishes them to do.  This may seem initially to be a perversion of Gell’s 
formula, in that it does not feature an artwork (at least in any conventional sense 
of the term): however, as we have already seen, Gell himself accepts no a priori 
conditions for the status of artwork, and, in some of his examples, even 
specifically allows for living objects—as part of performative rituals—to function 
as indexes. 
 The second example also includes a partial revelation of occluded agency: 
the plastic cups that Penn and Teller use are (optically) transparent, thus rendering 
the trick itself conceptually transparent.  This time the two performers are 
completely in control and render the trick impenetrable through the speed of their 
performance, and with a certain amount of stage misdirection.  This mesmerizing 
act becomes, in Gell’s terms, a cognitive trap because here, at last, we (the 
members of the audience) are given an opportunity to undo (or unblock) the 
magic’s technological means.  And yet we are completely unable to do so, not 
because we cannot ‘see’ what is happening, but because of the rhythmic intensity 
of the performance, which, somewhat like a dance, holds us spellbound.  In fact it 
could be argued that, in Gell’s terms, all that is actually revealed is the complex 
hierarchical nature of the cups and balls routine, its composition of parts into a 
whole, which Gell analyses in relation to apotropaic patterns: ‘the deconstruction 
of this complex of hierarchical relationships endows the decorated object with a 
certain type of agency, which is the reciprocal of the agency exercised by the 
recipient in (attempting) to perceive it.’103 
                                                 
103 Gell, Art and Agency, p. 83.  
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 These occlusions and their partial revelation return us once again to the 
subject of the spectator and to what might be thought of as a more instrumental 
reading of the magic act.  The position of the spectator in relation to the 
performing magician might suggest an asymmetrical distribution of power, in so 
far as the magician is in possession of knowledge of how the trick works, whereas 
the spectator is not.  However, what both Penn and Teller, and Tommy Cooper are 
acknowledging is that the secret and secrecy of a magic trick are not necessarily 
its key attributes, and in many cases revelation is never far behind.  Instead, the 
entertaining explication of a magic trick nuances the relationship between 
magician and observer—a metaphorical knowing wink, or hint of complicity that 
is the real key to these transactions.  Barbara Stafford, in an essay prefiguring the 
central thesis of her book Artful Science, describes a spectator who could learn 
from deception by being exposed (or partly exposed) to the mechanisms of 
illusion.  She cites in particular Henri Decremps’s La Magie Blanche devoilée 
(1788) for its nomination of magic as a ‘force for visual education’: 
  
 Momentary concealment and subsequent revelation were not the same as a 
 permanent lie.  This fluid and interactive performance medium demonstrated that 
 legerdemain, camouflage, distraction, misdirection, and above all the perspective 
 one had permeated the perception of life and need not be evil. (…) Invited to 
 conceptualize or model generally practiced social strategies of deception, they, 
 too, might eventually learn to avoid self-deception.104 
 
 Returning finally to Michael Craig-Martin’s An Oak Tree, we are 
presented with yet another condition of agency, one that is also predicated upon a 
kind of cognitive ‘trap’; here the objects that mediate (the artist’s) agency are the 
glass of water, the discursive argument, and the oak tree.  It might initially seem 
absurd to include the oak tree within this equation, but in fact whether one 
considers it to be a mental construct, a discursive symbol, or a ‘real’ object, there 
is no doubt that it is crucial to the meaning of the work.  In fact none of these 
objects really takes primacy: the work is not mere philosophical speculation (for 
which the text alone would suffice), nor is it simply the offering up of an 
                                                 
104 Barbara Maria Stafford, Conjuring: How the Virtuoso Romantic learned from the Enlightened Charlatan, 
Art Journal, 52, 2 (1993), pp. 22-30 (p. 28) 
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everyday object presented ‘as art’.  The essence of the work is a moment of 
transformation, which the viewer attempts mentally to reconstruct: An Oak Tree is 
an apposite demonstration of the protean nature of Gell’s concept of the abduction 
of agency. 
 
 
Summary 
 
In this chapter I have attempted to sketch out a historical and cultural background 
of theatrical magic, particularly within the modern period, together with some of 
the possible theoretical perspectives from which the subject might be approached.  
I have also begun to tease out some of the inherent magical themes within my 
work, as well as what I perceive to be broader thematic links between art and 
magic.  Finally I have outlined the theoretical position from which the following 
chapters will orient themselves, particularly in relation to Gell’s notions of the art 
object, agency, and enchantment. 
 Originating from an engagement with these theoretical issues, and in 
tandem with conceptual and material elements of my practice, four identifiable 
key themes emerge: the performer, the moving image, the object, and the 
cognitive ‘trap’.  My practice during the past six years or so has incorporated 
these modes of working, often in combination.  Thus the object/installation works 
have contained an implicit performative component, in the way either that they 
themselves ‘perform’, or that they motivate an interactive response from the 
viewer.  Conversely, performances have operated around a specific object (as in 
Zeno’s Oak Tree, where the material object is a recreation of Craig-Martin’s 
artwork discussed above).  Similarly, video works have featured magical objects, 
or video has been incorporated into performance; text pieces have been 
performed, or have functioned as material objects.  In other words, the four key 
themes do not represent dividing lines in my practice, rather they act as pivotal 
conceptual and material nodes upon which the work is hinged, and which the 
theoretical material can be deployed productively to illuminate. 
 The following chapters, though each having a discrete and identifiable 
theme, are thus also interlinked; accordingly, certain ideas, works, or subjects will 
be re-visited and re-interpreted under the rubric of each chapter heading.  As 
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much of the work seems to hinge upon the performative in some form or other, I 
begin by looking at the liminal aspects of performance, and at the concept of the 
artist/magician as a kind of ‘border prospector’.  In chapter three I examine the 
‘magic’ of the moving image in terms of its status as (in Gell’s terms) a 
technology of enchantment, but also as an assemblage of effects and practices 
originating in the magic shows of the 19th century.  Chapter four is concerned 
with an interpretation of Gell’s concept of the cognitive trap, in so far as it relates 
to my text-based works and, more generally, to an idea of extended cognition; this 
is an attempt to make a more salient link between Gell’s theory and certain recent 
developments in neuroscience.  Finally, chapter five examines the status of the art 
object in relation to its capacity to motivate the abduction of agency, drawing 
upon Gell’s notion of object agency, but also upon an attention to things whereby 
meaning is seen as embedded within them, rather than as something separate from 
them that requires to be decoded. 
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Do not trust those who analyze magic.  They are usually magicians in search of revenge. 
Bruno Latour105 
 
 
Chapter Two 
The Shuffling Gait of a Fit Man: Performance as wilful ambiguity and 
deception106 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
In The Prestige, his novel about two feuding 19th century stage illusionists, 
author Christopher Priest reveals one of the secrets of the Chinese magician Ching 
Ling Foo.107  Foo, Priest writes, performed an illusion in which he produced a 
large bowl of water out from under an empty cloth; logically, the only place that 
the magician could conceal the bowl was beneath his cape, and yet at the same 
time this was clearly impossible for ‘it was obvious to everyone that Ching Ling 
Foo was physically frail, shuffling painfully through his routine’.108  In fact Foo 
had adopted the shuffling walk in order to conceal the enigma—that the bowl was 
indeed concealed beneath his cape, and that the magician himself was a man of 
great physical strength and fitness.  He was therefore condemned always to walk 
in this fashion, performing or otherwise, solely in order to maintain the deception 
necessary to execute the trick.  In the novel Priest’s chief protagonist uses this 
story as a kind of clue to his own authorial deception, which, even in the writing 
of his memoir, ‘controls what I may write and what I may not.’109   
 In this chapter I examine the concept of the performer as a kind of border 
prospector, and I suggest that the sort of counter-intuitive inversion of reality 
represented by Ching Ling Foo’s ‘shuffling gait’ underpins the perverse logics of 
both magic and art, and is emblematic of the ways in which they often conceal 
                                                 
105 Bruno Latour, The Pasteurization of France, (Cambridge, Mass.; London: Harvard University Press, 
1988), p. 212 
106 Christopher Priest, The Prestige, St. Martin's Press, 1996). (‘The shuffling walk of a fit man.’ p. 36.) 
107 Ibid, p. 36. 
108 Ibid, p. 36  
109 Ibid, p. 36. 
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and reveal meaning.  I will employ ideas about play, in particular Alfred Gell’s 
suggestion that play orients the agent towards a ‘magic standard’, and Victor 
Turner’s conception of the ‘liminoid’—a ludic zone or in-between state, which 
permeates not just art, but everyday life. 
 
 
Ludicrous instruction: entertaining art and magic. 
 
In From Ritual to Theatre, the anthropologist Victor Turner explores the role of 
play in modern and pre-modern societies.110  In the book’s final chapter (Acting in 
Everyday Life and Everyday Life in Acting) he argues that acting is both ‘work 
and play, solemn and ludic, pretence and earnest’, that it is, in short, inherently 
ambiguous.111  Turner’s thesis draws a distinction between ritual and theatre, in 
that ritual does not differentiate between audience and performers, whereas 
(quoting Schechner) theatre ‘comes into existence when a separation occurs 
between audience and performers’.112  However, the performative is a position 
that enters into everyday life and, according to Turner, produces the ‘persona’ of 
pre-industrial societies (ritualistic but nevertheless a part of everyday life) and the 
‘individual’ of modern societies—one who plays and is entertained.113   In fact 
entertainment is a key word here: deriving from the French entretenir, to ‘hold 
between’, it can be interpreted as ‘the making of liminality, the betwixt and 
between state’.114  This ambiguous state offers the spectator an ‘as-if’ position 
from which to respond, simultaneously suspending disbelief and holding on to 
reality.  
 Turner’s conception of an ‘as-if’ position for the spectator, provides a 
useful perspective from which to examine the performance-related component of 
my practice.  Zeno’s Oak Tree (Proposition for a Miracle) is a work that 
incorporates installation, video, text and performance, and which takes as its 
starting point an artwork from 1974 called An Oak Tree, by the British artist 
                                                 
110 Victor Witter Turner, From Ritual to Theatre: The Human Seriousness of Play, (New York: performing 
Arts Journal Publications, 1982). 
111 Ibid, p. 102. 
112Richard Schechner, From Ritual to Theatre and back, in Richard Schechner, Essays on Performance 
Theory, 1970-1976. 1st ed. edn (New York: Drama Book Specialists, 1977).p. 79, cited by Turner, From 
Ritual to Theatre, p. 112. 
113 Turner, From Ritual to Theatre, p. 115. 
114 Ibid, p.121. 
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Michael Craig-Martin.115  As I outlined in the previous chapter An Oak Tree 
comprises a tumbler of water set on a glass shelf and is accompanied by a framed 
pamphlet containing an interview in which the artist is questioned about the 
origination of his artwork.  In this exchange, Craig-Martin (who is both 
interviewer and interviewee) engages in a quasi-philosophical dialogue that 
touches on, among other things, the intention of the artist, the act of 
transformation that takes place in the creation of an artwork, and, centrally, the 
importance of belief: ‘both the power of art to construct reality and the question of 
how this belief comes into being.’116  At the same time the two-sidedness of the 
auto-interview exposes a degree of doubt on the part of the artist: he is both 
believer and sceptic, whose own ability to effect change is barely comprehended.   
  
 Q: You don’t know how you do it?   
 A: It contradicts what I feel I know about cause and effect.117 
 
In the original work Craig-Martin examined the notion of belief as an ineluctable 
essence of an artwork, articulating it as a kind of hidden component, one that is 
brought to the work, unwittingly, by the spectator. 
 
 (An Oak Tree) is really […] an exercise in trying to think about what is the 
 absolute essence of a work of art. So I came to this idea that it had really to do 
 […] with belief, both the belief on the part of the artist in the genuineness of the 
 activity that they were engaged in, but also […] the suspension of disbelief 
 which is called upon with a viewer, and everybody understands that in the 
 theatre but of course people have to do that in an art gallery too, so what I tried to 
 do with the Oak Tree was to play on the relationship between the artist, the object 
 and the viewer, and all three of them are engaged then. […] [T]he text is in […] 
 the form of an auto interview and […] there's the half of me that's the artist and 
 there's the other half that's the audience, and there's the part of me that believes it 
 and there's a part of me that's sceptical, and so all of these things are played out 
 […], and so the work has been surprisingly successful and long lasting, […] 
                                                 
115 Jonathan Gilhooly, Zeno’s Oak Tree (Proposition for a Miracle), performed at Grey Area, Brighton, 2008, 
(see appendix). 
116 Lynne Cooke, ‘The Prevarication of Meaning’, Michael Craig-Martin, Michael Craig-Martin: A 
Retrospective: 1968-1989 (London: Whitechapel Art Gallery, 1989). pp. 11-36. 
117 Ibid 
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 because people recognise in it something about what it is that happens in all 
 works of art. 118 
 
My re-creation, Zeno’s Oak Tree, is in one respect a meditation upon and homage 
to an iconic artwork by means of a comic-absurd deconstruction; I appraise Craig-
Martin’s artwork, adapting its title and materials, and adopting its processes and 
methodology.  The presence of a text (which is performed to, rather than read by, 
the audience), together with its discursive complexion, echoes the original work’s 
accompanying (written) text, which was shown as part of the work itself.  This 
dialogue is performed by means of both parts (interrogator and interrogatee) being 
played by myself, each under a respective printed sign, ‘Q’ and ‘A’, on each side 
of the stage.  The dialogue proceeds—much in the manner of its model—as a 
philosophical exchange, and unfolds beneath a replica of the original work.  
However, as it progresses, further complicating reflections upon the work’s 
relationship with its originary source are introduced, resulting in a growing 
uncertainty and instability. 
 
 Q. Could you explain what you mean? 
 A. Of course.  An Oak Tree was concerned with an epistemological distinction 
 between appearance and substance: Craig-Martin claimed to have transformed 
 his glass of water into an oak tree – hence the title.  I make no such claim. 
 Q. So your piece is not called An Oak Tree? 
 A. Certainly not – that would be impertinent: my piece is called Proposition for a 
 Miracle. 
 Q. I’m afraid you’re losing me: where precisely is the miracle? 
 A. The Miracle is yet to take place: in An Oak Tree the miracle was the 
 transformation from glass of water into an oak tree, without – and I quote – 
 ‘changing the accidents – colour, weight, feel, size – of the glass of water in any 
 way’.  In my work no such transformation has taken place; nor is there any 
 guarantee that it will. 
 
Here, the dialogue itself becomes a kind of agent of deconstruction and 
ambiguity, incorporating metaphysical speculation and everyday niceties within 
                                                 
118 Michael Craig-Martin, in conversation with John Tusa, BBC Radio 3, 2003. 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/radio3/johntusainterview/craig_transcript.shtml. 
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its scope.  In Bryan Appleyard’s introductory essay to an exhibition of Craig-
Martin’s works at Waddington Galleries in 1992, he draws attention to the tenor 
of the interview accompanying An Oak Tree:  
 
 The interview which accompanied this glass of water on a glass shelf announced 
 his conviction that this was unquestionably an oak tree and that the 
 transformation he had executed was easy—‘no effort at all. But it took me years 
 of work before I realized I could do it.’  The tone is that of Samuel Beckett in 
 conversation with Georges Duthuit or even that of Oscar Wilde.  Whatever else 
 one says about Craig-Martin, it is worth remembering how much he shares with 
 that great tradition of perverse, dandyish Irishmen.119 
 
Appleyard might also have included another ‘perverse and dandyish Irishman’, 
the writer Flann O’Brien, whose absurdist novel The Third Policeman contains 
similar, apparently philosophically pointless meditations.  In their conversation 
about a tiny manufactured spear, the character MacCruiskeen describes its point to 
the protagonist of the novel: 
 
 ‘And what is this inch that is left’ I asked.  ‘What in heaven’s name would you 
 call that?’ ‘That is the real point,’ said MacCruiskeen, ‘[…] It is so thin that 
 maybe it does not exist at all and you could spend half an hour thinking about it 
 and you could put no thought around it in the end.  The beginning part of the inch 
 is thicker than the last part and is nearly there for a fact but I don’t think it is if it 
 is my private opinion that you are anxious to enlist.’120 
 
O’Brien goes further than Craig-Martin in his exposition of logico/absurdist 
discourse—in particular his punning on words like ‘point’ and ‘end’—but the 
‘tone’ of which Appleyard speaks is unmistakably shared by Craig-Martin’s 
interlocutors as they discuss the possibility or otherwise of transformation from 
glass of water to oak tree:  
 
 Q. Haven't you simply called this glass of water an oak tree? 
 A. Absolutely not. It is not a glass of water anymore. I have changed its actual 
                                                 
119 Bryan Appleyard, catalogue essay for Michael Craig-Martin, Michael Craig-Martin: Paintings (London: 
Waddington Galleries, 1992). p. 3. 
120 Flann O'Brien, The Third Policeman (London: Folio Society, 2006), p. 71. 
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 substance. It would no longer be accurate to call it a glass of water. One could 
 call it anything one wished but that would not alter the fact that it is an oak tree.121 
 During my performance of Zeno’s Oak Tree I discuss the flaws, as I see 
them, in Craig-Martin’s dialectic, whilst taking seriously its central proposition of 
material transformation. The climax of this performance occurs with the showing 
of a video, in which the pouring of water from a glass jug into a tumbler (sited on 
a glass shelf) has been filmed and subsequently subjected to a gradual slowing-
down, using high definition digital technology.  The significance of this action 
stems from a sense of doubt, on the part of the performer, that the moment of 
transformation has been thoroughly considered by the originator of An Oak Tree 
(Craig-Martin): this uncertainty hinges upon the use, in the original text, of the 
word ‘put’ to describe the depositing of the water into the glass.  By contrast, the 
performer (myself) envisages the pouring of the water from one vessel to the other 
as necessarily constituting a process, thereby throwing into question the 
instantaneity of the transformation.  By first recording this process (I argue) and 
then gradually slowing it down, this precise instant might be illuminated and 
pinpointed, through the technological agency of film.  I intended to make both the 
text and its performance represent a convergence of ‘modes’ of dialogue and 
delivery, from the didactic (the image of a lecturer—or, more prosaically, a 
weather forecaster) and discursive, through the comic, to the absurd.122  In The 
Invention of Culture, Roy Wagner discusses the necessarily playful dimension of 
what he calls ‘interpretive culture’: he cites the example of the weather forecaster 
who not only has to predict the weather but who also precipitates it, thus 
precipitating his audience.123  But because his predictions will at some point fail 
(weather being, by definition, unpredictable) he also has to ‘be a funny man, a 
kind of weather-wit’ in order not to be taken too seriously by his audience.124  
Thus, in Zeno’s Oak Tree, I spell out the argument in stepwise fashion, thereby 
accentuating its absurdity.  At the same time of course, I am mimicking the 
rhetorical strategy of the original text, in which Michael Craig-Martin’s imaginary 
                                                 
121 Richard Cork, Michael Craig-Martin, and Enrique Juncosa, Michael Craig-Martin, (London: Thames & 
Hudson, in association with the Irish Museum of Modern Art, 2006). p. 15. 
122 The discursive nature of the text and its attempt at resolution also alludes to the conversations between 
Sherlock Holmes and his confidante Dr. Watson, in their attempts to solve crime through deduction from 
evidence-based reasoning. 
123 Roy Wagner, The Invention of Culture. Rev. & Exp. Ed. edn (Chicago: Chicago U P, 1981), p. 69. 
124 Ibid, p. 69. 
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and sceptical interlocutor poses questions in a similar manner, as a means of 
adumbrating his intentions. 
 
 Q. There’s one [flaw] in particular that bothers me: in the accompanying text to 
 An Oak Tree, the artist’s interlocutor asks when precisely did the glass of water 
 became an oak tree: the artist replies, ‘when I put the water in the glass.’  My 
 issue here is with the use of the word put—one cannot really put water into a 
 glass, one would have to pour it.  It seems to me therefore that the artist has 
 glossed over a crucial dimension of the transformation—that of time.  You see, if 
 the artist could effect this transformation immediately (and he assures us that 
 there is no process involved) then surely it would take place as soon as the water  
 makes contact with the glass, in which case, why did he elect to fill the glass 
 almost to the top?                                    
 A. I wanted to film the water being poured into the glass, and then to slow it 
 down to discover whether the exact moment of transformation could be 
 determined, and if so, where precisely it takes place. 
 Q. And has it worked? 
 A. Not yet. You see I have slowed the film down exponentially (if that’s not a 
 contradiction in terms), so it’s taking longer and longer for the glass to fill up – it 
 may never do so.125 
The text here therefore embodies a semi-serious deconstruction of Craig-Martin’s 
original artwork in an attempt to understand an aspect of its make up which, 
originally, was not intended to be taken entirely seriously.  Because of the 
ambiguous nature of this text, the audience is uncertain how to respond: the text’s 
central thesis is surely not to be taken in earnest, particularly as it seems to be 
peppered with jokes—wordplay, banter, and deliberate mistakes—and yet the 
central image of the glass slowly being filled with water from the jug, induces a 
genuine sense of tension that somehow articulates this central message.  This 
video, whose stated (and notionally absurd) claim is to determine the exact 
moment of transformation, thereby becomes magically imbued with the potential 
of actual revelation. 
                                                 
125 Jonathan Gilhooly, Zeno’s Oak Tree (see appendix). 
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 However, there is more than the discursive and absurdist aspects of the 
piece that need to be considered here: importantly, although Zeno’s Oak Tree is 
constructed around a text, it is a text that is spoken and performed, and it is the 
performative element of the piece that, I believe, gives it meaning.  In Alfred 
Gell’s 1988 essay Technology and Magic, he describes magic as an ‘adjunct to 
technical procedures [that] serves symbolic ends, that is to say, cognitive ones’.126  
He continues: 
 
 Magic consists of a symbolic commentary on technical strategies in production, 
 reproduction, and psychological manipulation.  I suggest that magic derives from 
 play.  When children play they provide a continuous stream of commentary on 
 their own behaviour.  Not only does the basic format of children’s play-
 commentary […] irresistibly recall the format of spells, but the relation between 
 reality and commentary in play and in magic-making remain essentially akin.127 
 
This understanding of magic as deriving from playful commentary, and in 
particular that of children, needs some elaboration.  Perhaps by virtue of the fact 
that they have aggregated fewer experiences that contradict a sense of magical 
potential, children are able to hold apparently contradictory states in tandem with 
one another.  Richard Schechner, defines performance itself as ‘ritualized 
behaviour conditioned/permeated by play’, and emphasizes the capacity for play 
to oscillate between different states: ‘Playing creates its own multiple realities 
with porous boundaries.  Playing is full of creative world-making as well as lying, 
illusion, and defeat.’128  Children’s play can be particularly labile, ‘laughing one 
minute, crying the next, angry the next’.129  Gell’s point about magic deriving 
from a kind of playful running commentary, and serving cognitive ends, is a 
theme that he later develops in Art and Agency.  His concept of ‘abduction’ of 
agency draws upon the cognitive principle that a ‘powerful interest in and 
capacity for the abduction of agency is built into the human mind’.130  In Zeno’s 
Oak Tree, the element of psychological and rhetorical manipulation (of an 
audience), and the ‘magic’ commentary are effectively one and the same.  In other 
                                                 
126 Gell, 'Technology and Magic', p. 7. 
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words, the cognitive captivation that is the aim of the performance is embedded 
within and shades into the commentary (the text) that is its formal content.  At 
certain points the commentary itself is recursively commented upon, as when the 
questioner incorrectly identifies a thematic link with ‘Heidegger’s [sic] cat’, or 
when attention is drawn to the contrived nature of two actors being played by the 
same performer: 
 
 Q. Isn’t this all a bit didactic though? 
 
 A. Well if it is then it must be auto-didactic, because I doubt if anyone is really 
 falling for this rhetorical device of an interrogative dialogue in which we are 
 currently engaged – particularly here in Grey Area: I mean it might look 
 convincing on the printed page, but in here everyone can see that there is only 
 one person involved. 
 
 Q. Although you could of course be acting the part of two different people – the 
 interrogator and his interrogatee.131  
 
Here, the dialogue turns reflexively upon itself, becoming its own running 
commentary, and exposing a liminal area of uncertainty between performance and 
reality.  The audience therefore become aware of, not just the performance, but of 
the playing out of this performance in a present within which they too exist.  
Victor Turner uses the term liminoid to describe the spaces for ludic play that are 
opened up in post-industrial societies.132  Liminoid connotes a more knowing 
form of play whose emphasis is on ‘individuality and open-ended processes, they 
[liminoid phenomena] are seen to occur within leisure settings apart from work, 
are experimental and exploratory, plural and fragmentary, developing along the 
margins of society, forming social critique and providing the potential for the 
subversion of the status quo.’133  The type of art generally referred to as 
performance art has, since the 1960s, situated itself within this liminoid zone by 
rejecting both the narrative conventions of theatre and its ‘attempted evocation of 
                                                 
131 Jonathan Gilhooly, Zeno’s Oak Tree (see appendix). 
132 Turner, From Ritual to Theatre, pp. 32-33. 
133 Graham St. John, Alternative Cultural Heterotopia: ConFest as Australia's Marginal Centre (Unpublished 
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another, “absent” reality through mimesis’.134  Richard Schechner has commented 
on the ways in which performance and performance theory have been transformed 
in the postmodern era: ‘Recognising, analysing, and theorising the convergence 
and collapse of clearly demarcated realities, hierarchies, and categories is at the 
heart of postmodernism.’135  Describing the work of avant-garde theatre pioneer 
Richard Foreman, Marvin Carlson describes how he sought to ‘call attention to 
the audience’s moment-by-moment existence in the theatre, to seeing what is 
there, to seeing themselves seeing, and thus aiming to “ground us in what-it-is-to 
be-living”’.136  Audiences are ‘thereby made acutely aware of their process of 
reception.  The works are about the “making of art”’.137 We are returned once 
more to Crary’s model of a modernized spectator, able to make nuanced 
distinctions in response to particular types of performance.  In Dramaturgy of the 
Spectator Marco de Marinis considers a typology of performance ranging from 
‘open’ to ‘closed’, according to which a certain type of spectator might be elicited 
or anticipated.  Open performances (to which category most performance art 
could be said to belong) are able to address themselves to a recipient who is 
‘neither too precise, nor too clearly defined in terms of their encyclopaedic, 
intertextual, or ideological competence.’138 
  
 
The magician as border prospector 
 
In Performing Dark Arts Michael Mangan puts forward the case for the magician 
as someone who is ‘constantly engaged in boundary work: […] he brings us up 
against the limits of a culture’s beliefs and knowledge of its habitual ways of 
understanding the world’.139  For Mangan then, the magician is a border 
prospector par excellence, trading on contemporary beliefs or superstitions in 
order to test or subvert them.  In a chapter entitled On the Boundaries of the 
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Human, he explores magic’s questioning of enlightenment belief in the primacy 
of man’s status as ‘rational animal’, separate from and superior to the beasts. 
Many late 18th and early 19th century magicians gleefully used this as an 
opportunity to undermine the authority of the distinction itself by exhibiting a 
variety of intelligent animals, one such being William Pinchbeck’s ‘Pig of 
Knowledge’, which could spell out words by indicating, or moving, cards 
arranged on the floor.  Pinchbeck later wrote an exposé of his own method for 
training the animal, in the form of a series of correspondences between himself 
and a fictional inquisitor.  These dialogues uncannily recall the interchange at the 
heart of An Oak Tree:  
  
 Wherever I stop on my tour I am sure to hear of the fame of your celebrated Pig, 
 and the many different opinions prevailing relative to the mode of his tuition, 
 makes him a subject of general speculation.  Some contend it is witchcraft; and 
 others, like the ancient Pythagoreans, believing in the transmigration of souls 
 conclude that the spirit of the grunting philosopher might once have animated a 
 man.140   
 
 Mangan examines a different kind of boundary work in a chapter entitled 
Acting and not-acting.  He discusses the role of the French 19th century magician 
and clockmaker, Jean Eugène Robert-Houdin, who famously transformed the 
status of the stage magician when he declared: ‘A conjuror […] is an actor playing 
the part of a magician.’141  It was Robert-Houdin who was largely responsible for 
transforming the persona of the magician, moving away from the traditional 
wizard-like associations of street performers and towards the more urbane image 
of the high-class gentleman.  Mangan extrapolates the position of Robert-Houdin 
towards a more complex definition of acting; he quotes from the performance 
theorist Marvin Carlson who argued that, while performing, the performer ‘is not 
herself (because of the operations of illusion), but she is also not not herself 
(because of the operations of reality).  Performer and audience alike operate in a 
world of double consciousness’.142  A modern popular performer who best 
exemplified the colonisation of this hybrid form was the comic/magician Tommy 
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Cooper; uniquely, Tommy Cooper was both comic and magician, the two 
practices eliding uneasily and often anarchically with one another.  In his 2004 
essay Last Laughs, Adrian Heathfield describes the enduring appeal and intrinsic 
strangeness of Cooper’s act: 
 
 His work displayed an unusual formal hybridity, and in the space of this interplay 
 and fusion he found a brand of liminal performance which shares a surprisingly 
 large range of aesthetic tactics with 1980s and 1990s British and American 
 experimental theatre and live art.  The correlation is more than formal.  His most 
 enduring themes were the frayed edge between appearance and disappearance, 
 the visible and the invisible, illusion and reality, the sensory life of objects and 
 subject-object relations, the play of indeterminacy in meaning, and most 
 significantly the collapse of identity. 143 
 
For Heathfield, Cooper’s act was characterized by a fascination with ‘the comic 
possibilities of temporal disjunction and disorder’.144  His performances were 
peppered with disruptions: from unseen off-stage ‘producers’, by his own meta-
commentaries on the success or otherwise of his act, by his mistimed laughter, 
and by the frequently half-abandoned tricks.  He played within ‘that complex 
space between the intended and the unintended mistake’.145 
 This hybrid notion of the actor/performer can be expanded from art and 
magic, to the role of the lecturer/pedagogue, who simultaneously delivers and 
withholds information. For the lecturer, the role is, at least in part, a performative 
one, and is framed as much by what is left out as by what is included.  In his 
introduction to The Art of Anthropology: essays and diagrams, Alfred Gell 
discusses the role of the seminar in University culture, and his attempts to deliver 
papers that were inherently performative, rather than written: ‘scripts to be 
performed’ in which ‘the skilled dialecticion […] exploits the opportunity 
afforded by hostile questioning to produce additional extemporized displays of 
wit, turning the questions back on the questioners and making fun of their 
positions.’146  So the seminar is inherently social, ‘a game, an exchange’ full of 
wit, humour and the ‘cut and thrust of debate’; it is in itself a form of witty 
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play.147  In fact, in an earlier draft introduction to the volume, Gell explicitly 
declares his attraction to the ‘anthropological muse’ of comedy, citing 
Malinowski’s ‘comic’ style as a foil to the faux-seriousness of anthropology as an 
academic discipline; comedy and humour have the ability to induce an empathetic 
response on the part of the listener or reader. 148  Gell asserts, rather provocatively, 
that the prose style of Bronislaw Malinowski—the ‘father’ of modern 
anthropology—is inflected with a comic tone, that we are being asked, as readers, 
to be amused by his anthropological subjects (the Trobrianders): ‘Malinowski’s 
themes are the social comedy of “exchange” and the intellectual comedy of 
“magic”, contained within the broader comic frame of the expatriate polyglot Pole 
versus the rooted, self-assured, Trobrianders.’149   
 The lecture format is one that has been productively employed by 
contemporary artists, as a means of re-situating and re-activating the medium of 
performance.  Mark Leckey’s Turner prize-winning work, Cinema-in-the-Round, 
consists of video documentation of a quasi-lecture delivered at various institutions 
(including Tate Britain) between 2006 and 2008, and incorporating speech and 
movie clips, as well as oblique references to Disney characters and to the work of 
other artists, including Marcel Duchamp and Philip Guston.150  The Disney 
reference is particularly telling, with Leckey citing the multiplane camera—a 
device for producing three-dimensional effects from two-dimensional images—as 
(pace Gell) representing a ‘technology of enchantment’.151  However, it is 
Leckey’s delivery of these ‘lectures’ that is most disconcerting: he employs a 
speech style that can only be described as informal oratory, forgoing the more 
authoritative enunciation of a ‘conventional’ speaker (the received pronunciation 
common to most ‘voice-overs’) in favour of his own, distinctive South Wirral 
accent.  The work leaves the viewer speculating as to the status of the artist’s 
performance: Leckey is a lecturer himself, but his delivery seems almost 
perversely pedestrian and self-conscious, as if highlighting the inherent fragility 
of his chosen medium. 
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 The artist Martin Creed has also explored what Carlson calls this ‘double 
consciousness’ between performer and audience, but within the conventional 
setting of the interview.152  In a discussion with Pablo Helguera, Creed 
consciously traverses a liminal zone by ostensibly responding to questions by the 
interviewer and members of the MoMA audience, whilst subtly and almost 
imperceptibly transforming the event into a kind of performance.153  This is a 
reflexive act however, in which the performer is acting out his awareness of his 
own performativity.  Creed’s faltering, semi-improvisatory and deadpan 
delivery—the stumbling utterances of an articulate man—gradually causes the 
audience to lose their sense of orientation in relation to the event, resulting in 
some bewildered responses.  The outcome is disorientating and occasionally very 
funny (the segment in which they—Creed and Helguera—debate whether they 
should stand or sit for the interview verges on (aural) slapstick).  Later, when 
opened to audience questions, one particularly exasperated contributor accuses 
Creed of a lack of sophistication in his ‘literal’ thought-processes, asking: ‘was 
there ever a point that you had to de-intellectualize yourself to be like this?’ to 
which Creed replies, ‘all you’re hearing are my words, not my thoughts.’  Creed 
creates a liminal (or liminoid) space within the conventional framework of the 
interview, one that projects his own persona (as indecisive, semi-articulate artist) 
but displays an awareness of that persona, possibly exaggerating it at the same 
time.  In a more recent interview for Art Monthly, Creed himself reflected on this 
process: 
 
 MC: Over the years, as I was doing more and more of these [slide] talks, I 
 realized that the slides were a kind of escape route for me, a way of actually 
 avoiding talking about something, away from a dialogue.  So I started doing talks 
 without slides and I decided that the best way of talking about making work was 
 to try and make a work in front of people, using words. 
  
 DT: Like a piece of performance? 
  
                                                 
152 Carlson, Performance, p. 5 
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 MC: Aye, but I was just talking about my work without slides – I was trying to 
 make a work using words.  I would improvise, there would be questions and 
 often it would just end up as a bit of a conversation, but it was to try to take away 
 some of the conventions in order to make it more of a direct experience.154  
 
Creed’s ‘act’ subverts the conventions of the artist-interview: instead of making 
analysis the object of the exchange—as a means of arriving at a putatively 
objective understanding of his artwork—he foregrounds the dialogue itself, thus 
exposing (through enaction) its innate mechanistic tenuousness.  Creed’s border 
prospecting is therefore, between interview and performance, between the passive 
and the active, and between acting and ‘not-acting’. 
 Michael Mangan also considers the conventions of the interview as 
platform for performance.  He describes the position of Uri Geller who achieved 
notoriety in the 1970s as a self-styled psychic; Geller was able to use television—
a still (relatively) new medium—and the chat show format (a still-accepted form 
of ‘reality’ entertainment), as a stage for his displays of ‘supernatural’ power.  
The notion that interviews with celebrities simultaneously reinforce and deny the 
‘falseness of celebrity’ through a form of ‘contrived intimacy’, is now a 
commonplace in the era of Big Brother and other similar reality shows.155  At the 
time of Geller’s appearances however the lines (between honesty and 
dissemblance) were less clearly drawn, and he was able to use the format as a re-
framing device, ‘in effect, an extremely effective form of misdirection in itself.’  
As Mangan explains: ‘Geller was implicitly saying – “This is not showbiz; this is 
me.  I’m really doing this.  Look, come closer, bring the camera in as close as you 
like.  This is reality.”’156  Both Geller’s and Creed’s ‘performances’ elicit an 
uneasy and ambivalent response from the viewer/listener, whereby the borders of 
the interview frame are suddenly made fluid and permeable. 
 In similar spirit, another of my own performances, Hat, begins with a 
formal introduction during which the audience are informed about the content of 
the piece.157  This exposition trails off as I apparently become increasingly 
distracted by a top hat sitting on a nearby table.  Thus, very quickly, the dividing 
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line between formal introduction and actual performance is blurred, the one 
morphing imperceptibly into the other.  Hat is a free association of tropes and 
gestures associated with magic performance, and employed without recourse to 
narrative, resolution or, for the most part, the pay-off of a conventional magical 
effect.  The intention here is to stall what might be considered orthodox 
expectations—the bracketing of the act and its resolution in the form of some sort 
of climax—in favour of an emphasis on ‘presence’. 
 
 
Magic stories: transformations and transitions 
 
The articulation of a liminal zone implies some kind of transition, between one 
state and another, or between different interpretations of a performance, for which 
an object can become a mediating agent—as was the case with the glass of water 
in Zeno’s Oak Tree.  Prestidigitales is a short collection of twelve pithy anecdotal 
tales that I produced specifically for performance; the central premise for each is 
that an object should take on magical significance in the mind of the listener.158  
Read out to an audience, the provenance and authenticity of these stories is 
uncertain, particularly as some of them are clearly a pretext for a comic punchline.  
Furthermore, actual objects—matchbox, magnifying glass, playing card—feature 
as part of the narrative.  The first of these aphoristic tales features the early 20th 
century magician Max Malini and his legendary ability to predict any card at 
random, in any situation.  The punchline to the story is to give away its secret: 
that Malini’s identification of a playing card found on the street, was due to his 
having placed it there the previous evening.  The effectiveness of this yarn stems 
in part from its uncertainty, in that it is exactly the sort of anecdote one might 
expect to hear about a magician in a secular age, and one that has possibly been 
subject to embellishments or apocrypha.  It falls therefore within the realm of the 
story related at the beginning of this chapter, about Ching Ling Foo and his 
‘shuffling gait.’  One of the purposes of these stories seems to be a disenchanting 
one: it endows its protagonists not with unnatural powers but with the will and 
cunning to deceive.  These magicians are con-men, or at the very least, they prey 
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upon the gullibility of their victims.  However, the performance of the stories has 
an enchanting purpose, as it opens up a liminoid space, incorporating real magic 
effects within the presentation.  The stories I include also represent artists such as 
Marcel Duchamp (whose agency is extended via a maverick trickster, Pinoncelli, 
who attempts to deface or destroy Duchamp’s works), and Piero Manzoni, whose 
Socle du Monde sculpture transforms the entire world into a work of art.  Another 
tale pivots around a magnifying glass belonging to the writer Sir Arthur Conan 
Doyle.  Used in one context to ascertain photographic evidence for the existence 
of fairies, and in another by his (fictional) character Sherlock Holmes in aiding 
the deductive solution of crimes, it thus takes on a dual function as both magical 
lens and scientific instrument.  These stories are predicated on a passage in Simon 
During’s Modern Enchantments, in which he discusses ‘fictive illusions’; During 
suggests that, once magic’s role as cultural agent is understood, ‘our sensitivity to 
the play of puzzlement, fictiveness, and contingency in modernity will be 
heightened.’159  
 A different kind of transitional space is occupied by the French artist Yves 
Klein, who also maintained an acute balance between acting and not-acting.  His 
photo-performance work Leap into the Void captured the artist apparently in mid-
flight, leaping from a second storey window.  The photograph provided a kind of 
evidential document, appearing in a one-day, self-published newspaper—
Dimanche—and featuring a caption: 
  
 Today the painter of space must, in fact, go into space to paint, but he must go 
 there without trickery or deception, and not in an airplane, nor by parachute, nor 
 in a rocket: he must go there on his own strength, using an autonomous, 
 individual force; in short, he must be capable of levitation.160 
 
Klein’s stated claim, that his training as a judo expert had taught him how to fall 
without injuring himself, was a ruse: the photograph was faked, a clever piece of 
image manipulation.  Klein was commenting on the precarious role of the artist—
particularly in the uncertain years of the post-war period—but his was no 
armchair commentary: Klein played the role of artist as mystic/charlatan, 
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operating within a self-publicized ‘magic’ space—a space that is ‘both nowhere 
and everywhere.’  Olivier Berggruen articulates this as a tension within Klein’s 
work, that of the ‘contradictory impulse between the preservation of the ritual, 
which links the artist to a society in which he fulfills a role that is not unlike that 
of the shaman, and the dissolution of all worldly relations into the void’.161  
Klein’s leap is therefore a leap into another dimension, which the image both 
depicts and enacts; it is, in the phrase used by Martin Holbraad, an ‘ontological 
leap’ from presence to absence.162  The liminal status of Klein’s performative  
self—between ego and the void—is articulated within the photographic image, 
whose epistemic truth-status can, however, only be sustained through 
contamination.  The photograph, as index of this transitional act, is ‘doctored’ so 
that the ‘purity’ of the act can be maintained.  Leap into the Void therefore 
represents a failure, albeit a failure masquerading as ecstatic triumph.  A similar 
photographic model of failure is represented by Bruce Nauman’s photograph 
Failing to Levitate in the Studio, in which the artist is depicted in a double 
exposure image: one exposure shows him lying horizontal, supported by two 
chairs, while the other shows his slumped body after one of the chairs has been 
removed.163  The work originates from a period when Nauman was examining the 
mythic and stereotyped image of the artist-in-his-studio, and reinterpreting it as 
performance.  Prospecting and exposing the border between the physical space of 
the studio, and the mental space of the creative process, Nauman was forced to 
include the failures, as well as the successes, of his studio-based experiments.  
 
 
Summary 
 
The examples discussed in this chapter represent attempts to map out an area of 
performance that is situated between, and that overlaps with, a number of discrete 
performative disciplines: the lecture, the art performance, the interview, the slide 
show—all are alluded to by these artists/performers.  At the same time the 
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constructedness and conventional nature of the boundaries that divide them is 
exposed.  Although I have focused on Victor Turner’s concept of the liminoid, as 
a means of examining and interpreting a particular aspect of performance, this 
analysis can be seen to converge with the ideas of Alfred Gell in Art and Agency.  
First of all Gell prioritizes the performative in a number of ways, not least that the 
art object can be seen as an index of agency within a network of relations—a 
highly action-centered approach.  More specifically, Gell also views the artwork 
(or index) as a ‘congealed residue of performance and agency in object-form, 
through which access to other persons can be attained, and via which their agency 
can be communicated.’164  The idea of the performer (whether artist or magician) 
as a border prospector, operating in a liminal zone, can be viewed through the lens 
of Gell’s theory, whereby meaning can be abducted via the performer’s 
transformative act; the spectator is brought up close to this ‘betwixt and between’ 
space, also recognizing it as one that exists in everyday life situations. 
 In my video/performance piece Never Odd or Even, a performer interacts 
with his filmed double in a sequence of tableaux that range from formal spatial 
organisations of blocks of colour, through illusionistic tricks, to out-and-out 
slapstick.165  Several liminal zones are represented in this work: the performance 
embodies a bringing together of the filmed element with the live in such a way 
that an audience will believe that some kind of genuine interaction is taking place, 
whilst being simultaneously aware that this cannot be the case and that the filmed 
part must have been created and choreographed with the live component in mind.  
In addition to creating the illusion of a single time zone—a continuous ‘present’ 
from a real present and a recorded past—the performance portrays, or appears to 
portray, a single space, i.e. the screen against which the action unfolds.  There is, 
however, a notional line that dissects the screen vertically, and which marks out 
the spaces—real and filmic—within which the respective protagonists are 
confined.  Here, the liminal zone is specifically an imaginary space between the 
filmed and the real, situated in the planar centre of the projected image itself.  
Here also, the performative converges with the filmic—a normative disposition in 
the early, pre-picturehouse days of cinema, when the act of showing a film was 
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often seen as a kind of performance in its own right.  These ‘monstrations’ were 
regularly given in the context of a diverse range of popular entertainment forms, 
including the magic show; it is to the magical aspects of the moving image that I 
turn in the next chapter.166 
 
 
 
Fig. 7.  Yves Klein, Leap into the Void (Early version, 1960). 
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I see what is not and I see this unreal thing exactly (Jean Epstein)167 
 
Chapter 3 
‘An orchid in the land of technology’: the magic in and of the moving image168 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 8.  Jonathan Gilhooly, Balloon Head (2006). 
 
Introduction 
 
In my short video Balloon Head, a man’s head and shoulders are seen, shot 
against a black background, inflating a white balloon with a face (his own) drawn 
onto it.169  As the balloon becomes larger it gradually obscures the figure’s head 
so that the drawn face is now substituted for his own.  The balloon continues to 
                                                 
167 Rachel O. Moore, Savage Theory: Cinema as Modern Magic (Durham: Duke University Press, 2000), 
p.84. 
168 Walter Benjamin, The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction (XI), in Walter Benjamin, 
Hannah Arendt, and Harry Zohn, Illuminations. Edited and with an Introduction by Hannah Arendt. 
Translated by Harry ZohnLondon: Fontana, 1973), pp. 211-244, (p. 226). 
169 Balloon Head (Homage to Meliés), shown at Portsmouth Film Festival, 2006, (see appendix). 
  
70 
expand until it fills the frame and finally bursts, leaving (for a split second, before 
fading to black) a black space where the head should be.  Although the original 
impetus for the piece was an externally imposed time restriction of sixty seconds, 
the inspiration is Georges Meliés’ 1901 film The Man with the Rubber Head, in 
which first Meliés himself, and then his clown accomplice, inflate a duplicate of 
the filmmaker’s own head, until it and the accompanying apparatus explode.170  In 
The Man with the Rubber Head Meliés superimposed the image of his own head 
onto the already exposed film and, through a careful combination of masking, and 
dollying of the camera (to create the illusion of expansion), created the effect of 
an inflating head.  Although comedic in spirit, Meliés film also hints at the 
violence and mutilation that runs through much early cinema, and which had 
become a staple of the 19th century magic show.171  In Balloon Head and other of 
my video works, I wanted to explore ideas around the double, occlusion, and 
displacement.  Unlike Meliés’, my film is a single-shot piece, the frame-filling 
balloon obscuring momentarily the behind-the-scenes business of (with assisted 
help) covering the head with a black cloth to match the background. The slow 
build-up represented by the balloon’s inflation is contrasted with its sudden 
bursting, and the quick fade-out of the image; the film is looped to repeat almost 
immediately, so mirroring the inhaling and exhaling of breath.  
 In A Crumpled Ball of Paper Floating on the Breath of the Artist the 
viewer is presented with the image of a floating ball of paper (apparently kept 
aloft via the continuous blowing by a recumbent figure) while being 
simultaneously invited to discover the means by which the illusion has been 
produced.172  This is the pre-condition of much special effects in mainstream 
cinema, where the spectator views scenes he knows are impossible but which are 
presented with a seamless degree of photographic and cinematic realism.  Dan 
North opens his book Performing Illusions with the example of the closing scene 
of Peter Jackson’s 2005 remake of King Kong, in which the computer-generated 
eponymous anti-hero appears with the ‘real’ female star at the top of the Empire 
State building.173 
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 Even as the shot asks us to accept that the two figures share the same narrative 
 space, and thus that their spatial proximity can convey an empathetic bond, at 
 another level we are invited to marvel at a complex technical achievement, and 
 challenged to locate discrepancies in the illusion.174 
 
In similar spirit, Angela Ndalianis, in her essay The Frenzy of the Visible, 
describes the effect upon the spectator of the fight scenes in The Matrix, 
comparing them with contemporary theme park rides. 
 
 The Matrix epitomises contemporary effects cinema’s tendency towards 
 enveloping the spectator in pure, unadulterated spectacle.  […] [T]his spectacle 
 of motion finds its closest parallel in the similar sensations to be experienced on 
 funrides that simulate movement and dupe us into momentarily […] losing 
 ourselves in spaces that present themselves as temptingly lying somewhere 
 beyond our reality. […] Both examples share a concern for the haptic and 
 kinaesthetic, a concern which has increased recently as media such as film, 
 digital technology and amusement park attractions converge and share common 
 concerns centred around the speed of the image.175 
 
These two perspectives on the role of the spectator—one a desire for submersion, 
the other a curiosity for technical explication—are intertwined with one another, 
and are fundamental to our experience of the medium of film.  They are 
underpinned by a third component, the tendency for the astonishment at the 
technologically new to ‘fall off’ into inurement or habituation.  This then begs the 
question of how these hidden or submerged aspects of the filmic experience might 
be exposed, at the same time reigniting the sense of ‘wonder’ that once 
accompanied them. 
 In this chapter I approach the subject of the moving image as a category of 
‘enchanted’, or magical technology, by drawing upon Alfred Gell’s writings on 
captivation—what the author describes as a ‘primordial kind of artistic agency’, 
one which exerts some kind of power over the spectator by virtue of his (the 
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spectator) ‘inability mentally to rehearse’ its origination.176  I also refer to Rachel 
O. Moore’s complementary proposition in Savage Theory: Cinema as Modern 
Magic, that the ‘Hollywood banality that films are magic, or “our magic”, […] 
stands here as a serious theoretical proposition’.177  Paralleling Tom Gunning’s 
notion of (early) cinema as an ‘aesthetic of astonishment’, I intend to explore this 
primal definition of the phenomenon of moving image technology.178 As well as 
examining formal and stylistic particularities of early film (what he has called a 
‘cinema of attractions’), Gunning has considered the cultural history of 
technologies from the point of view of their ‘move from dazzling appearance to 
nearly transparent utility, from the spectacular and astonishing to the convenient 
and unremarkable’, and the ways in which this might expose certain myths about 
modernity.179  However, the particular interpretation of enchantment that I wish to 
explore needs to be predicated upon a model that is antinomial in nature, allowing 
for a knowing suspension of disbelief whose origins lie within the tradition of the 
magic show, in its myriad guises.180  It also needs to give critical credence to a 
particular form of response to the cinematic experience: that, as William Paul has 
commented, ‘like play, art may well be an end in itself’ and that cinema allows us 
to ‘get lost in play … (and) … in the rush of immediate experience’.181  In similar 
spirit, when describing the phenomenon of the phantasmagoria, Tom Gunning has 
suggested: ‘it plays with its audience causing sensations that resolve themselves 
into both fear and laughter.’  These assessments alert us to the sensual and 
spectacular attributes of the cinematic experience, attributes that are often 
implicitly denigrated or marginalized by modern film theory, but which 
undeniably constitute a central thread throughout the history of film.  They invite 
a broader interpretative approach to the medium, and incorporate ‘elements that 
involve a more rudimentary sense of play and interaction’.182  The essence of this 
                                                 
176 Gell, Art and Agency, p.69, p.71. 
177 Moore, Savage Theory, p. 2. 
178 Tom Gunning, An Aesthetic of Astonishment: Early Film and the (In)credulous Spectator, in Linda 
Williams, Viewing Positions: Ways of Seeing Film, Rutgers Depth of Field Series (New Brunswick, N.J. ; 
[Great Britain]: Rutgers University Press, 1995), pp. 114-33. 
179 Tom Gunning, Re-newing Old Technologies: Astonishment, Second nature, and the Uncanny in 
Technology from the Previous Turn-of-the-Century, David Ph D. Thorburn, Henry Jenkins, and Brad Seawell, 
Rethinking Media Change: The Aesthetics of Transition, Media in Transition (Cambridge, Mass. ; London: 
MIT Press, 2003), pp. 39-59. 
180 Landy and Saler, The Re-Enchantment of the World, p. 3. 
181 William Paul, Laughing, Screaming: Modern Hollywood Horror and Comedy, Film and Culture, (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1994), cited in Angela Ndalianis The Frenzy of the Visible, p. 6. 
182Angela Ndalianis, The Frenzy of the Visible, p. 6. 
  
73 
double bind response on the part of the spectator lies, I suggest, in the gap 
between our awareness of the technological artifice of film and its overwhelming, 
enchanting effect. 
  
 
Enchanted Technologies 
 
During the ten years prior to the publication of Art and Agency, Alfred Gell wrote 
two related essays in which he examined the themes of magic and technology.  In 
the first, entitled Technology and Magic (1988), Gell sets out his definition of 
three distinct areas of technology, relating to production, reproduction, and 
enchantment.183  It is the third of these, enchantment, that he explicitly defines as 
constituting a range of psychological strategies (which include the arts) which 
humans use upon one another, as a means of securing assent or compliance: ‘The 
manipulation of desire, terror, wonder, cupidity, fantasy, vanity, an exhaustible 
list of human passions, offers an equally inexhaustible field for the expression of 
technical ingenuity’.  Gell goes on to define magic as that which ‘formalizes and 
codifies the structural features of technical activity’ and which sets ‘an ideal 
standard, not to be approached in reality, towards which practical action can 
nonetheless be oriented’.184  Later, in The Technology of Enchantment and The 
Enchantment of Technology, Gell expands on this notion of a magic standard, as 
constituting a zero cost, the ‘baseline against which the concept of work as a cost 
takes shape’.185  For Gell, art, as a technology of enchantment is not opposed to 
technology, but is ‘a technology in itself’.186 
 If, as Gell suggests, art can be considered as a ‘component of technology’, 
and if the particular technology of which art is a component is a ‘technology of 
enchantment’, then cinema can with some justification be regarded as the 
quintessential technology of enchantment.  Cinema produces a singular ‘reality-
effect’ out of a mechanized technological assemblage that, for the most part, 
remains unseen, and from which it is (seen as) separate.  Gell’s development in 
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Art and Agency of the concept of enchantment (or ‘captivation’) is based upon a 
resistance, presented by artworks, to being cognitively possessed by the viewer: 
‘the difficulty I have in mentally encompassing their coming-into-being as objects 
in the world accessible to me by a technical process which, since it transcends my 
understanding, I am forced to construe as magical.’187  Within this formula Gell 
allows other forms of resistance (other than that initiated by technical skill), 
which, in his terms, could justifiably include the phantasmagoric effect of film as 
a category of captivation, separated as it is from its agentive source; it is, or it at 
least appears to be, a technology of zero cost.   
 The concept of phantasmagoria is one I will return to shortly, but first it is 
worth drawing attention to the similarity between Gell’s concept of magic as a 
model-technology of zero cost, and Walter Benjamin’s notion of technology, 
specifically in relation to the illusory nature of film.  In his seminal 1936 essay 
The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction, Benjamin describes the 
paradoxical nature of film—that it emerges, an apparently artifice-free image, 
from a highly artificial and technologically cluttered environment: 
 
 Its illusionary nature is that of the second degree, the result of cutting.  That is to 
 say, in the studio the mechanical equipment has penetrated so deeply into reality 
 that its pure aspect freed from the foreign substance of equipment is the result of 
 a special procedure, namely, the shooting by the specially adjusted camera and 
 the mounting of the shot together with other similar ones.  The equipment-free 
 aspect of reality here has become the height of artifice; the sight of immediate 
 reality has become an orchid in the land of technology.188 
 
What Benjamin is proposing here is that film simultaneously conceals and reveals 
reality: it reveals a technologically unencumbered reality-effect, whilst concealing 
the all-too-real technologically driven means by and through which this 
appearance of reality is produced.  Benjamin already presents these two aspects of 
film in opposition and contradistinction to one another.  In the same essay, 
Benjamin also opposes film (as a new technology) to painting (as an example of 
                                                 
187 Alfred Gell, The Technology of Enchantment and The Enchantment of Technology, in Gell and Hirsch, 
The Art of Anthropology, p. 169.  
188 Benjamin, Arendt, and Zohn, Illuminations. Edited and with an Introduction by Hannah Arendt. 
Translated by Harry Zohn, p. 226. 
  
75 
an earlier, ‘auratic’ art form): for Benjamin, in earlier societies, painting was an 
‘instrument of magic’, and tied to ritual, whereas in the era of film, the 
cameraman ‘penetrates deeply into [the] web’ of reality, using a technology that is 
freed from ritual.189  Implicit in this account is a dialectical relationship between 
magic and technology; Benjamin’s technology is a technology of reproduction, 
within which film (as a post-auratic form) might have a utopian purpose—that of 
educating the masses to recognize the dissembling purpose of technology through 
its (invisible) embodiment in film.  Benjamin contrasts the role of the cameraman 
with that of the painter, using the analogy of medicine: for Benjamin the painter is 
closer to the image of the magician who heals through ‘the laying on of hands’, 
and the cameraman to that of the surgeon who ‘cuts into the patient’s body’.190  
However, Benjamin seems deeply ambivalent about the capacity for film to 
overcome its divided self; in fact there would seem to be sufficient reason for 
figuring the role of the camera(man) as magical, at least as much as that of the 
painter, once the surgical analogies have been tested.   
 In a recent essay, Bruno Latour and Antoine Hennion have argued against 
Benjamin’s account of the mechanical nature of film, as simply mistaken: ‘The 
movie camera adds another mediation to an already long chain but it does not cut 
it’, and ‘[t]echnique has always been the means of producing art; it is not a 
modern version of some prior, disembodied creativity’.191  This last point echoes 
Viva Paci’s injunction, about the importance of distinguishing between film’s 
capacity for original production, and its associated, but additional, potential for 
reproduction (or ‘multiplication’).192  Furthermore, the nature of the dichotomous 
forces that permeate Benjamin’s essay, presupposes an opposition between 
painting and film that polarizes the spectator into either the reactionary critic (of 
modern painting), or the progressive (but still critical) ‘enjoyer’ of film.  This is of 
course an inherent characteristic of Benjamin’s ‘sustained, utopian faith in the 
socially transformative potential of contemporary visual art’ but it runs the risk of 
fatally undermining his own argument, predicated as it is upon a shifting 
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definition of the ‘aura’.193  Latour and Hennion also question Benjamin’s multiply 
serviceable concept of aura, which is employed as a Janus-faced figure within his 
essay: 
  
 When Benjamin looks at the modern period, aura becomes a kind of Lost Paradise, 
 a negative foil to what he describes as the new effects of mechanically reproducing 
 works of art, and to the new seduction of the masses that has replaced the former 
 beauty of art.  But when he turns to the past, Benjamin sees the nostalgia for the 
 aura as an illusion, a relic or a residue of a cult value.194 
 
Warwick Mules has also drawn attention to the ambivalence of Benjamin’s 
concept of aura, by challenging his conception of film as a post-auratic practice:  
 [F]ar from being something rendered obsolete by new technologies, aura and 
 auratic  experience is accelerating in intensity and scope, as the phantasmagoria 
 of capitalist consumer culture becomes ever more deeply embedded in new 
 technological forms.  Aura has taken on an aspect of the real that now requires 
 renewed efforts on the part of critical theorists and creative artists alike, to 
 unpack its illusory structures and to expose its power to deflect sensory 
 experience into pseudo-presence, or false origin.195  
Although I do not wish to pursue Mules’ analysis of aura specifically in terms of 
its relation to capitalist consumer culture, his questioning of Benjamin’s faith in 
film based on its identification as a post-auratic practice, is useful.  It potentially 
divests Benjamin’s argument of some of its dichotomous components, clearing 
the way for fresh associations.  Benjamin’s aspiration for film instrumentally to 
produce a new kind of response, one in which the viewer might become alerted to 
the dissembling nature of this new medium, recalls Joshua Landy’s description 
(referred to earlier in chapter 1) of the modern magician, represented by Robert-
Houdin, as producing a new kind of spectator by reinforcing an ‘aptitude of 
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detached credulity’.196  When Benjamin describes film as serving to ‘train humans 
in those new apperceptions and reactions conditioned by their interaction with an 
apparatus whose role in their lives increases daily’, his words chime with those of 
Landy.  In fact, both James W. Cook and Simon During point to the possibility of 
narratives of enchantment and disenchantment that diverge sharply from that of 
Benjamin, by suggesting that the concept of the reflexively alert spectator might 
pre-date the latter’s arbitrarily designated ‘film-moment’.  Cook, discussing the 
artful deceptions of P.T. Barnum and other 19th century American showmen, 
employs W.J.T. Mitchell’s distinction between illusion and illusionism to explain 
how popular cultural deceits ‘routinely involved a calculating intermixing of the 
genuine and the fake, enchantment and disenchantment, energetic public exposé 
and momentary suspension of disbelief’.197  For Mitchell, illusionism constitutes 
an aesthetic realm in which illusions themselves are objects of play: ‘the self-
conscious exploitation of illusion as a cultural practice.’198  Cook makes it clear 
however, that the 19th century audiences of these spectacles were fully able to 
reflect on their own spectatorial behaviour, and in an implicit repudiation of 
Adorno’s dialectical view of modernity and enchantment (and, by extension, of 
Benjamin’s), asserts that ‘long before the late twentieth-century insights of critical 
theory and postmodernism [...] many American consumers thought about, 
discussed, and resisted the ways that they were manipulated by the culture 
industry’.199   In similar spirit Simon During contends that the growth of the 
fictional within modernity has coaxed ‘consumers of modern culture [to] learn to 
accept one set of propositions in relation to the domain of fiction, and another in 
relation to the everyday world’.200  Like Cook, During is critical of Adorno’s 
indictment of Western modernity as a ‘globalizing enchantment’, wherein 
modernity is seen as a ‘battleground between enchantment and disenchantment, 
rather than as a field which invites the subtle and supple deployment of belief’.201  
What During is arguing for here is a more flexible critique of early (and, by 
extension, later) modern film audiences—that far from being passive subjects of a 
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hypnotic effect, they were able to contend with and adapt to the fictive demands 
of the moving image: ‘to fall almost simultaneously into enchantment and 
disenchantment […] at their own leisure and pleasure, with little subjectivity—or 
political agency—engaged.’202  
 
 
Conspicuous demonstration 
 
At this point it might be useful to return the discussion to the arena of art practice, 
in relation to Tom Gunning’s notion of a kind of transition from technological 
astonishment to familiarity (a transition that much experimental artists’ film has 
sought to make visible), by referring to the writings of Martin Heidegger.203  Like 
Walter Benjamin, Heidegger was concerned with the effects of technology upon 
human ‘being’; he used the example of the tool (not necessarily a tool in the 
strictest sense of the word, but any-thing that might be ‘in use’) as a means of 
describing how it is that things in the world present themselves to us.  He used the 
expression ‘ready-to-hand’ to say how objects disappear or ‘withdraw’ into the 
work that they do, so that when tools ‘work’ we do not attend to them; it is only 
when they ‘break down’ or cease to function in the way that they normally do, 
that they suddenly become conspicuous—they become ‘unready-to-hand’.204  
Now although Heidegger’s argument is nuanced towards a question of ‘being’, 
and his attitude towards technology (at least in its modern guise) was a generally 
negative one, there is no reason why his ‘tool-being’ idea cannot be 
conceptualized as a means of gaining fresh perspectives on particular 
technologies, through the disruption of routinized engagement with them.205   
What this means in effect is that the artist might be conceived as a kind of ‘tool-
breaker’, whose interventions into technology can reveal previously unseen or 
unforeseen dynamics within the technological systems in use.  This interpretation 
can be conjoined with Mules’ gloss on Benjamin as a means of analysing a 
revealing/concealing paradigm in aspects of contemporary art practice.   
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Fig. 9.  Damien Roach, A Small Big Thing (2003). (Courtesy Sies and Hoke Gallery). 
 
 
In A Small Big Thing by Damien Roach (2003), the artist utilizes an assemblage 
of slide projector, video camera, monitor and a sheet of black card.206  The 
monitor, which is wall-mounted at head height, reveals a nocturnal snowstorm, or 
perhaps some sort of cosmological vision—points of light slowly spiralling 
against a dark void. Yet this image is self-evidently a phantasmagorical 
construction: the camera, positioned on the floor, is pointed towards the sheet of 
black card, it’s perspective interrupted by the perpendicular beam of light from 
the slide projector.  What the camera therefore relays to the monitor is the image 
of myriad specks of dust, swirling in the projected light. The lo-fi aesthetic 
employed by Roach exposes a bathetic relation between the disconnected, sublime 
effect, and its technologically quotidian components.  By reconnecting the image 
with its technological media, Roach demonstrates how the familiar can become 
unfamiliar, uncanny even, when it irrupts from its equipmental world.  This 
apparently modest work demonstrates and embodies Heidegger’s concept of the 
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tool that emerges, ‘unready-to-hand’, from its submerged being-in-use.  It also 
recalls Tom Gunning’s statement concerning technologies’ ‘move from dazzling 
appearance to nearly transparent utility’, by alluding to the way in which the 
experience of early cinema was as much about the monstration of the apparatus as 
it was about the filmic image.207  Roach’s piece not only makes no attempt to hide 
the apparatus responsible for the effect, it effectively and actively manifests it 
almost as a form of demonstration.  Ironically, even though the illusion’s 
productive means stands exposed in this piece, the surprising and fantastical 
nature of the image is not diminished, but is increased: instead of disenchantment, 
there is re-enchantment.  In this way A Small Big Thing lays bare a model of 
enchantment offered in Michael Saler’s essay: Modernity and Enchantment: 
  
 [M]any modern historians no longer subscribe to the binary and dialectical 
 approaches, finding the antinomial approach more true to the lived experience of 
 their subjects.  […] There are forms of enchantment compatible with, and even 
 dependent upon, those tenets of modernity usually seen as disenchanting the 
 world, such as rationality and self-reflexivity. Modern enchantment often 
 depends upon its antinomial other, modern disenchantment, and a specifically 
 modern enchantment might be defined as one that enchants and disenchants 
 simultaneously: one that delights but does not delude.208 
 
Saler provides a useful description of the kind of ‘disenchanted’ enchantment 
offered up in Roach’s piece: the disclosure of the technical means of production, 
the giving away of the secret, so to speak, only serves to sharpen the sensory 
immediacy of the viewer’s experience.  For Saler, without at the very least some 
residual awareness of the intrinsic artifice of film, delight in its revelation would 
not be possible. 
 In moving away then from the dialectical propositions of Benjamin’s Work 
of Art essay, perhaps it might be possible to formulate a different model for the 
speculative appraisal of early film and its audiences, one which places film within 
a network or chain of technological practices around the ‘photographic’.  In an 
essay concerning the ‘historical ontology of photographic imagery’, Peter 
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Osborne refuses a single, underlying, medium-specific basis for photography, 
instead positing a ‘relational totality of the variety of different photographic forms 
coexisting within the present’.209  For Osborne, the unity of these forms (which 
include photography, film, television, video, digital media, etc) obtains both from 
a ‘material form of the technologies’ and from ‘their predominant socio-cultural 
functions and uses’; it is distributive, in so far as it spreads beyond the boundaries 
of individual images or ‘works’, on account of its inherent reproducibility.210  
Osborne’s photographic ontology is reminiscent of Latour’s response to 
Benjamin, in that Latour, through his concept of Actor-Network-Theory, also 
refuses ontological primacy to either material or concepts, insisting instead upon 
the unity of these components, through an extended and performative network of 
relations.211  This in turn echoes Gell’s ideas about the (art) index constituting a 
nexus of relations, within and throughout which both material (technologies) and 
concepts (mind) are distributed.  But perhaps even Osborne’s notion of 
distributive unity might be unnecessarily delimited by ‘technically produced 
indexical images’ together with those (digital) images in which ‘such indexical 
effects are simulated in various ways’, and whose ‘predominant socio-cultural 
functions and uses [are predicated upon] epistemically privileged representations 
of the real’.  As Laurent Mannoni usefully points out in his account of film as a 
multifaceted agglomeration of optical technologies, the graphical method of 
fixing the ‘real’ (whether image or movement) was itself subject to a disparate 
chain of inscribing systems, before resolving in favour of one that possessed 
inherent stability—that of the ray of light.212  With this in mind, Osborne’s ‘chain’ 
of distributive unity can surely be extended to include those earlier technologies 
such as the phantasmagoria that, although not indexical as such, were certainly 
perceived as representations of the (spectral) ‘real’.  This would open up a highly 
salient sequence of technological practices of the visual, within which the 
photographic (in Osborne’s sense) is but one link, and within which the condition 
of an enchanted ‘subject’ is mutually constituted. 
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 Culminating in the effect known as Pepper’s Ghost in the 1860s, optical 
effects of various kinds had been used as part of magic shows since the late 18th 
century.  Many of these effects, deployed to produce a miscellany of illusions, 
derive from the technology of the magic lantern; Terry Castle, in an analysis of 
what she calls the ‘spectralization of mental space’ focuses on one such effect—
the Phantasmagoria.  Its chief protagonist, the Belgian inventor and showman 
Etienne-Gaspard Robertson, used a magic lantern to project images, in darkness, 
onto a floating gauze screen; another of these inventors, Guyot, actually projected 
his apparitions onto smoke.213  Embedded within the technological apparatus of 
the phantasmagoria is the desire to separate the image from its true agentive 
source, by eclipsing its material support.  Projection onto smoke (emanating from 
a brazier), resulting in shifting configurations, would have greatly enhanced the 
autonomous appearance of these ghostly apparitions.  An early form of ‘dollying’, 
effected by setting the apparatus on rollers, also caused the image to shrink or 
grow, thus enhancing its existentially ambiguous status for the onlooker. Castle 
dwells upon this ambiguity, figuring it as a ‘profound epistemological confusion’: 
 
 Were ghosts themselves real or illusory? Inside the mind or outside it? […] The 
 subliminal power of the phantasmagoria lay in the fact that it induced in the 
 spectator a kind of maddening, irrational perception: one might believe ghosts to be 
 illusions, present ‘in the mind’s eye’ alone, but one experienced them here as real 
 entities, existing outside the boundary of the psyche.214   
 
Castle here highlights a fundamental paradox inherent in the post-enlightenment 
desire to rationalize ghostly or phantasmagorical phenomena: in subsuming such 
occurrences to the category of thought, the mind itself became supernaturalized. 
She argues that it was Freud who, ironically, through an attempt to account for 
and dispel such illusory forces, ended up reinventing them within his theory of the 
unconscious.  Although I do not intend to deploy Freudian theory here, Castle’s 
essay alludes to the propensity for film to break through or exceed, in a variety of 
ways, the material limits of its medium, and to its problematic relationship with a 
‘phantasmagorized’ spectator. 
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 Tom Gunning frames his analysis of the phantasmagoria in slightly different 
terms, one that discloses it as having a twofold function, as representing a 
‘conflict between rational belief and sensual experience’. 
  
 From the demystifying point of view, the Phantasmagoria asserted the ultimate 
 truth of the rational and the fallibility of the senses. But, from the point of view of 
 showmanship, audience pleasure, and aesthetics, (particularly if we take the term 
 from its Greek root aisthetikos, ‘of or pertaining to things perceptible by the 
 senses,’) the novelty of the Phantasmagoria lay in its manipulation of the senses—
 not to foster credulity—but simply to produce startling effects. Rather than seeing 
 Phantasmagoria exclusively as either an ideological machine sustaining illusions or 
 a process of demystification, it might be worth pursuing it as a new model for the 
 manipulation of the senses. 215  
 
Gunning elaborates upon this in another essay Phantom Images and Modern 
Manifestations: here he speaks of the historically uncanny obverse of the 
photographic medium, whereby at the same time that it appeared to valorize a 
particular, positivist reading of a ‘real’ objective world of objects, it also conjured 
a ‘parallel world of phantasmatic doubles’.216  Gunning refers here, not to the 
Platonic notion of eidos for which photography might become a kind of material 
attestation, but to a subtler notion of the subject as a ceaseless emitter of images, 
somewhat like sloughed off skin. 
 
 these images are constantly cast off, like a sort of detritus.  Photography simply 
 retains some of them.  This process of individual entities constantly broadcasting 
 imperceptible signals which can be received as images exemplifies an 
 extraordinary new mythology of modernity as it confronted technological change.  
 Unlike official  allegories which vaunted the forces of commerce and technology 
 with dessicated images from classical mythology, this modern mythology 
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 welcomed the dissolving effects of modernity into the core of its metaphysics.217 
 (italics added) 
 
Gunning is arguing here for a recognition of the early reception of photography as 
uncanny, as marked by its propensity for producing ‘doubles’—that this was what 
conferred uniqueness ‘as much as its existential link with its original source’.218  
While this immediately summons up the spirit of Freud’s essay of 1919 (in 
Unheimlich, Freud names the double as an apposite theme for his theory), it also 
recalls Alfred Gell’s concept of distributed personhood and agency in Art and 
Agency.219  Here Gell, citing Yrjo Hirn, proposes a philosophical approach to the 
concept of ‘convergence between images of things and parts of things’, that of the 
Epicurean doctrine of emanations, or eidola according to which ‘every image of a 
thing constitutes a concrete part of that thing itself’.220   
 
 According to the clear and systematic statement of this doctrine given by the old 
 Epicurean philosophers […] shadows, reflections in a mirror, visions, and even 
 mental representations of distant objects, are all caused by thin membranes, 
 which constantly detach themselves from the surfaces of all bodies and move 
 onwards in all directions through space.221 
 
Gell goes on to quote from Lucretius’ epic poem on Epicureanism, De Rerum 
Natura: 
 
 [Many visible objects], … emit bodies some in a state of loose diffusion, like 
 smoke which logs of oak, heat and fires emit; some of a closer and denser 
 texture, like the  gossamer coats which at times cicades doff in the summer […] 
 since these cases occur, a thin image likewise must be emitted from things off 
 their surface.222 
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This description of images as having substance in and of themselves, and 
particularly in its analogical comparison with the emission of smoke from fire, is 
inescapably reminiscent of Terry Castle’s account, already referred to, of the 
spectacular phenomenon of ‘fantasmagorie’ at the end of the 18th century.  
Castle’s penetrating psychological analysis productively links Gunning’s 
moderately Freudian account of the uncanny, photographic double, with Gell’s 
anthropological interpretation of the distributed agent: ‘that images of something 
(a prototype) are parts of that thing (as a distributed object).’223  Furthermore, in 
Castle’s formulation, the phantasmagoric model embodies not only a 
destabilization of the relationship between things and images of things, but also 
between the inner and outer of ‘mind and world, illusion and reality’.224 This is 
not the ‘either/or’ dialectic of Benjamin’s Work of Art essay, formulated as it was 
for political expediency, but a more pliant and ambivalent conception in which 
film can be seen as part of a distributive chain of spectralized optical technologies 
of enchantment. 
 
Doubles and substitutions: photography 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 10.  William Mummler, spirit photograph (c. 1871). 
                                                 
223 Ibid, p.223. 
224 Castle, 'Phantasmagoria', p. 50. 
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Tom Gunning pursues further the concept of images as ghostly apparitions, this 
time in relation to the still photographic image, in his essay Phantom Images and 
Modern Manifestations.  Here he draws attention to the position held by 
photography in the 19th century as an ‘emblem’ for a ‘new realm of visual 
certainty’, possessing a dual identity as icon and index.225  But photography also 
created a parallel world of ‘phantasmatic doubles’, recording visual reality but at 
the same time dematerializing it.  Clement Cheroux echoes this line of enquiry in 
his reference to the 19th century correspondent to Le Progres Photographique, 
who described as resembling a ‘cage of ghosts’ the glass negatives bearing traces 
of earlier images.226  The notion of a ghost as a faint, secondary image caused by a 
fault in an optical system (here, photography, but equally valid in other such 
systems: faulty TV reception or internal reflection in a mirror) was analogical 
with more traditional imagery of ghosts as spirit beings or phantoms.227  This 
second definition was adopted by followers of Spiritualism, a growing movement 
from the 1840s onwards in both the United States and Europe.  Thus, according to 
Cheroux, application followed accident (as so often in the history of photography) 
and a few photographers began intentionally to exploit the perceived similarities 
between the two effects.  William Mummler produced spirit ‘portraits’ (sitters 
accompanied by a ghostly figure) in order to convince a public of the plausibility 
of the spirit world, but at the same time images of ghosts, spirits and fairies were 
used in conjunction with contemporary optical toys and as part of magic 
entertainment shows (phantasmagoria).  During this period the status of the 
medium became crucial and, according to Gunning, it was claimed that all the 
great spirit photographers were mediums and that, once again, an analogy could 
be drawn between the photographer as medium and the ‘medium’ of the photo-
sensitive plate: it was deemed sufficient for the spirit photographer simply to hold 
the sensitive plate in order for an image to be formed.  Thus the idea of the 
photographic image as the product of a receptive (photochemical) medium was 
echoed in the belief in the Medium as similarly ‘sensitive’ and productive. At the 
                                                 
225 Gunning, Phantom Images and Modern Manifestations, in Petro, Fugitive Images, (p. 42). 
226 Clement Cheroux (2005) Ghost Dialectics: spirit photography in entertainment and belief, in Clément 
Chéroux, The Perfect Medium: Photography and the Occult, (New Haven, Conn. ; London: Yale University 
Press, 2005), pp. 45-71. 
227 In the Hideo Nakata’s 1998 film Ring, characters watch a barely perceptible ghostly trace on a rented 
videotape - allegedly recorded by mistake from a dead TV channel - before falling victim to a malevolent 
force.  
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same time there was a belief in the idea that the technological agency of 
photography itself could capture and reveal something that lay beyond or beneath 
the threshold of ordinary human perception. 
 
 A second sort of spirit photography became known as ‘full 
materializations’—full-bodied figures of spirits revealed during séances.  The 
physicist Sir William Crookes was the first to take photographs of 
materializations and, in contrast to spirit photographs—which revealed the 
presence of a spirit that remained invisible to the spectators present—photographs 
of materializations revealed spirits who could clearly be seen, and even touched, 
by those present.  It was in the phenomenon of the séance that Spiritualism and 
magic began to overlap: William and Ira Davenport, two brothers from Buffalo, 
New York, demonstrated complex sittings in which the closed spirit cabinet 
became a means of removing the medium from the eye of the public.228  In fact 
the second part of the Davenport’s ‘show’ would take place in almost complete 
darkness, members of the audience having been invited to tie up the brothers 
inside their cabinet.229 
  Although controversial, these shows signalled the arrival of a new type of 
magic entertainment, this in spite of the fact that the Davenports continued to 
protest their authenticity as mediums.  In fact Spiritualists went to great lengths to 
dissociate themselves from the ‘tricks’ used in magic shows: in the case of spirit 
photography they gave complex ‘scientific’ explanations of how a form invisible 
to the spectator could leave a visible trace on a sensitized plate.230  A further 
manifestation of spirit photography was the documenting of ectoplasm—a pale 
substance expelled from the orifices of mediums: in some of the photographs of 
these manifestations the ectoplasm itself bears images, the Medium herself 
thereby becoming a sort of camera.  It also suggests a fascinating possibility about 
the role that images play in Spiritualist manifestations: that, as Gunning suggests, 
they supply ‘a sort of pictographic code between the visible world and the realms 
of the invisible’.  Ectoplasm was thought of as proof of spiritual manifestations 
                                                 
228 It is significant that these séances took place in darkness thus echoing the very conditions in which the 
photographic image is produced or constructed; a controlled darkness, or semi-darkness, was also a 
prerequisite of certain theatrical magic illusions of this period. 
229 During, Modern Enchantments, p. 154. 
230 John Neville Maskelyne, who attended a Davenport séance at Cheltenham in 1865, discerned their 
methods and declared his intention to recreate the séance ‘without the aid of spirits’.  
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but could also be conceptualized as a kind of ‘ethereal glue’, linking the human 
agent with the technological apparatus.231  Overall, these otherworldly images 
speak of a surfeit or excess, which the camera at once reveals but which it cannot 
completely contain.  But they also represent a kind of visual documentation of 
what Daniel M. Wegner has called ‘virtual agency’, wherein the intentional 
agency of the medium seems to be transferred or deferred to the spirit or ghost.232  
This could be seen to parallel what happens, more prosaically, in the interaction 
between human agent and camera, whereby agency is tacitly transferred to the 
camera, and the photograph seems to ‘take itself’. 
  
 
Doubles and substitutions: film 
 
The double-nature of the photographic image—its role as both guarantor of the 
real and purveyor of the uncanny—is for Gunning what gave it its ‘unique 
ontology’.233  He goes on to discuss the trick films of the French filmmaker 
Georges Meliés as further engagement with the phenomenon of spiritualism; 
however, Meliés never claimed supernatural status for his films, instead inviting 
‘technical amazement at a new trick rather than awe at a mystery.’234  Laurent 
Mannoni has stressed the deceptive aspects of moving image technology, 
acknowledging a historical variance between still and moving image: whereas 
spiritualist photographs often elicited a credulous, or at least ambivalent response 
as to the veracity of their content, the moving image was more clearly associated 
with trickery and deceit.  Mannoni lists the various devices and techniques in 
which ‘deceptive art’ consists, including ‘silhouettes; tricks with mirrors; camera 
obscuras and lucidas; anamorphoses […] all flow into this current and form an 
immense body of production in the history of the sciences and arts’.235  In an 
essay subtitled The Magical Magic of the Magic Image, André Gaudreault has 
commented on how Meliés used magician’s misdirection even in his editing: the 
                                                 
231 I have taken this phrase from Yves Klein’s description of the ‘essential of painting is that something, that 
“ethereal glue,” that intermediary product which the artist secretes with all his creative being and which he 
has the power to place, to encrust, to impregnate into the pictorial stuff of the painting’. 
232 Daniel M. Wegner, The Illusion of Conscious Will, (Cambridge, Mass.; London: MIT Press, 2002), p. 269. 
233 Gunning, Phantom Images and Modern Manifestations, in Petro, Fugitive Images, (p. 43) 
234 Ibid, p. 63. (Meliés produced a film called The Spiritualist Photographer in 1903). 
235 Mannoni, The Art of Deception, in Mannoni et al., Eyes, Lies and Illusions, p. 43 
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eyes of the spectator are firmly focused on the lower half of the film, where the 
(narrative) action is taking place; in the meantime, a different kind of action is 
occurring in the upper half, and close examination of the film strip reveals the 
traces of gluing in the upper part of the frame.  Thus, as Gaudreault comments, 
Meliés understood that even as cinematographer he was still first and foremost a 
magician who ‘must draw the viewer’s attention towards areas where nothing is 
happening, but where everything appears to be happening in order, as he must, 
not to reveal his secret’.236  Here the physical material of the film itself becomes 
doubly the site of occlusion and concealment, and of deception. 
 In these trick films of Meliés, the narrative is far less important than the 
simple spectacular nature of the ‘cut’, or edit, that facilitates the trick, and the 
presentational style of the effects themselves: this is what Tom Gunning has 
called the ‘cinema of attractions’, a sort of ‘now you see it, now you don’t’ 
approach to the moving image.237  The kind of ‘simplistic’ edit employed by 
Meliés is notionally invisible, even though, to our (21st century) eyes, it is blatant.  
Of course, the rigorous theatrical frontality of Meliés’ tableaux, which were, after 
all, produced and shot inside a purpose-built theatre (The Robert-Houdin theatre 
in Paris, where Meliés had been a stage magician), was instrumental in 
maintaining the illusion of pictorial continuity, therefore allowing the tricks to 
look convincing.  But what is perhaps more fascinating is the way in which, 
because of the naturalization of continuity editing, audiences have become inured 
to basic, ‘classical’ cinematic techniques even when, as in a simple shot-reverse-
shot sequence, they are arguably more disruptive and disjunctive to the pictorial 
fabric of the film; it is the narrative element in mainstream cinema that ‘heals’ 
over these lacerations.238   
 Meliés’ fascination with producing effects and manipulating the response 
of his audience, emerged from his experiences as a stage magician and through his 
knowledge of a variety of optical effects and scientific phenomena that were 
frequently staged as lecture-performances during this period.239  In Gunning’s 
                                                 
236 André Gaudreault, 'Meliés the Magician:  the Magical Magic of the Magic Image', Early Popular Visual 
Culture, 5 (2007), p. 167-174, (p. 167). 
237Both Gunning and During have drawn attention to the context within which much early film was seen – as 
part of a ‘variety’ of forms of popular entertainment. 
238Ironically, Meliés would not use ‘tricks’ (such as shooting twice from different viewpoints) which, for him, 
were not ‘motivated’.  During, Modern Enchantments, p. 170.  
239 Although Meliés could not have witnessed the original presentations of Pepper’s Ghost at the Royal 
London Polytechnic, he would certainly have known about it from the writings of Robert-Houdin, whose 
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essay ‘Primitive’ Cinema: A Frame Up? Or The Tricks On Us he discusses the 
‘stop-motion’ techniques employed by Meliés: Gunning suggests that Melies in 
fact used splicing (the physical cutting and suturing of the film-strip), as opposed 
to the manual stopping and re-starting of the camera, in order to maintain the 
illusion of continuity.240  Meliés the magician immediately grasped the 
illusionistic potential of this technical ‘flaw’ and many of his films incorporate 
adaptations of magic tricks in which the idea of transformation or metamorphosis 
is explored.  Whilst in a staged magic show this would have involved complex 
stage props and methods of misdirecting the attention of an audience, in the 
medium of film Meliés was able to employ a temporal disjunction as a means of 
‘re-setting’ the tableau with the new figure, object, etc, substituted for the 
original.  The apparent ‘real time’ trajectory of the now spliced narrative would 
ensure the anticipated continuity and complete the transition.   
 Meliés also employed double exposure in order to obtain ‘dissolves’ 
between substitutions: in The Living Playing Cards a life-size court card 
transforms into a real woman and back again by virtue of this method.241  These 
techniques have since become cinematic clichés, although they are more often 
used to facilitate temporal or spatial shifts (rather than maintain the illusion of 
temporal continuity) in order to satisfy, as Gunning and others would have it, the 
demands of classical cinematic narrative.  Mary Ann Doane draws attention to the 
way in which the ‘magic tricks’ of cinema underpin or support the conjuring 
tricks of the magician (in Meliés and in Edison, whose film The Artist’s Dilemma, 
she specifically cites).  The emerging ‘out of blackness’ that characterizes 
Edison’s film (as well as some of Meliés’) demonstrates for Doane ‘that the film 
seeks to reinscribe the uncanny likeness of the cinematic image as magic, and 
magic as the underside of science’.242  The transformations that take place in 
Meliés’ films share with some of the spirit photographs the idea of the double: in 
                                                                                                                                     
theatre he inherited.  Jim Steinmeyer has argued convincingly that Meliés re-exposure of film for the 
deployment of special effects derived from the principle employed in Pepper’s Ghost. Jim Steinmeyer, 
Hiding the Elephant: How Magicians Invented the Impossible, (London: Arrow, 2004), p. 179. 
240 Tom Gunning, ‘Primitive’ Cinema: A Frame-Up?  Or the Trick’s on Us, in Early Cinema: Space-Frame-
Narrative, ed. by Thomas Elsaesser and Adam Barker, (London: BFI Publishing, 1990), pp. 95-103.  
Meliés himself recounts in his diaries how, whilst filming on the streets of Paris, his camera jammed and it 
took him a full minute to release and restart the film: when later on the same day he re-played the footage he 
observed that ‘men transformed into women, a carriage became a hearse’. (From ‘Melies the Magician’ Arte 
Video DVD, 2001). 
241 Meliés, The Living Playing Cards, (Star Film, 1904). 
242 Mary Ann Doane, The Emergence of Cinematic Time: Modernity, Contingency, the Archive, (Cambridge, 
Mass.; London: Harvard University Press, 2002),  p. 111.  
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The Spiritualist Photographer a young woman transforms into her own two-
dimensional image and the magician (played by Meliés), after having rolled up 
the life-size figure, unfurls it in dramatic fashion, producing the restored, now 
three dimensional figure and leaving the paper blank.243  According to Tom 
Gunning, for Meliés, ‘spirit photography results less in communication with the 
dead than an exchange of identities between image and model.’244  Here Gell’s 
notion of ‘distributed personhood’ is once again evoked; in some of Meliés films 
he appears as a double of himself, whereby the protagonist’s agency as magician, 
actor and director is extended through his multiple filmic image.245 
 In another of his essays, ‘Now You See It, Now You Don’t’: The 
Temporality of the Cinema of Attractions, Gunning draws a parallel between the 
early films of Meliés and ‘curiosity-arousing devices’ of the fairground (and, by 
extension, of the magic show), describing cinema’s concurrent ‘fascination with 
novelty and its foregrounding of the act of display’.246  This, for Gunning, 
undermines the assumption of ‘narrative primacy’, at least in the cinema before 
1908.  However, even as late as 1924 Buster Keaton, in his film Sherlock Jr, was 
making use of the ‘trick splice’ pioneered by Meliés: although arguably 
employing it to the more classical ends of spatial shifting, Keaton’s character (a 
cinema projectionist and amateur sleuth) is transposed into a bewildering 
succession of hostile settings whilst maintaining the illusion of temporal 
continuity.  The effect was achieved by Keaton standing stock still (his poses 
were measured laboriously using surveyors’ instruments), and then re-positioning 
himself into the new background sets or locations.  It could be argued here that a 
parallel can be drawn between the temporal dislocation of the spirit photographs 
and that of film: in the former the accepted notion of the photograph’s 
instantaneity is resisted and challenged, in the latter the ‘real time’ appearance of 
the film is disputed.  These substitution devices become (at least in Meliés) almost 
literally invisible and again, arguably, the double-exposure technique of the spirit 
photographs is similarly invisible, regardless of the plausibility of its content.  
Gunning challenges the arguments put forward by Mitry, Metz and others, that 
                                                 
243 Gunning, Phantom Images and Modern Manifestations, in Petro, Fugitive Images, (p. 64). 
244 Ibid, p. 64. 
245 Gell, Art and Agency, pp. 96-153. 
246 Tom Gunning, Now You See It, Now You Don’t: The Temporality of the Cinema of Attractions, in  
Silent Film, ed. by Richard Abel, (London: Athlone, 1996), pp. 71-84, (p. 73). 
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early cinema represented a struggle between theatricality and narrativity.  Instead 
he introduces the term cinema of attractions, which he defines in terms of the 
special emphasis it places on the spectator.  Narrative invokes the spectator’s 
interest by ‘posing an enigma’ whose resolution is delayed during the unfolding 
of that narrative.  This necessitates a denial of complicity with the spectator, 
which transforms him into a voyeur, unacknowledged by the world of the film.  
By contrast the cinema of attractions constitutes an exhibitionist relation to the 
spectator: it addresses him directly, acknowledging the viewer’s presence in order 
to ‘quickly satisfy a curiosity’.247  Sometimes this encounter could be 
confrontational as when an oncoming locomotive train threatens to break out of 
the cinematic space and into the theatre itself.248  So the cinema of attractions is 
seen by Gunning as a means of creating a ‘temporal disjunction through an excess 
of astonishment and display’ predicated on the notion of presence and absence 
(the ‘Now You See It, Now You Don’t’ both of the title and of the fort/da game 
played by little Hans, and observed by his grandfather, Sigmund Freud) that form 
the basic temporality of this form.249  Rachel O. Moore echoes this notion of 
cinematic excess, or plenitude, in her book Savage Theory: Cinema as Modern 
Magic.  Moore also uses the example of Buster Keaton, again in Sherlock Jr, in 
which Keaton passes in and out of a (depicted) film frame, threatening to disrupt 
the autonomy of the film image.  Here Moore again returns us to the concept of 
the double. 
 
 The film image can be seen as the spirit double of the real thing it shows, always 
 independent of that thing, an exact copy that is thoroughly autonomous and exists 
 as part of the spirit world that is cinema.  The magical nature of the spirit double 
 is very  evident in films that play tricks with the frame and thereby highlight the 
 delight got by its autonomy.250 
 
  
                                                 
247 Ibid, pp. 74-75. 
248 Buster Keaton poked fun at this convention in his film The Goat (1921) when the onrushing train upon 
whose cowcatcher he sits, stops dead ‘in front of’ the screen, Keaton himself staring impassively at the 
audience. 
249 Sigmund Freud, James Strachey, and Angela Richards, On Metapsychology: The Theory of 
Psychoanalysis: 'Beyond the Pleasure Principle', 'the Ego and the Id', and Other Works, (Harmondsworth: 
Penguin, 1984). Gunning, Now You See It, Now You Don’t, p. 80. 
250 Moore, Savage Theory, p. 87. 
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Fig. 11.  Buster Keaton, Sherlock Jr (1924). 
 
 
 In considering how the readings of these texts might in some way relate to 
my own practice I want to look at two works, Light House and Never Odd or 
Even.251  In Light House one of the principal considerations was the discrepancy 
between real—i.e. experienced—time, and filmed time.  In Light House the image 
of a magician, apparently illuminating a light bulb, is projected onto the wall of a 
small, specially constructed room.  This image ostensibly appears in continuous 
time but, by virtue of substitution splicing, actually configures a sense of presence 
or absence (of light) in a variety of ways.  For example, the background wall in 
the projected image alternates randomly between black and white as the 
(projected) light bulb goes on and off.  But the projector itself alternates its 
function between conveyor of image and simple light source, and to further 
confound this, a phantom bulb—a double—of the projected bulb, appears to hover 
in front of the screen.  This phantom bulb is produced via the agency of an angled 
sheet of glass—invisible to the spectator—that divides the viewing area from the 
screen.  The glass reflects the image of the bulb (the real bulb is hidden from 
view) so that it appears to hover just in front of the screen (this is the effect known 
as Pepper’s Ghost, and referred to earlier in the chapter).  The audience is 
involved directly both by their spatial immersion in the piece and by virtue of the 
                                                 
251 Jonathan Gilhooly, Light House, 2005, shown as part of Variety at the De La Warr Pavilion, 2006, (see 
appendix). 
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fact that a light source in the actual room, independent of the projected image, is 
randomly switched on and off.  Light House chimes with the dynamics of 
presentation and display discussed in Gunning’s essay, ‘Now You See It, Now You 
Don’t’, although the effect is less one of surprise than of disorientation.   
 In Never Odd or Even a live performer (again a double) interacts with his 
on-screen self, initially mimicking and then deviating from the other’s actions.  
All of the action (live and filmed) takes place on or in front of a screen just large 
enough to contain both the performer and his double, visible from the waist up.  
The piece begins with the pair acting out a sequence of moves in which sheets of 
primary coloured paper are systematically moved and repositioned across the 
screen, resulting in secondary hues where coloured light overlaps material colour.  
As the action progresses, the substitution tricks employed by Meliés are here 
applied to exchanges between the two players, in other words between real and 
depicted space: a jacket is passed from the real to the filmed performer; a red silk 
is taken by the real actor from his double, made to disappear, and is then returned 
to him.  These actions are, because of the nature of the projected image over (that 
is, physically on top of) the live performer, at certain times more or less visible to 
the spectator, at others the result of genuine sleight-of-hand.  A tension is thus 
created between the apparent real-time event, and knowledge of the artifice that 
underpins it, together with an uncertainty as to the distinction between real-time 
tricks and those supplied by the camera. There is no linear narrative to the piece, 
rather a series of tableaux in which a sequence of actions, revelations and 
exchanges are played out.  The final four minutes consists of an extended credit 
sequence, in mock homage to mainstream cinema, in which the filmed performer 
gradually shrinks in size in relation to his counterpart. The ‘apotheosis’ ending of 
early film is combined with a trope from classical cinema to provide a climax or 
denouement. 
 The role of the double here is that of the uncanny doppelganger, but also 
the unwitting mediator between audience and screen.  This is a role that has 
traditionally been occupied by the dipsomaniac or drunk, as described by Rachel 
O. Moore in her analysis of ghost images in Norman Z. McLeod’s film Topper, in 
which two drunks witness a pair of invisible ghosts move objects including a tyre 
and a wheel-jack: 
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 Outcasts from the film’s plot, the drunken observers […] mark the periphery of 
 the film, the line between viewer and film, between reality and make-believe.  
 They don’t know it’s only a movie; the viewer, on the other hand, knows better.  
 The figure of the drunk is also a sort of wedge, easing open, albeit in a 
 containable way, a porthole for the fantastical and the magical. […]  The drunks’ 
 amazement at seeing objects move of their own accord, of magic, weakens 
 the sober viewer’s reality resolve.  We know the objects can’t really move on 
 their own, but we wish, ever so much, to see them do so.252 
 
In Never Odd or Even the live performer only gradually becomes aware of his 
(filmed) double’s existence, initially mimicking the other’s actions in nonchalant 
fashion.  His subsequent awareness and surprise now echoes that of the spectator, 
for whom he is mediator, but of whose presence he remains blithely unaware.  
These complex relays—of awareness and unawareness, knowledge and surprise, 
belief and disbelief—passing between audience, actor, and double, constitute the 
conceptual edifice of the piece, underpinning both its stylistically formal and 
theatrically anarchic elements.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The model of the moving image that my work seeks to elicit and perform is one in 
which its illusory and duplicitous characteristics are foregrounded.  Gell’s model 
of agency, in which abduction from an index is posited as elusive and 
unpredictable, provides a robust theoretical interpretation of cinema.  The 
enchantment, or captivation, of which Gell speaks occurs when there is a 
resistance exerted by the artwork—what Gell calls a ‘halo-effect of technical 
“difficulty”’—such that it might be construed as having come into the world 
magically; it is their ‘becoming rather than being’ that enchants.253  Film achieves 
this through various means, but central to its power is the way in which its 
technical agency is uncoupled from its enchanting effect.  Film as an index of 
agency is often uncertain, ambiguous, not only because of its reality effect, but 
due to the proliferation of doubles—its uncanny underside—which it produces.  
                                                 
252 Moore, Savage Theory, pp. 85-86. 
253 Gell and Hirsch, The Art of Anthropology, p. 166. 
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My video works attempt to bring the viewer up close to the technological 
mediation situated in the dark background that film adumbrates.  They attempt to 
achieve this through fairly modest, technological means; in other words, by 
looking towards, and rejuvenating, some of the notionally simple tricks of early 
cinema in order to produce what I like to think of as ‘muted spectacles’.  In Never 
Odd or Even, the filmed character appears to have agency in his communications 
with his live double, even though we ‘know’ this cannot be the case.  This 
exposure alerts us to the kinds of irrational responses that we constantly suppress, 
or sublate into a more normative, or commonsensical understanding of the 
cinematic experience. 
 
 But we might wonder if another alternative is not laid out here, a deeply sensual 
 art, certainly evocative of dreams and illusions, but which does not attempt to 
 found a new religion or support an old mythology.  Simultaneously popular in its 
 address and yet often abstract in its forms, it plays with its audience causing 
 sensations that resolve themselves into both fear and laughter. Unlike canonical 
 high modernist art, this art is not overly concerned with objecthood, or even the 
 materiality of the artwork. Rather, it manufactures machines and devices for 
 shaping light and darkness, constantly aware that its true material lays less in its 
 projections than in the sensual experience of its viewer. It seems to me to be a 
 model that still has an uncanny hold on life. 254 
 
 The phenomenon of doubling appears again in my next chapter, this time 
in the guise of mimicry or imitative behaviour.  This forms part of my appraisal of 
enchantment in the context of what Alfred Gell has called ‘cognitve traps’, as a 
means of approaching a further strand of my practice—that of the conceptual 
conundrum. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
254 Gunning, Illusions Past and Future, p. 16. 
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Figs. 12-17.  Jonathan Gilhooly, Never Odd or Even (see appendix).
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Chapter 4 
Tricks and traps: the cognitive dissonance of word games 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
In Art and Agency, Alfred Gell refers to the ‘cognitive stickiness’ of apotropaic 
art—patterns that protect against demons or other malevolent spirits.  Apotropaic 
(literally, averting evil) patterns are such that their designs become objects of 
fascination for a hostile demon, who becomes caught up, hopelessly stuck within 
the complexity of its arrangement.  Gell uses the specific example of Kolam, 
South Indian threshold designs, drawn freehand by women using lime, rice and 
other sorts of powder, and yielding complex topological figures whose 
manufactured trajectory is difficult to follow. 
 
 On first inspection, it seems to consist of a single line, pursuing a complex, 
 sinuous path between the rows and columns of dots.  However, this is an illusion 
 in that this kolam is actually composed of four continuous loops of asymmetric 
 configuration, superimposed on one another while being rotated in 90-degree 
 steps.  This kolam is, so to speak, the visual equivalent of a canon in four parts, in 
 which each voice sings the same notes but not in phase.255 
 
Here Gell is using analogies of both music and mathematics to explore the 
structure and configuration of the pattern.  It is a strategy echoing that of Douglas 
Hofstadter in Godel, Escher and Bach, in which he identifies the concept of 
‘strange loops’, tangled hierarchies, each level of which may consist of objects or 
processes, and which is linked to at least one other by some type of 
relationship.256  Hofstadter explores this concept throughout his book in an 
intermittent sequence of tripartite metalogues, within which the concept of the 
strange loop is materially imbricated.  The difference is that while Hofstadter’s 
loops are purely models of cognitive perception, illustrated through the—as he 
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256 Douglas R. Hofstadter, Gödel, Escher, Bach: An Eternal Golden Braid, ([S.l.]: Harvester Press, 1979). 
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sees it—interrelated themes of mathematics, music and visual images, Gell’s 
analogies are part of a broader endeavour to formulate an ‘anthropological theory 
of visual art’.257  It should be said that for Gell they also function as a means of 
indicating how abduction of agency might take place in the context of abstract or 
non-figurative images/indexes.  However, what underpins each author’s 
conceptual analysis is the notion of cognition as primary ontology: as Gell says 
‘the “technology of enchantment” approach […] (which is the psychological 
aspect of the anthropology of art) conjoins a theory of social efficacy with 
considerations which, if not aesthetic, are definitely cognitive in nature, because 
cognition and sociality are one’.258 (Italics added).  This bringing together of 
cognition and sociality by Gell is key to the approach I wish to take in this 
chapter, in which I examine artworks and magic illusions that are inherently trap-
like in Gell’s sense of the term.  Once again magical phenomena (this time, tricks-
as-traps) are employed as a means of illuminating what I believe to be a salient 
characteristic of the artworks under appraisal.  At times my experience as a 
spectator of magic has taken the form of a kind of cognitive dissonance, 
provisionally proposed here as paralleling, in certain respects, the form and 
function of Gell’s cognitively ‘sticky’ patterns.  Gell’s extension of a cognitive-
social dynamic to include a magical (in a broad sense) aspect is derived from 
Pascal Boyer’s writings on the cognitive origins of religious and supernatural 
beliefs, and is an extension of Boyer’s notion of intuitive ontology.  Boyer argues 
for the idea of cognitive constraints, a kind of mental natural selection of certain 
types of representations ‘more likely than others to be acquired and transmitted, 
thereby constituting those stable sets of representations that anthropologists call 
“cultures”’.259  Instead of the tendency for magical or religious thinking to be 
understood as the product of a false or deluded system, it is construed here as part 
of a ‘normal’ inferencing process (or set of processes) of the mind.  
 In this chapter I employ two apparently distinct, but (I believe) actually 
related lines of enquiry as a means of tackling the apparently enigmatic or 
contradictory aspects of the artwork and of the magic act.  Firstly, proceeding 
                                                 
257 Gell, Art and Agency, p. 1. 
258 Ibid, p. 75. 
259 Pascal Boyer, Cognitive Constraints on Cultural Representations: Natural Ontologies and Religious 
Ideas, in Mapping the Mind, eds. Lawrence Hirschfeld and Susan A. Gelman (Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 1994), pp. 391-411, (p. 391). 
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once again from Alfred Gell’s Art and Agency, this time from two chapters 
entitled The Critique of the Index (that deals with patterns as traps), and The 
Extended Mind, respectively.  Second, by employing an aspect of cognitive 
neuroscience concerned with accounting for the imitative tendencies of animal 
(human and non-human) subjects.  Two inter-related themes emerge: the notion of 
the conundrum itself, and the concept of mimicry (as distinct from mimesis), both 
of which will be played out within this chapter.  Returning to Gell’s image of a 
preoccupied demon, I want to explore the possibility that this is an imitative 
tendency that itself mirrors the unconscious propensity, on the part of the 
spectator, to mirror (or at least to desire to mirror) the actions of the 
artist/magician through either the live performance, or the ‘congealed’ residue of 
the artwork.260  This model might be conceptualized within a range of quotidian 
human activities—for example, the crossword puzzle solver who is re-tracing the 
intricate steps of the crossword puzzle setter. 
  
 
Delayed transactions 
 
The notion of cognitive traps, in Gell’s terms, is explained as a ‘cognitive 
stickiness’; elsewhere as ‘demonic flypaper’ (to describe apotropaic traps); he also 
makes frequent use of words such as ‘tackiness’, and ‘viscosity’.  Gell’s persistent 
use of these treacly metaphors is very deliberate and is intended to suggest a sense 
of retardation or obstruction, but also of adhesion; this concept of stickiness 
derives in part from a Maussian notion of gifts as adhesive connections between 
donors and recipients.261  It is also, however, articulated as a kind of weapon in 
contact with which an enemy (usually in demonic form) will become hopelessly 
trapped in its attempt to retrace the steps of the pattern’s manufacture.  Here the 
example of the Kolam comes into play, and Gell describes his own frustrated 
attempts mentally to disentangle the four interlaced drawn lines that make up the 
intricate patterns. 
 
                                                 
260Gell, Art and Agency, p. 68.  
261Ibid, p. 84. 
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 Here seeing the figure is quite distinct from being able to mentally intend the 
 process  of its construction.  Yet we ‘write in’ the fact that it is possible to 
 construct the figure, because here it is, it has been made by someone […].  So we 
 end with a series of paradoxes.  We want to see this figure as one continuous line, 
 but we know it is four separate loops, which, however, we cannot separately 
 abstract from the overall design.  We know too that this design […] was made 
 […] but we cannot retrace fully  the process whereby the design came into the 
 world, by the agency of this woman. 262 
  
Gell extends this interpretation to artworks in general, envisaging them as a 
special kind of cognitive trap, in which the viewer becomes ensnared.  
 
 Partly this comes from the spectator’s inability mentally to rehearse the 
 origination of the index from the point of view of the originator, the artist.  The 
 ‘blockage’ in cognition arises at the point when the spectator cannot follow the 
 sequence of steps in the artist’s ‘performance’ (the ‘performance’ which is 
 objectively congealed in the finished work).263 
 
In Critique of the Index, Gell expounds a detailed analysis of the index-as-pattern 
through an appraisal of non-representational decorative designs.  He views 
decorative patterns as being a component of the technology of enchantment, 
inseparable from an artefact’s more obviously functional attributes.  Additionally, 
typologies of pattern variation can be analyzed in terms of their capacity to 
compel the viewer mentally to translate the notional shift of a motif (around a 
symmetrical plane), and consequently to induce a sense of animacy, so that 
‘agency and motion seem to inhere in the motifs themselves’.264  That this is 
merely an illusion of movement is however mistaken, as it is not a purely 
subjective phenomenon: the sense of motion derives ultimately from our own 
agency, from the movement of our bodies and the saccades of our eyes.  Gell goes 
into great detail in order to adumbrate this idea of complex patterns as somehow 
inducive of movement in the gaze of the beholder; what underpins his argument 
however, is the notion of ‘complex patterns as unfinished business’, the 
                                                 
262 Ibid, p. 86. 
263 Ibid, p. 71. 
264 Ibid, p. 78. 
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inexhaustibility of their potential to entrap and engage, to slow the perception of, 
the viewer.265 
 The ‘cognitive stickiness’ that Gell attributes to such patterns as the South 
Indian Kolam, in which the apotropaic motifs are drawn with rice powder trickled 
from the hand, is immediately reminiscent of the work of certain contemporary 
Western artists such as Bernard Frize and James Siena.266  Frize’s intricate 
paintings consist of polychromatic ‘ropes’ of pigment brushed into the wet resin-
coated support and forming looped, recursive or braided patterns, which, through 
various means, index their own manufacture.  One of these methods is employed 
in Unimixte (1999), one of a series of works in which a loaded brush is employed 
in a single, uninterrupted stroke until the paint is used up.  The consequent 
gradual emaciation of colour clearly indicates both directionality and temporal 
origin.  In spite of this, the longer we look at Frize’s painting and attempt to 
retrace the path taken by the artist’s brush, the more we become ‘cognitively 
trapped’ and ultimately unable mentally to recreate the process of its construction.  
The wonky linearity of Frize’s patterns betrays their handmade-ness (in contrast 
to the imagistic quality of mass-produced patterns), thus eliciting the observer’s 
desire to decode the history of their making.  In fact Unimixte is a trick, the 
successful perpetration of which is due in part to our tendency to view artworks as 
the product of a single creative hand.  Frize’s paintings, conversely, are often the 
work of several participants or performers, moving in meticulously 
choreographed sequences, so that the painting emerges as the ‘congealed residue’ 
of their joint performance.267  
 
 I imagine it’s amusing to understand how it’s made, and to reach out to the 
 viewer in a game in which they can be involved.  That’s what I enjoy when I 
 look at a painting anyway: understanding how it works, what was done, what 
 happened, why it was made, etc.268 
 
                                                 
265 Ibid, p. 93. 
266 This notion of a traceable facture might easily be extended to incorporate artists who produce action-
centered, or overtly gestural paintings, such as Jackson Pollock. 
267 Gell, Art and Agency, p. 68. 
268 Bernard Frize, interviewed by Irmeline Lebeer, in Bernard Frize, Aplat, Musée D'art Moderne De La Ville 
De Paris, 06.06-28.09.2003 (Paris: Paris musées, 2003), p. 92. 
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Frize’s colours indicate purely relational distinction between hues, rather than 
being used in an overtly spatial or aesthetically ‘balanced’ manner.  He is 
fastidious in his attempts to reduce the tonal or chromatic dominance of any single 
hue, thus assigning to colour the function of differentiating the various linear 
trajectories, later to be teased out by the viewer.  The American artist James Siena 
creates drawings and paintings in which the unique configurations of complex 
figure/ground relationships possess a similarly idiosyncratic facture to those of 
Frize.  In Critique of the Index, Gell analyses the phenomenon of figure/ground 
patterns in terms of their intractability, that we cannot quite grasp the relationship 
between the ‘figure’ and the ‘ground’: ‘We experience this as a kind of 
pleasurable frustration; we are drawn into the pattern and held inside it, impaled 
as it were on its bristling hooks and spines.  The pattern is a mind-trap.’269  
Siena’s drawings evince this very complexity: they are glitched, algorithmic 
patterns whose amalgam of order and error entices us back to their surfaces, 
slowing down our perception as we attempt mentally to possess them fully. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 18.  Bernard Frize, Unimixte (1999).        Fig. 19.  James Siena, Untitled (1999).  
 
      
 The Critique of the Index that Gell pursues in Art and Agency is 
effectively a kind of supplement to Vogel’s Net, an earlier essay in which Gell 
                                                 
269 Gell, Art and Agency, p. 80. 
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deals directly with traps of a distinctly more recognizable sort.  He discusses the 
ways in which animal traps are at once models of their creator (the hunter, in 
absentia), and the victim, in so far as they mimic aspects of the animal’s 
behaviour in order to trap it.  Gell explains: ‘Traps are lethal parodies of the 
animal’s Umwelt [self-centered world].  Thus the rat that likes to poke around in 
narrow spaces has just such an attractive cavity prepared for its last, fateful foray 
into the dark.’270  The cleverer the animal, the more imaginative and laterally 
conceived must be the trap that ensnares it; so a chimpanzee—who will display 
curiosity, rather than running away like a ‘dumb’ animal—must have its 
intelligence engaged in a more functional way, in order to trap it.  As well as 
describing actual animal traps Gell makes explicit reference to works of 
contemporary Western art: he discusses artworks by the British artist Damien 
Hirst—specifically his acclaimed ‘shark in formaldehyde’ (The Impossibility of 
Death in the Mind of Someone Living) from 1991, and A Thousand Years (1990) 
in which a decaying cow’s head hatches maggots/flies, which are then zapped by 
a high-voltage flytrap.271  These works are considered in relation to the 
(aforementioned) African hunting traps, which Gell describes as carriers of ideas 
and meanings, but also as ‘transformed representations’ of their makers and 
victims.  Within the context of an imaginary exhibition of traps (the conceit 
within which Gell frames his essay), works by Western artists such as Hirst would 
both illuminate and become illuminated by their inclusion and proximity, 
occupying as they do, the same ‘semiological territory’.272  However, Gell also 
makes clear that A Thousand Years is, to all intents and purposes, a trap in the 
sense that he has already established—that it plays out a kind of fatalistic tragic-
drama in which the victim’s demise is inevitable:  
 
 A trap within a trap, victims within a victim; as anthropologists we should be the 
 first to recognize redundancy within the mythological code as a means of 
 underlining the dialectical message, which in this case is to induce the spectator 
 to identify him- or herself with the victims in this assemblage (the dead animal, 
                                                 
270Alfred Gell, Vogel’s Net: Traps as Artworks and Artworks as Traps, in Gell and Hirsch, The Art of 
Anthropology, pp. 187-214, (p. 201). 
271 Gell incorrectly refers to it as a sheep’s head. 
272 Gell, Vogel’s Net, in Gell and Hirsch, The Art of Anthropology, p. 203. 
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 the maggots, the flies) and at the same time with the vicious God who has set this 
 rigmarole of a world in motion, the makers of traps, Hirst, you, me…273 
  
It is in this essay that Gell mentions, in passing, a work by Marcel Duchamp that I 
think has particular significance: Trébuchet, a readymade from 1917, is an 
ordinary coat-rack that has been nailed to the floor.  In 1953, Duchamp described 
this readymade in the following manner to Harriet Janis:  
  
 A real coat hanger that I wanted at some time to put on the wall and hang my 
 things on but I never did come to that – so it was on the floor and I would kick it 
 every minute, every time I went out – I got crazy with it and I said the hell with 
 it, if it wants to stay there and bore me I’ll nail it down, and then the association 
 with the Readymade came and it was that.274  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 20.  Marcel Duchamp, Trébuchet (1917). 
 
 
Trébuchet, is loosely translated as ‘trap’, but ‘trebuchér’, the verb, means to trip 
or stumble. There are three further possible meanings: a double-trayed scale for 
weighing gold and other metals, a bird trap, and a chess player’s ruse for ‘tripping 
                                                 
273 Ibid, p. 205. 
274 Interview with Sidney Janis, 1953, quoted in Anne and M. A. C. Shine D'Harnoncourt, Marcel Duchamp, 
and Kynaston Macshine, Marcel Duchamp, ed. by Anne D'harnoncourt and Kynaston McshineLondon: 
Thames and Hudson, 1974), p. 283. 
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up’ his opponent.275  Thierry de Duve describes it as three-dimensional word-play 
(recalling the work of Raymond Roussel, whose writing influenced Duchamp), 
but also makes oblique reference to the Zeuxis and Parrhasios fable: ‘The birds 
caught in the trap are the viewers […] who take this coat rack nailed to the floor 
for a real object when it is merely, thanks to its title, something placed on the 
aesthetic scale […] for their attention.’276  According to Gell’s notion of the 
expanded connectedness of artworks and artefacts, Trébuchet functions as a 
‘thought-trap’, set within a context (the gallery) which is itself, a place of fleeting 
captivity: ‘and what is any art gallery but a place of capture, set with what Boyer 
calls “thought-traps”, which hold their victims for a time, in suspension?’277  
Implicit in Duchamp’s own description of this errant object is the idea of 
repetition (‘I would kick it every minute, every time I went out’), immediately 
suggesting a certain comic tone reminiscent of slapstick comedy.  A great part of 
the humour of slapstick (particularly in the early films of Laurel and Hardy, and 
Buster Keaton) lies in its repetitious inevitability: the knowledge that if something 
is there to trip over, then someone will trip over it—often over and over again.  
There is much of Duchamp’s work, including Trebuchet and Door: 11, Rue 
Larrey (1927)—a door angled between two adjacent doorways—that implicates 
the viewer in an actual or mentally projected farcical engagement. 
 Might it be possible here to extrapolate Gell’s notion of artworks as traps 
to the arcane arena of theatrical magic?  It may be objected that the comparison of 
static, two or three-dimensional artworks, with magic routines that are inherently 
performative, is tenuous, in that they represent distinct areas of practice.  
However, as Gell points out, the act of drawing can usefully be considered as 
performative—analogous to dancing—the resulting artefact representing a ‘kind 
of frozen residue of this manual ballet’.278  This parallel becomes especially 
apposite for Frize’s paintings (discussed earlier), where the choreographic nature 
of employing multiple executants is often a pre-requisite for their outcome.  Even 
Duchamp’s work can be thought of as performative: ‘ontological transformations 
                                                 
275 Thierry de Duve, Kant after Duchamp, (Cambridge, Mass. ; London: MIT Press, 1996), p. 409.  
(Duchamp was a keen chess player). 
276 Ibid, p. 409.  The story is that Zeuxis and Parrhasios, two 5th century (BC) Greek artists, held a contest to 
determine which was the greater artist: when Zeuxis unveiled his painting of grapes, they appeared so life-
like and inviting that birds flew down from the sky to peck at them. 
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278 Gell, Art and Agency, p. 95. 
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[…] forged through language, the performance itself a show of rhetorical 
tropes’.279  A candidate for consideration here is what is thought possibly to be the 
oldest routine in magic, the ‘cups and balls’, in which a complex and perplexing 
sequence of moves is executed by the magician, during which the viewer is 
continually ‘tripped-up’ and led into a number of ‘traps’, or false assumptions.  
The apparent function of these moves is to dazzle or mesmerize the viewer, who 
then becomes caught up in, or captivated by them; in reality this pattern of 
manoeuvres conceals the real business of the routine, which is to get the balls (and 
often various other objects) under, and out from under the cups, without the 
audience seeing them.  Even then the hapless spectator is not released from this 
particular trap, for the appearance, disappearance and displacement of balls was 
itself a ruse, a false ending: the real climax (the ‘prestige’) of the cups and balls, is 
one of scale.  When we think the trick is over, the magician tips over the cups one 
final time, to reveal objects twice or three times the size of the original balls—
limes, lemons, eggs, even live chicks, suddenly appear from underneath objects 
surely too small to have contained them in the first place.  In each of the above 
examples the notion of a trap is not material—in that no one is ‘physically’ being 
trapped (apart from the chicks)—but cognitive.  
 
 
 
Fig. 21.  Cups and Balls magic routine, instructional illustration. 
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Word games and performatives 
 
The sequence of pieces that I produced under the generic heading of Incantations 
were intended to function as an exploration of this notion of cognitive traps, but in 
this case as works which introduce language as a means of triggering certain kinds 
of dissonant responses in the viewer.  There is a rich tradition of language being 
exploited for its ambiguity (puns, nonsense verse, word games, logical 
paradoxes), which, although sometimes regarded as trivial, seemed to me to be 
constitutive of the territory I had already been exploring.280  Additionally, many 
artists associated with the tendency in art from the 1960s and 70s identified 
broadly under the rubric of ‘Conceptual Art’ (Joseph Kosuth, Mel Bochner, John 
Baldessari, Ian Burn and others), used language as a means of testing the 
relationship between art and ideas, between the percept and the concept.  Ian 
Burn’s 1970 work entitled Looking Through a Piece of Glass embodies this idea: 
it consists of a rectangular box-frame with glass panels at the front and sides, the 
back painted panel having the words LOOKING THROUGH A PIECE OF 
GLASS painted in white lettering.  This of course is exactly what you are doing 
when you read the words, immediately conjoining the act of looking with the 
material qualities of the artwork.  As Adrian Piper points out: ‘you get this 
conflict between looking at the surface, looking through the surface, looking at 
yourself in the surface, and reading the text behind the surface, which refers you 
back to what’s beyond the surface and which you can’t possibly look at while 
you’re reading the text.’281  Furthermore, the work enacts an example of 
‘performative’ linguistic phenomena; in Green and Lowry’s essay From Presence 
to Performative, the authors draw upon J.L. Austin’s ‘Speech Act Theory’, in 
which the philosopher of language distinguished between denotative statements, 
called constatives—‘sentences which seemed to describe an event or matter of 
fact’—and performatives, which ‘could best be described as actions rather than 
being decoded as meanings.’282  Burn’s piece certainly has a performative aspect, 
in so far as the viewer is acting out its message. 
                                                 
280 In the English language, Edward Lear, Lewis Carroll and even James Joyce are examples of writers who 
indulged in wordplay. 
281Adrian Piper, Ian Burn's Conceptualism, in Michael Corris, Conceptual Art: Theory, Myth, and Practice, 
(Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), pp. 342-357 (p. 348). 
282 David Green and Joanna Lowry, From Presence to the Performative: in Green, PhotoWorks., and 
PhotoForum Inc., Where Is the Photograph? (pp. 47-60), p. 52. 
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 The works that constitute Incantations took as their starting point the 
phrase VIEW FROM OTHER SIDE, this in turn originating in the many years 
spent giving lectures in which the visual component was provided via slide 
transparencies and projectors (these words often appear on the lower framing edge 
of one side of a slide transparency, as an indicator for positioning within the 
carousel).  This ubiquitous instruction, familiar to anyone who has ever given a 
slide lecture, seemed to me to bring together language and vision in a dissonantly 
productive fashion.  Possibly due to my own stumbling at these points of acute 
decision-making (I usually failed to remember which way round the slides should 
be positioned in the carousel), but also suspecting that here was a moment of 
cognitive irruption that might be ‘universally’ recognizable, I began to think about 
the possible connotations and implications of this experience.  Subsequently I 
made a large-scale installation drawing, in response to the difficulties of 
negotiating a shop-door whose sign read ‘push’ on one side, and ‘pull’ on the 
other; this straightforward directive was complicated by the simple fact that the 
door itself was made of glass, thereby creating a momentary disjunction in what 
would otherwise have been an ‘invisible’, cognitive operation.  Once again I am 
able to invoke Heidegger’s equipment or tool model here, for this simple 
negotiation of a door is one that he specifically mentions: ‘When we enter here 
through the door, we do not apprehend the seats, and the same holds for the 
doorknob.’283  Michael Wheeler, in his proposal for a Heideggerian model of 
cognitive science, refers to this example of ‘smooth coping’ that becomes 
disrupted, for example, when the door is stuck and the doorknob suddenly irrupts 
into ‘conspicuousness’; it ceases to be phenomenologically invisible.284  The work 
that I produced in response to this experience of negotiating the door (Untitled, 
2003), consisted of an 8’ x 8’ free-standing gallery display board with the word 
‘PUSH’ drawn, in reverse, across the width of its upper half.285  In order to further 
complicate the reading, the letters themselves were outlined, as a negative, by 
their own implied, thrown shadow, thereby treating them as if they were physical 
objects.  The three-dimensional display board itself also had to be negotiated by 
                                                 
283 Wheeler, Reconstructing the Cognitive World, p. 131. 
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285 Jonathan Gilhooly, Untitled, (2003), shown in Hung, Drawn and Quartered, an exhibition of drawing at 
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the visitor to the gallery, as it partially blocked access to the main space, resulting 
in a kind of re-enactment of my original experience with the door. 
 The recent pieces View from other side, take a similar approach to 
text/language as provisional and pliable.  Specifically the word ‘view’ acts as both 
verb and noun, transforming the phrase from command to statement (or vice 
versa).  When originally shown the pieces were hung in doorways, thus alluding 
to the original function of apotropaic traps as threshold devices.  Like the ‘Push’ 
drawing, they display lettering as negative and (literally) ‘cut out’; the letters 
themselves are reversed, although the phrase is not, meaning that, in spite of an 
inkling that it might be readable from the ‘other side’, it is actually illegible from 
both.  Another piece in this group of works situated the phrase, as a cut-out 
negative, in front of a letter-box shaped mirror; the normal expectation that the 
words would be reversed is confounded by their appearance as an echo, thereby 
implying infinite regression and the impossibility of ever fulfilling the implicit 
instruction.286  Another work, Double Bind, extends this idea through a 
combination of mirrors and glass tumblers.287  Recalling the formal arrangement 
of the ‘Cups and Balls’ routine, Double Bind positions three groups of two glass 
tumblers in such away that each pair supports a rectangular mirror or sheet of 
glass at a forty-five degree angle. 288  The tumblers contain objects such as red 
balls or limes, but as the viewer moves around the piece some of these objects 
disappear and reappear owing to the confusing nature of the symmetrical 
reflections.  Once again, as in View from other side, the agency of the spectator is 
elicited in producing the meaning of the work itself. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
286 Jonathan Gilhooly, View from other side, (2008). 
287 Jonathan Gilhooly, Double Bind (2007), shown at Grey Area, Brighton. 
288 Gregory Bateson formulated the concept of double-binding in conjunction with an investigation of mental 
disorders such as schizophrenia.  However, he also acknowledged that it could occur in ‘normal’ 
circumstances, especially in ‘play, humor, poetry, ritual and fiction’.  The clearest illustration of the double 
bind occurs in humour or comedy: in his book The Act of Creation, Arthur Koestler expounds a theoretical 
basis for comedy based on the notion of the double bind, although he terms it bisociation. Koestler’s notion 
of bisociation focuses on a structural dissection of this particular phenomenon, whereas Bateson’s concept of 
double bind concentrates on what happens within an existential engagement with cognitive dissonance.  
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Fig. 22.  Jonathan Gilhooly, View from other side (2008). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 23.  Jonathan Gilhooly, Double Bind (2007). 
 
 
 
The aim of these drawings was to activate the viewer in such a way that he would 
be impelled to move around the work in order to see the ‘other side’; finding 
himself in an effective double bind, he would be unable to extricate himself, or to 
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find a ‘solution’ to the apparent conundrum.  Furthermore the phrase itself is 
intended to conjure up associations of witchcraft and the supernatural: ‘the other 
side’ is the side of the spirit world, and therefore alludes to a late 19th century 
preoccupation with visuality as being somehow consonant with the hidden world, 
with the world of spirits.289  The ‘other side’ is therefore both symbolic and 
geographical in so far as the viewer might imagine another (metaphorical) side at 
the same time as physically moving to an opposite viewing position.  As with the 
Ian Burn piece, the spectator is here acting out in the manner of his response, the 
tacit instruction at the heart of the work.  This returns us to Gell’s ‘apotropaic’ 
patterns, and to a component of his argument not yet fully addressed: that the 
viewer (whether demon or human spectator) can be conceived of as a mimic of 
previously articulated actions.  This concept of mimicry, or mirroring, is not only 
consonant with Gell’s concept of agency, it also articulates a central tenet of 
modern neuroscientific research, wherein a possible cognitive basis for the social 
tendency for mimicry or imitative behaviour has been identified. 
 
 
 
Mirrors and Mimicry 
 
In his book, Making Up The Mind, neuropsychologist Chris Frith talks about what 
he sees as the very real phenomenon of mind over matter, in so far as it manifests 
itself in our own everyday experience of lifting our fingers, hand, or arm in order 
to carry out an action.290  We respond, he asserts, to the agency of others in the 
same way that we respond to our own agency; this is a view of agency that has 
emerged from a relatively new hybrid discipline, that of social neuroscience.  
Frith argues that our knowledge of the world of other minds is created in the same 
way for each of us as our knowledge of the world ‘out there’.  We acquire this 
knowledge by observing how others act (are agents) within and upon the world.  
                                                 
289 This is similar to the description in the previous chapter, of the employment of photography (in the 19th 
century) as a means of securing belief in the spirit world; i.e. as a scientific affirmation of that which 
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290Christopher D. Frith, Making up the Mind: How the Brain Creates Our Mental World (Oxford: Blackwell, 
2007), p.152.  Frith quotes a literary passage: ‘She raised her hand and flexed its fingers and wondered, as she 
had sometimes before, how this thing, this machine for gripping, this fleshy spider on the end of her arm, 
came to be hers, entirely at her command.’ (From Ian McEwan’s Atonement.)  
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According to Boyer’s notion of intuitive ontological categories, we intuitively 
infer different types of movement (a leaf blown by the wind, a human hand 
gesture) in terms of intentional agency, cause and effect.291  Although simple 
recognition (that a particular object is a cat, rather than a tree) ‘does not give us 
access to the mental world of beliefs and intentions’, observing the intentional 
movement of a cat (or a person) can tell us something about those worlds.292  In 
Echo Objects Barbara Maria Stafford compares recent experiments in functional 
brain imaging (fMRI) with the Romantic insight that ‘individuals, things, and 
scenes constitute a resonating system’; in other words, that ‘mind’ can become 
diffused or extended into its environment.293  In the chapter Mimesis again! 
Stafford invokes the phenomenon of mirror neurons as a basis for the discussion 
of mimetic behaviour.  Mirror neurons were experimentally postulated by the 
Italian neurophysiologist Giacomo Rizzolatti, whilst observing brain activity in 
Macaque monkeys; particular neurons became activated not only when the 
monkeys made certain kinds of movements (eg, grasping an object), but also 
when they observed other monkeys, or even humans, making the same kind of 
gesture.  For Stafford, the concept of mirror neurons helps to return mimesis ‘to 
its rightful esthetic significance after a long poststructuralist hiatus’, in that it 
challenges certain assumptions that have emerged through a prioritizing of 
language as the ‘royal road to the knowledge of other minds’.294   
 The evidence for mirror neurons is by no means overwhelming, and 
opposing experimental data has also been produced.295  More importantly 
perhaps, as Chris Frith has argued, ‘people and their brains are rarely found in 
isolation.  Isolation is bad for them.  The human brain is exquisitely tuned for 
interaction with other people.’296  This qualification by Frith helps to curb what 
might otherwise have constituted a fairly reductive, positivist interpretation of 
mirror neurons (that they are purely ‘brain-centered’ phenomena), and instead 
positions them within a more socially oriented model of mind as extended and 
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294 Daniel Clement Dennett, Kinds of Minds: Towards an Understanding of Consciousness, Science Masters 
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295 Ilan Dinstein et al., 'Executed and Observed Movements Have Different Distributed Representations in 
Human aIPS', J. Neurosci., 28 (2008), 11231-39. 
296 Frith, Making up the Mind, p.187. 
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distributed.  I recognize however that I will need to tread carefully here: the 
adoption of neurological evidence (for the existence of mirror neurons) into the 
sphere of philosophy (pace Wheeler and others) is itself complex and diverse, 
yielding subtly nuanced and contending variations on the theme of extended 
mind.  However, what I intend in deploying these ideas is that they can be seen 
provisionally to underpin the more anthropologically oriented definitions of 
‘mind’ in a generically plausible manner; it is therefore not necessary for me to 
get involved in the minutiae of internal arguments concerning mirror neurons, in 
order to justify their inclusion.  Having said that, the ideas of Andy Clark and 
Michael Wheeler do seem to be those that most closely converge with Gell’s.  
Clark, whose radical hypothesis of extended cognition favours a ‘coupled 
system[…] comprising neural, bodily and worldly elements’, uses the example of 
what he calls ‘thoughtful gestures’, bodily movements that accompany verbal 
communication, suggesting that, rather than being merely expressive, these might 
play ‘some kind of active causal role in thinking’. 297  Like Stafford, Clark also 
invokes the example of mirror neurons, citing David McNeil’s suggestion that our 
own gestures activate ‘the part of the brain that responds to intentional actions, 
including gestures, by someone else, and thus treats one’s own gestures as a social 
stimulus’.298  For Wheeler, cognitive processes can incorporate extra-somatic 
components (such as notebooks and computers), with which the subject extends 
his cognition into the world ‘out there’.  These ideas, it seems to me, clearly 
converge with Alfred Gell’s notion of mind as something extended and 
distributed.  Gell’s concept of the extended mind is itself an extension of the idea 
of distributed personhood to which I referred in the previous chapter; Gell sees an 
‘isomorphy of structure between the cognitive processes we know (from the 
inside) as “consciousness” and the spatio-temporal structures of distributed 
objects in the artefactual realm’, and correspondingly that our ‘inner personhood 
seems to consist of replications of what we are externally’.  With these ideas in 
mind, it might now be possible to conceptualize some of the text works referred to 
earlier, such as view from other side, as eliciting a unified, coupled response, 
incorporating mind, vision, language, body and world.   
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298 Ibid, p.128. 
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 In similar vein art historian David Freedberg has commented on the 
capacity for viewers of paintings mentally to reconstruct bodily gestures from 
their visible traces as painted marks: 
 
 even the artist’s gestures in producing the art work induce the empathetic 
 engagement of the observer, by activating simulation of the motor program that 
 corresponds to the gesture implied by the trace.  The marks on the painting or 
 sculpture are the visible traces of goal-directed movements.299 
 
Freedberg’s description (above) might well be seen to support a Gellian analysis 
of the kind I made earlier in relation to the paintings of Bernard Frize; arguably it 
is less convincing for more overtly figurative works in which evidence of the 
‘trace’ might be muted or less significant.  However, from the point of view of my 
argument this kind of mimetic or empathetic activity has a more straightforward 
‘you do as I do’ significance: in magic the magician fakes symmetrical responses 
(nods of the head, eye movements) in order to dissimulate his intentions.  In other 
words the viewer can be fooled into a false sense of empathy with the magician.  
A good example of this is the tense-relax strategy employed to great effect by 
Tony Slydini; the Italian magician exploited the way that an audience will tend to 
mirror or echo the body language of the performer, thereby enabling him to 
predict when attention will be at its most acute, and when it will be less critical.300  
In the realm of visual art, Barbara Stafford has commented on the series of 
‘Museum’ photographs by German artist Thomas Struth, in which viewers are 
depicted as unconsciously mimicking the compositional orientation of the 
paintings in front of which they stand. 
 
 His Gallery series illuminates how socially diverse and entropically scattered 
 modern viewers, standing in the world’s great museums, unconsciously align 
 themselves with schemata implicit in the painting on the wall that they are 
 beholding.  A telling case is the group of tourists diagonally fanning out in front 
 of Gericault’s Raft of the Medusa, mimicking and so internalizing the compact 
                                                 
299 David Freedberg and Vittorio Gallese, Motion, emotion and empathy in esthetic experience, in Trends in 
Cognitive Sciences, (Volume 11, Issue 5, May 2007), pp. 197-203, (p. 202). 
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 triangular structure of this natural and human disaster until it gets lodged in the 
 bone.301 
 
The fact that this feature may be a by-product of Struth’s intentions does not 
undermine the saliency of Stafford’s analysis; the observations she makes are 
undeniably features of the photographs’ compositional structure.   
 It seems worth commenting briefly on the use of the word ‘mirror’ to 
describe these neurologically-driven theories: mirrors lie at the heart of magical 
illusionism, in fact Barbara Stafford herself describes the mirror as ‘that absolute 
(optical) device […] from which all the others in one way or another subtend’.302  
The presence of actual mirrors in artworks immediately suggests and embodies a 
problematized relation with reality—we see ourselves, seeing.  For the observer 
however, this can present the possibility of a rejuvenated engagement with 
original material.  In Mark Wallinger’s video work, Regard a Mere Mad Rager 
(1993), we see a clip of British comedian Tommy Cooper performing a quick-
change routine, which sees him putting on and taking off a series of hats.303  The 
title of the piece is, in fact, a palindrome, and the video-tape itself is played 
backwards—the video monitor visible only as a reflection in a large mirror. This 
displacement of the material has the effect of defamiliarizing it, in spite of the 
image of Cooper himself being utterly familiar to a British audience.  In viewing 
the work we find ourselves attempting to regain familiarity by endeavouring to 
reconstitute the backward-running commentary, or at least our memory of it.  In 
an impromptu recent work in response to Anish Kapoor’s Sky Mirror, I mimicked 
the form of the original sculpture (a three metre-diameter, tilted concave mirror) 
by producing a miniaturized replica.304  The site of Kapoor’s piece (a public 
gardens) was thought to necessitate the use of both a protective cordon and a 
security guard, consequently making both the work and its normally public 
location oddly inaccessible.  It seemed to me that the senses of touch and sight 
had been unwittingly and provocatively brought together by this prohibitive act, 
the strictures of ‘do not touch’ becoming all but synonymous with ‘do not look’.  
This, and Sky Mirror’s circular form, immediately recalled the polished shield 
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worn by Perseus as an aid to killing the Gorgon, Medusa; as gazing directly at the 
Medusa would have resulted in instant death, Perseus used his shield as a 
reflective device to enable him to look upon, and so defeat her.  My own piece, 
Empyrean Speculum, was sited close to the Kapoor work, complete with its own 
tiny fence and faux-security guard.  In spite of the larger mirror’s intended 
purpose to reflect the sky, it was evident that the majority of people wanted to get 
up close in order to see their own reflections, which they were more easily able to 
do with the miniature version.305  Empyrean Speculum functioned as a reflection, 
literally and metaphorically, of Sky Mirror, by mimicking its form, and thereby 
exposing some of the (partially concealed) circumstances of its installation. 
 That developments in neuroscience have led to the articulation of ideas 
around agency that seem uncannily close to those theorized by anthropologists 
such as Gell, is interesting for a number of reasons, not least because some of the 
technological paraphernalia used by scientists are similar to those used by 
magicians.  Chief amongst these are, appropriately enough, mirrors. The 
neurologist Vilayanur S. Ramachandran has investigated the phenomenon of 
‘phantom limbs’, in patients who have lost a limb through amputation.  Most 
patients with phantom arms feel that they can move their phantoms, but in many 
the phantom is fixed or paralyzed, often in a cramped position that is 
excruciatingly painful. In order to overcome what he postulated as a ‘learned’ 
paralysis, Ramachandran created the mirror box in which a mirror is placed 
vertically in front of the patient, who then looks at the mirror reflection of the 
normal arm so that the reflection is optically superimposed on the felt location of 
the phantom (thus creating the visual illusion that the phantom has been 
resurrected).  Remarkably if the patient now moved his normal hand while 
looking at the reflection, he not only saw the phantom move (as expected) but felt 
it to move as well. In some patients this seemed to abolish the pain in the 
phantom; In others the phantom disappeared entirely—along with the pain—for 
the first time in years. 306  In I Am Anagram, the artist Aura Satz uses the exact  
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Fig. 24.  V.S. Ramachandran, ‘phantom hand’, mirror experiment. 
 
 
same set up to explore the connection between a tradition of violence and 
dismemberment in aspects of the magic act, and the use of magic props (mirrors, 
etc) within the discipline of neuroscience—this time to opposite effect, that is, to 
recreate integrity where there is loss.  The work constitutes an ‘interactive 
performative sculptural installation, a complex kaleidoscopic mirror box of sorts, 
which audience members are guided through and into, one by one’.307 
 
 I Am Anagram explores the concept of the Exquisite Corpse both literally and 
 metaphorically. The new anatomy that results from illusion is conjured through 
 the joint authorship of interior phenomenological experience of body-image and 
 exteriorized spectatorship, a sense of being at once within and without one’s self. 
 This is extreme close-up magic; inner, interiorized, incarnate magic, which can 
 be, to the actual sufferer, a terrifying pandemonium. Throughout the show, the 
 cabinet will become an accumulative repository full of the phantom limbs of its 
 participants.308 
 
Satz work also explores the concept of ‘displaced agency’, when the binding 
together of the cause and effect of an action is undone in some way.  This is 
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precisely what is happening to Ramachandran’s patients, who feel the effect of 
pain in missing limbs, without the concomitant cause.  
 I am now able to re-position my video/performance work Never Odd or 
Even, (referred to in the previous chapter) in the context of these ideas around 
extended agency.  In the video a live performer appears to mirror the actions of 
his filmed double; this doubling function gradually disintegrates as the protagonist 
becomes aware of his own unique agency, as separate from that of his co-
conspirator.  Much of the meaning of the work derives from the way in which the 
viewer becomes inured to distinctions between flesh and blood actor and his two-
dimensional doppelganger, the two of them interacting in ways that are clearly 
staged, but seem fluid and natural.  What I am proposing here is that the ability 
for the live performer in this piece to respond naturally to his filmed double, goes 
beyond the limits of rigorous rehearsal (timing, coordination of movements, etc); 
rather there is an element of ‘thoughtful gesturing’, and empathetic response to 
gestures, that occurs between the performer and his double.  The video 
documentation of the performance reveals a great deal of unconscious mimicry 
(head movements, eye contact, hand gestures) that seems to go beyond the 
structural mirroring already built into the format of the piece.  Moreover, the 
audience is able to respond knowingly to these exchanges—aware of the work’s 
constructedness, but simultaneously caught up in the complex symmetrical 
‘dance’ that these two agents perform in front of them. 
 
 
Summary 
 
How do the theoretical concepts I have employed in this chapter—Gell’s 
cognitive traps, Heidegger’s ‘unreadiness-to-hand’, and the neuroscientific 
concept of mirror neurons—come together to form a productive appraisal of my 
chosen material?  I believe that it is possible to regard the scientific concept of 
mirror neurons in such a way that it helps to throw light upon and reinforce Gell’s 
‘extended mind’ theory.  This in turn aids a particular interpretation of artworks 
that positions them as part of a network within which the viewer is (cognitively) 
trapped.  The kolam, or threshold designs described by Gell are created with the 
specific intention of fooling the malevolent demon; the implicit suggestion here is 
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that, in many parts of the world demons, although powerful, are also (deemed to 
be) stupid.309  The demon has certain human characteristics attributed to it (sight, 
movement, agency), but not others (intelligence, humour).  Human agents on the 
other hand, are able to enjoy the experience of becoming cognitively ensnared—
can find it challenging, frustrating, even funny.  They can also (unlike the demon) 
have a kind of meta-awareness of their own trapped state, whether via a 
malfunctioning doorknob, a complex abstract pattern, or a bewildering magic 
routine, thus being momentarily ousted from their normative ‘smooth-coping’ 
condition.  Furthermore, the points raised in relation to pieces such as View from 
other side reveal a response to artworks which is not simply about looking at 
them, but about engaging with them visually and bodily, even (unconsciously) 
mimicking the vestigial intimations of their agency.  In the final chapter I look 
more closely at the ‘materiality’ of the artwork itself, and as a category of 
enchanted object. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
309 Boyer, Religion Explained, p. 9. 
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Chapter 5 
Enchanted Objects, Objects of Enchantment 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
In Mirror Ball (2008), the spectator enters an apparently empty white gallery 
space.  On closer inspection there is a small aperture in the centre of the far wall, 
situated at roughly head height, and approximately one centimetre in diameter.310  
The view through this aperture reveals a small room that can be glimpsed behind 
the gallery wall; close to the back of this space stands a white plinth on top of 
which sits a mirrored cube that is open on three sides.  Floating inside this cube—
moving erratically up and down and from side to side—without any visible means 
of support, is a crumpled ball of white paper.  The ostensible lack of support for 
the ball of paper is reinforced by its complete visibility, via the agency of the 
mirrored cube, which enables the spectator to see it from all sides.   At the same 
time at least part of the space in which this installation stands is also visible: the 
top half of the plinth (assuming that the floor is on the same level as the one on 
which the spectator stands), the back wall situated just behind the plinth, and what 
appears to be the front wall thrown back in the complex configuration of 
reflections from the mirrors themselves.  Something else also appears in these 
reflections: a small shelf of some sort (the brackets are clearly visible) that 
appears to support a flat rectangular object and narrow horizontal bar, the exact 
position of which are difficult to ascertain, but which seem to constitute a 
contraption that is somehow central to the performance of the whole effect. 
 In a companion piece, A Crumpled Ball of Paper Floating on the Breath of 
the Artist (2008), a life-size video projection is positioned low on the gallery 
wall.311  The film depicts the head and chest of a recumbent figure blowing gently 
at a crumpled ball of paper, which floats just above his face, apparently rising and 
falling in rhythm to the exhalations of his breath.  For the 90 second duration of 
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the video the camera remains static, and there are objects visible at the periphery 
of the image: at the lower left corner is a single plug socket, with plug inserted 
and a lead trailing out of the lower edge of the picture; at the top right corner of 
the screen the portion of a laminated sign of some sort can be clearly seen, its 
lower left-hand corner tacked to the wall with a single, white drawing pin. 
 In both of these works the viewer is presented with a limited but 
significant amount of visual information—information that simultaneously 
conceals and reveals.  The visual cues presented appear to reinforce a particular 
kind of reading, one that emphasizes the normative relationship between the 
viewing position of the spectator and the structural orientation of the work itself.  
At the same time, there is not enough visual data to substantially explain or justify 
the phenomenon apparently taking place in each piece of work—that of a ball of 
paper, floating impossibly in mid-air.  In fact each work produces its 
phenomenological effect in a roughly similar way, firstly by rotating the image 
seen through 90 degrees.  In the video work this was achieved at the filming stage, 
by tilting the camera on its side so that the (actual) seated, upright figure appears  
 
 
 
Fig. 25.  Jonathan Gilhooly, Crumpled Ball of Paper floating on the Breath of the Artist (2008). 
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to be lying on his back.  The plug socket at the lower left of the image has been 
fixed at a 90-degree, clockwise angle from its normal position so that, when 
viewed through the tilted camera, it appears the right way up and in the correct 
position and orientation for a plug socket.  This still does not account for the 
ability of the ball of paper to float: this was achieved with the use of invisible 
thread, an extremely fine, single filament nylon fibre used by magicians, and 
which, under the proper lighting conditions, is virtually impossible to see.  Acute 
and sustained scrutiny might actually discover this thread, but, because of the 90-
degree tilt, it is no longer attached to the ball of paper from the point at which the 
viewer would expect to find it (i.e. suspended vertically), but horizontally from 
the side, so that its invisibility is, so to speak, doubly assured.  Mirror Ball works 
according to similar principles: a sheet of mirrored glass directly behind the 
viewing aperture is angled at 45 degrees, making the plinth and mirrored cube—
which are actually lying horizontally on the floor—appear as if standing vertically 
at the back of the space.  Again, invisible thread is used to suspend the ball of 
paper, whose bobbing movement is caused by a small fan, just outside the 
spectator’s line of sight.  Because the angle of the thread is perpendicular to the 
spectator’s sight line, once again its invisibility is reinforced.  In this piece, even 
though the apparatus for realizing the illusion is notionally visible in the mirrored 
cube (the shelf, brackets and bar referred to above), its presence is not enough to 
counter the strength of an intuitively normative reading of the visual information 
being offered.  In other words, the illusion of a ‘normal’ reading is absolute even 
when the spectator knows (or is able to deduce) how it has been achieved.  Both of 
these pieces present a recognizable object—the ball of paper—as simultaneously 
banal and magical.312 
 In this chapter I want to examine the role and status of the art object and 
the magic object from two related positions: firstly Alfred Gell’s notion of art as a 
‘technology of enchantment’, in which he positions the artwork as a specific 
category of object the nature of which is unpredictable, and that can exercise, or 
be treated as exercising, social agency.  As a supplementary argument I propose 
that the orthodox notion of artistic ‘influence’ might be re-calibrated, in terms of 
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Gell’s theory, as the abduction of agency through a causal chain of sympathy and 
contagion.  Thus the connections between works of other artists (often 
consciously adopted) and my own can be accounted for in a manner consonant 
with the theoretical framework; this will also enable me to set out a speculative 
interpretation of the way in which art objects acquire positions (culturally and 
historically) within a (putatively taxonomic) network of relations.  Second, by 
way of a material culture analysis (derived principally from Henare, Holbraad and 
Wastell’s Thinking through Things), I will introduce the idea that objects (or 
things) might be considered synonymous with their significatory power: this 
second approach treats things as if they embodied their representational concepts, 
rather than seeking to explain them through (western) orthodox, analytical 
means.313  These two approaches form a mutually constitutive analysis of the art 
object and of the magic object, in so far as these can be viewed first of all as 
possessing agency (as opposed to a more normative ‘neutral’ status of awaiting 
the impact of some external agency), and secondly as embodying concepts (as 
opposed to representing or symbolizing them).  The object that provides the nexus 
of these theoretical approaches within this chapter, is the magic object or ‘prop’; I 
intend to deploy the magic ‘prop’, as an ontologically problematic and 
indeterminate object, in order to illuminate certain characteristics of the 
postmodern art object. 
  
 
Object agency and enchantment 
 
In Alfred Gell’s anthropological theory of art, Art and Agency, art objects are 
conceptualized, not as objects of an aesthetic gaze, but as material indexes of 
agencies that are able to trigger abduction in viewers.  Gell’s notion of abduction 
is not a theory of causal inference, but of inferred intentionality, itself drawn from 
what he sees as an innate tendency to attribute social agency whenever we 
encounter effect.  The important—and somewhat counter-intuitive—issue here is 
the power that Gell ascribes to objects which, though non-biological, might be 
                                                 
313 Amiria Henare, Martin Holbraad, and Sari Wastell, Thinking through Things: Theorising Artefacts 
Ethnographically, (London: Routledge, 2007). 
  
126 
construed as animate within particular social contexts.  In other words, things can 
have agency imputed to them, whether this be the little girl’s doll who becomes an 
effective family member, or the car that is chastised by its owner for having the 
temerity to break down at an inconvenient moment (both are examples given by 
Gell).314  Gell deals with the potential objections to this account of agency (that 
non-biological ‘things’ cannot have intentions) by appealing to the fact that 
human agency is always exercised within an already causally active material 
world: ‘unless there is some kind of physical mediation which always does exploit 
the manifold causal properties of the ambient physical world […] agent and 
patient will not interact.’315 
 Gell also defines captivation or enchantment, as a process in which the 
spectator becomes trapped (cognitively) within the index (artwork) because, as he 
says ‘the index embodies agency which is essentially indecipherable’.316  Gell 
seems mainly to attribute this indecipherability to the disparity of powers between 
artist and spectator (which we—that is ‘we’ within the Western tradition—might 
attribute to inspiration, or artistic genius), in so far as the spectator is unable to 
trace the path of technical processes by which the transformation from raw 
material to finished product has been effected.317  He uses the example of 
Vermeer, whose technical virtuosity frustrates the attempts of the spectator to 
trace the origins of his paintings, in spite of perhaps understanding, on some level, 
how a painting is made.  The origination of the artwork is therefore blocked or 
occluded, and the spectator is left, as Gell himself explains, ‘suspended between 
two worlds; the world in which I ordinarily live, in which objects have rational 
explanations and knowable origins, and the world adumbrated in the picture and 
which defeats explanation.’318  Gell equates western notions of inspiration or 
genius with the magical efficacy of so-called primitive societies, and although he 
stresses the idea of technical virtuosity (as in the Vermeer painting), he is willing 
to extend this category beyond its purely mimetic function to include modern 
artists such as Duchamp, in whose work little or no skill (in the conventional 
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sense) is evident, and whose transformation of materials may be conceptually and 
contextually defined rather than technically, but the effect of which is still beyond 
the intellectual grasp of the viewer.  (This could be described as the paradigm of 
much late modern and postmodern art, which has become self-reflexive, and 
which provides, at least in part, a critique of its own ‘grounding’.)  Gell had 
previously identified ‘magical technology’ as a model for the efficacy of works of 
art in his essay The Technology of Enchantment and the Enchantment of 
Technology; he describes enchantment and technology, broadly speaking, as being 
mutually constitutive: ‘The power of art objects stems from the technical 
processes they objectively embody: the technology of enchantment is founded on 
the enchantment of technology.  The enchantment of technology is the power that 
technical processes have of casting a spell over us so that we see the real world in 
an enchanted form.’319 He continues: 
 
 What really characterizes art objects is the way in which they tend to transcend 
 the technical schemas of the spectator, his normal sense of self-possession, then 
 we can see that there is a convergence between the characteristics of objects 
 produced through the enchanted technology of art and objects produced through 
 the enchanted technology of magic, and that, in fact, these categories tend to 
 coincide. 320 
 
Gell also describes magic as an ideal technology, a standard against which ‘all 
productive activities are measured’: it is when something appears effortless that it 
most closely converges towards this magic touchstone. 
 How might the notion of inferred intentionality be applied to magic 
objects?  Theatrical magic, with its somewhat degraded cultural status, is arguably 
tolerated only in its representation as entertainment, within the technological 
framework of what Simon During calls the ‘magic assemblage’.321  Yet its central 
project is concerned with the severing of normal cause and effect events—objects 
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appear, vanish, levitate, are transformed, etc—and these inherently transgressive 
acts push at the edges of the theatrical frame, threatening to disrupt its stabilizing 
presence.  The historical propensity for (faked) violence in the magic act is well 
documented: from P.T. Selbit’s ambulances and buckets of blood, serving as gory 
pre-performance side-shows outside the theatre, to Penn and Teller’s extreme 
‘body-mutilation’ acts.322  These allude to magic’s desire to present its effects as 
real—as more real than real—in spite of the resistance of the theatrical frame.  
Perhaps because of this dichotomous character—on the one hand transgressive 
and transcendent, and on the other trivial and shoddy—magic has provided 
contemporary art with an alluring paradigm for exploration.323  But it is the 
objects of magic that occupy the nexus of magical effects; in Gell’s terms, the 
magic object is the index whose abducted agency is continually deferred and 
occluded.  The behaviour of the particular objects in the above examples—playing 
card, ball of paper, etc—frustrates attempts, on the part of the spectator, to abduct 
agency from them, even when a possible inference is offered: would the blowing 
of a stream of air be sufficient to maintain the levitation of the crumpled ball of 
paper; or the action of a small fan be enough to cause the playing card to spin in 
mid-air?  The artist here takes on the role of magician in possessing the power to 
perform this feat apparently effortlessly.  I want to explore further this special 
position occupied by magic objects, through the theory of ‘embodied concepts’, 
but first of all I need to return to the artworks with which I began this chapter, in 
order to discover the nexus of relations within which their featured objects are 
situated. 
 Mirror Ball and A Crumpled Ball of Paper Floating on the Breath of the 
Artist rely on a particular lack of knowledge on the part of the spectator by 
including prosaic bits of visual information ostensibly for the purposes of 
orientation: these objects—shelves, plug-sockets, coving—‘disappear’ into the 
background of the main action even though their overt and somewhat weighted 
presence might be questioned.  Another ‘double bind’ situation is contrived here: 
                                                 
322 Steinmeyer, Hiding the Elephant: How Magicians Invented the Impossible, p. 81.  Selbit would tell the 
queuing audiences that it was ‘just a rehearsal’. 
323 Con Art at the Site Gallery, Sheffield (2002), comprising works by artists such as Jonathan Allen, Keith 
Tyson and Mark Wallinger, surveyed this neglected territory.  It’s stated aim was to explore ‘the convergence 
of art and magic in contemporary practice’ and ‘magic and art’s shared imaginations and art’s conspicuous 
affinity with strategies of deception. Helen and Pier Giorgio Varola, Magic/Object/Action in Varola, Maund, 
and Varola, Con Art.  
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these objects are there purely for the purposes of reinforcing a particular, 
normative reading of the image; however, because of the phenomenological 
intensity of the main event—to which the viewer gives his full attention—they are 
rendered insignificant.  It is only when shown in their correct (i.e. inverted) state, 
that they suddenly become ‘visible’.  It might be useful to return briefly to 
Heidegger’s ‘tool analysis’, first introduced in chapter 3, in order to analyse this 
phenomenon.  Graham Harman, in his account of Heidegger’s tool, or 
‘equipment’, analysis, describes what he calls an ‘invisible realm’ wherein the 
entities or aspects of the world that we rely upon, or take for granted, tend to 
recede from our awareness: ‘Instead of encountering “pane of glass,” we tend to 
make use of this item indirectly, in the form of “well-lit room.”’324  As a rule 
these entities ‘work their magic upon reality without entering our awareness’—
what Heidegger called ‘ready-to-hand’—it is only when they ‘fail’ that they 
become visible.  In this sense, the floating, crumpled ball of paper has ‘failed’ in 
that it has ceased to be part of a ‘general equipmental effect’.  As an object it is no 
more or less quotidian than the plug, until it begins to float and thereby irrupts 
into visibility.325  This is an interesting interpretation of the magic object: an 
object that—in the Heideggerian sense—has failed (to operate ‘normally’).  At no 
point does Gell make explicit reference to Heidegger in this respect, but Gell’s 
conception of magic as a technology of zero cost, could be seen to elide with 
Heidegger’s notion of the ‘unready-to-hand’, or the broken tool; magic is ‘the 
negative contour of work’, just as the smoothly functioning tool and broken 
equipment constitute mutually exclusive figure and ground to one another.326 
  
 
Sympathy and contagion 
 
The title of one of the works described above alludes to two other artworks in 
which some sort of alchemical transformation has notionally taken place: Martin 
Creed’s Work No. 88: A sheet of A4 paper crumpled into a ball, in which a sheet 
of A4 paper has been crumpled into a ball, and Piero Manzoni’s Fiato d’Artista, 
                                                 
324 Harman, Tool-Being, p. 18. 
325 Ibid, p. 18. 
326 Gell and Hirsch, The Art of Anthropology, p. 181. 
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or The Artist’s Breath, in which a red balloon is inflated by the artist and 
displayed on a wooden base.327  Partly via the title of my work I not only allude to 
these two artworks, but also endeavour to abduct their (iconic) agency into the 
service of my own.  This idea of a tacit appropriation of the magical properties of 
the work of others draws from the concept of contagious and sympathetic magic, 
the notion that objects of similarity or contact can maintain or extend their 
influence even when removed from each other in space or time.  In Art and 
Agency, Gell returns to Frazer’s ideas about magic in order to explore notions of 
causality and intention.  Frazer had distinguished two types of magical action; 
sympathetic magic, which depends on shared properties of objects, and 
contagious magic, or magic through contact, in which influence passes from one 
object to another.  This second law is conceived of as a chain of sympathy, along 
which various characteristics can be transmitted.  Frazer describes it as follows: 
‘that things which have once been in contact with each other continue to act on 
each other at a distance after the physical contact has been severed’.328  This 
concept of a ‘causal chain’, temporally dispersed, might be seen to function as a 
quasi-magical alternative to the orthodox western art historical notion of ‘stylistic’ 
influence.  The original sense of this word—influx, flowing matter—and its 
instantiation within scholastic Latin as ‘imperceptible or indirect action exerted to 
cause changes’, is highlighted here, from the point of view of origination of 
agency, mediated through or by (art) objects.   
 This is closer to Gell’s notion of agency mediated through objects and in 
fact echoes specifically his discussion of the oeuvre of Marcel Duchamp, in the 
concluding chapter of Art and Agency.  Through a complex replaying of Husserl’s 
model of time-consciousness, Gell outlines the works of Duchamp in terms of a 
sequence of retentions (from earlier works) and protentions (towards later works), 
which result in a ‘single temporal entity’.  To be more specific, Gell describes the 
artist’s oeuvre as a chronologically arranged set of works ‘each of which is partly 
a recapitulation of previous works and partly an anticipation of works as yet 
uncommenced’, and amounts to ‘artistic consciousness (personhood in the 
cognitive, temporal sense) writ large and rendered public and accessible’.329  Gell 
                                                 
327 The balloon itself has long since deflated and perished, but the crimson residue staining the plinth, 
represents a trace of the artist’s agency. 
328 Gell, Art and Agency, pp 99-106. 
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131 
articulates this notion of a body of work as temporal ‘object’, through a discussion 
of a single work by Duchamp, The Network of Stoppages, a preliminary study for 
Large Glass.  It is clear from even a cursory inspection of this work that Duchamp 
painted it over a pre-existing image—in fact two images, palimpsests ghosting 
through the reused canvas.  The first is a faint preliminary sketch for the layout of 
Large Glass, and beneath it, the trace of a painting from Duchamp’s ‘symbolist’ 
phase of 1911, entitled Young Man and Girl in Spring.  By re-framing the work’s 
title as both an expression of Duchamp’s fascination with the fourth dimension 
and Durkheim’s meditations upon time in Elementary Forms of the Religious 
Life, Gell makes salient a connection between the subject matter of Duchamp’s 
painting and its mode of presentation.330 
 
 The Network is a protention towards the Large Glass, which is a retention, first, 
 of the original abstract layout for that work […] and secondly a retention, from 
 this retention, of Duchamp’s Symbolist beginnings, the thirst for transcendence 
 […] which set him on the path he subsequently followed.331 
 
 In a similar way then A Crumpled Ball of Paper Floating on the Breath of 
the Artist can be seen as a retention of the work of two other artists (Creed and 
Manzoni) and as a protention of Mirror-ball, through a process of sympathetic or 
imitative attraction.  The question remains however, as to why these two 
particular works (by Creed and Manzoni) have been brought to bear upon the 
service of a third—namely my own.  In order to answer this it is worth staying 
with Creed’s artwork, Work No. 88: A sheet of A4 paper crumpled into a ball, for 
a little while longer.  What might seem at first glance to be an intensely banal 
work is in fact performing a number of transformative functions almost by virtue 
of that very banality.  First of all it seems to me that Creed’s crumpled ball of 
paper can be described as being in a state of transition: for what is the crumpled 
ball of (A4) paper if not the archetypal object of despair for every artist—writer, 
draughtsman, poet, composer?  It is the final state of the rejected work shortly 
before it is artlessly ejected from the world via the receptacle of the waste-paper 
                                                 
330 It could be argued that this model of Gell’s relies somewhat heavily upon the institutional categories for 
art, which earlier in the book he seems to reject: Duchamp’s ‘durée, as Gell puts it, can only be instantiated 
through a particular institutional interpretation of the artist’s ‘oeuvre’. 
331 Gell, Art and Agency, p. 246. 
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basket.  At the same time it is the quotidian flotsam chucked casually from the 
workstation by the office worker at the end of the day: Dale McFarland has 
described Creed’s artwork as ‘the office tantrum […] turned into something akin 
to an alchemical transformation’.332  However, Creed has added to this particular 
crumpled ball in that he has fashioned it approximately into a sphere, thus 
providing it with nominal sculptural form.  What we have here therefore is a kind 
of double trajectory of opposites, one descending towards bathos, and the other 
leading upward to poiesis.  Part of the rationale of Creed’s work is to put objects 
into the world that all but disappear into it, and it is this that accounts partly for its 
diffidence and inscrutability—for its obdurate presence.  Manzoni’s Fiato 
d’Artista configures the artist’s breath as magical agent, carrying forward his 
distributed personhood (at least until its/his expiration).  Here the concept of 
inspiration (literally, ‘breathe into’) is brought together with contagious magic 
(the artist’s breath as physically detached fragment) in the form of the index. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 26.  Martin Creed, Work no. 88: a sheet of A4 paper crumpled into a ball (1994). 
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The ‘things’ themselves, and the properties of ‘props’ 
 
Gell’s concept of object agency can, I think, be supplemented by a different, but 
complementary approach to objects, or things, one that places greater emphasis on 
the things themselves.333  Notable in Gell’s formulation of object agency is the 
specification that agency is abducted from objects; this consolidates Gell’s 
qualification of objects as secondary agents and could be said to draw attention 
away from the objects themselves.  This is a view put forward by Leach, who 
argues that in Gell, the (art) object is treated ‘as an index of something else’, 
rather than as something that has agency in and of itself; in this latter sense the 
(art) object ‘has a life of its own for which the producer(s) can claim at best partial 
credit or responsibility’.334  This is the methodological stance sketched out by 
Henare, Holbraad and Wastell in the introduction to their book Thinking Through 
Things, and it expresses the notion that ‘things might be treated as sui generis 
meanings’; in other words to treat thing and meaning as identical, rather than 
meaning being treated as something distinct from material things, or as something 
to be imposed upon it.  In Thinking Through Things, the writers articulate a 
manner of conceiving material objects not interpretively, but such that 
‘wonderment’ can be held in a ‘state of suspension so as to resist the urge to 
explain it away’.335 
 
 With purposeful naïveté, the aim of this method is to take ‘things’ encountered in 
 the field as they present themselves, rather than immediately presuming that they 
 signify, represent, or stand for something else.  Adopting an approach that might 
 be called ‘radically essentialist’ […](this) can be seen as exploring a more open, 
 heuristic approach to analysis that allows ‘things’, as and when they arise, to 
 offer theoretical possibilities[…].336 
 
 This form of ‘radical essentialism’ can be seen as different in degree, 
rather than in essence, from that of Gell’s object agency.  In spite of Leach’s 
                                                 
333 In Thinking Through Things, the authors privilege the word thing over object, artefact, or materiality, in 
that it carries ‘minimal theoretical baggage’.  Henare, Holbraad and Wastell, Introduction: Thinking through 
things, in Thinking through Things, ed. Henare, Holbraad, and Wastell, (pp. 1-31). 
334 James Leach, Differentiation and Encompassment: A critique of Alfred Gell’s abduction of creativity, in 
Ibid,  p. 184. 
335Henare, Holbraad and Wastell, Introduction: Thinking through things, in Ibid, p. 1. 
336 Ibid, p. 2-3. 
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comments, Gell does at least grant (the manifestation of) agency to objects as well 
as to humans, and makes it clear that the general argument in Art and Agency 
depends upon this position.  Also (as Pederson points out in his contribution to 
Thinking Through Things) Gell argues that art objects which are part of certain 
forms of collective transactions (such as the Trobriand Kula exchange system) do 
not simply ‘serve to represent a corresponding body of social and cultural 
knowledge; rather the very materiality of these objects is itself a vehicle of such 
knowledge.’337  Importantly, Gell’s approach towards the art object is, as stated in 
my opening chapter, emphatically opposed to its determination in symbolic terms 
(‘I view art as a system of action, intended to change the world rather than encode 
symbolic propositions about it’).338  Furthermore, Art and Agency is self-
avowedly a theory whereas it should be emphasized that the authors of Thinking 
Through Things view their project as predominantly methodological, as a means 
of identifying things within diverse contexts in such a way that they might then 
yield theoretical positions (rather than imposing pre-existing theoretical 
frameworks upon them).  Having said this, I find that the central idea expressed in 
the introduction of Thinking Through Things—of a collapsing of the distinction 
between concepts and things—to be instrumentally useful (as an adjunct to Gell’s 
‘object agency’) in scrutinizing the curious ontological status of magic objects.   It 
is useful not only in and of itself, but also as a means of countering some of the 
more orthodox (and frankly rather jaded) interpretations of magic objects, 
particularly those of an overtly symbolic nature, which I refer to later on in this 
chapter.  Magic objects (or ‘props’) are, it seems to me, rather odd things that 
deserve close examination in relation to the various contexts in which they might 
function.  Martin Holbraad’s thesis in The Power of Powder—an enquiry into the 
ontological status of Aché, a powder used in Cuban divination rituals—provides a 
useful case study against which this methodological approach can be tested.339  
The practitioner of these rituals (called a babalawo) ‘draws’ into the layer of 
powder that is spread onto a divining board, as a means of revealing certain 
divinatory configurations, which are themselves related to particular myths.  
                                                 
337 Morten Axel Pederson, Talismans of Thought: Shamanist ontologies and extended cognition in Northern 
Mongolia, in Ibid, p. 141. 
338 Gell, Art and Agency, p. 6. 
339 Martin Holbraad, The Power of Powder: multiplicity and motion in the divinatory cosmology of Cuban Ifa 
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Holbraad emphasizes however, that for the babalawos, this powder does not 
merely represent power, it is somehow synonymous with it: ‘neither thing nor 
concept, but rather a bit of both’.340  He goes on: 
 
 (aché’s) abstract meaning as power is internally related to its concrete nature as 
 powder.  So the meaning of aché (the ‘concept’) is literally constituted by the 
 things to which it would otherwise be assumed simply to ‘apply’.  Its intension is 
 modified by its extension (…) by what one might call a relation of ‘hyper-
 metonymy’ (imagine a crown that didn’t just signify royalty, but actually made 
 it—a ‘magical crown, then).341  (Italics added). 
 
 This, it seems to me, is an elegant, if counter-intuitive, way of describing 
magical objects—in other words, objects that, within a set of specially 
circumscribed conditions (for example, a theatrical magic performance), can be 
conceived of as embodying their ‘symbolic’ role.  There are certain objects within 
the magic act that are traditionally associated with effecting particular kinds of 
change: the magic wand, for example, is the magical agent of change par 
excellence.  However, the wand is not exempt from transformation itself—for 
example it might suddenly become soft, or metamorphose into a bunch of flowers, 
or float in mid-air.  This apparently maverick capacity for the wand to restyle 
itself from tool to magical object, or to be both at the same time, is of course part 
of the anarchic apparatus of the magic act.  It illustrates Henare, Holbraad and 
Wastell’s proposition that ‘the “things” themselves may dictate a plurality of 
ontologies’.342  So the wand’s ‘meaning’ (which might conventionally be thought 
of as metonymic symbol of the magician’s power), is embedded within its very 
thing-ness, with what it does or is seen to do.  This prioritizing of the agency of 
objects goes beyond what Gell sees as the ‘secondary agency’ of objects in 
relation to their (human) primary agents.  Within a highly specialized and 
(stylized) setting, the theatrical magic act retains a conception of objects as 
intrinsically meaningful, agentive and fluid.  This, however, is not the usual view 
of magicians themselves: ironically, magicians often seem to play down the role 
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of magic objects (the word ‘props’ being used in pejorative fashion) in favour of 
more overtly symbolic meanings which are, as it were, attached to the magic 
performance.  In Beyond the Props, an article for Magic Magazine, writer and 
magician Larry Hass puts forward the idea that ‘magic is about life, not the 
props’.343  Hass is critical of the ‘fluffy’ approach magicians often take towards 
their performances, an approach which, according to him, focuses too much on 
the props being used:  
 
 To feel the force of the problem here consider the following: no other art form 
 takes for its thematic focus the materials out of which it is made.  That is, there 
 are no notable films about cameras, […] no paintings about canvas and 
 brushes.344 
 
This statement deserves close examination, for it goes to the heart of some of the 
assumptions being made about, not just the performance of magic, but of its 
ontological status.  Contrary to what Hass says, clearly there are in fact numerous 
examples of (late modern and postmodern) artworks that do indeed take as their 
subject, their own materiality—at least in a reflective, or reflexive, way.  Artists 
and avant-garde, or experimental, filmmakers in particular have used the material 
status of film as subject (from Vertov’s Man with a Movie Camera, through much 
of the structuralist film of the 1960s) and such approaches have also filtered 
through into mainstream cinema.  Modern and contemporary painting too has 
often reflected on its means of production, from Pollock’s action-centred abstract 
works to present day artists such as Bernard Frize (whose work I analyzed in the 
previous chapter), and Callum Innes’ process-oriented ‘exposed’ paintings.   
 Another writer and magician Eugene Burger argues along similar lines to 
Hass: ‘To get unstuck as a magician I need to take my performances beyond the 
props and move them into the realm of meanings’.  Burger’s default position 
seems to be that magic is about mystery and about healing:  
  
 In this view, the magical effects of the earliest conjurors functioned symbolically, 
 pointing beyond themselves to a deeper healing mystery.  The result has been a 
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 movement away from seeing the origin of conjuring within a framework of 
 human selfishness and greed, and putting it instead into a framework intended to 
 produce group cohesiveness and individual healings.345 
 
But there is no particular reason why this should be so just because Burger prefers 
that magic be something that ‘uplifted the spirits of early men and women’.346  
The problem with the argument against props is that, it in its place it often 
privileges an extremely vague notion of ‘storytelling’ as being centrally important 
for the magician’s act.  What Burger and Hass seem to prefer is that magic 
performance should be ‘about life’, that it should direct itself thematically (that is, 
through a form of narrative) and symbolically, to the everyday interests of the 
spectator—matters of life, death, love and loss.  But by drawing attention to these 
themes magicians often trivialize them, and overlook the fact that, in many cases, 
these themes are already embedded into the props and pre-existing rituals of the 
magic act.  So for example, playing cards are already understood as being ‘about’ 
fate and chance, because a random element is, as it were, built into them; 
similarly, a knotted rope is already (at some level) ‘symbolic’ of entanglement or 
binding, precisely because it is an entangled object.   
 Magic acts that employ a narrative which derives from and elaborates 
upon these embedded meanings are arguably indulging in performative truisms, 
rituals that add nothing to the efficacy of their routines.  By way of contrast, Fred 
Kaps’ performance of the ‘five card’ routine requires only that his audience 
understand the distinction (conceptual and perceptual) between cards of a high 
and low value.347  Beyond this the trick plays itself out by being ‘about’ the 
disappearance, fluctuation, and transformation of the cards as material objects.  
Because of this, and in spite of the relative small scale of playing cards (especially 
in the hands of Kaps, a physically large man), attention is intensely focused on 
them as the objects of great dramatic potential.  Kaps’ (fairly banal) patter simply 
relates what he is doing in parallel to the playing out of the trick itself—the very 
kind of incantatory commentary that Gell suggests derives from play.348                  
 What I am arguing for here is that magic objects (and, by extension, art 
                                                 
345 Eugene Burger and Robert E. Neale, Magic and Meaning, (Seattle: Hermetic Press, Inc, 1995), p. 81. 
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objects), disclose their meaning through what they are (conceptually), and via 
what they do (performatively).  Furthermore, it is possible to regard magic 
objects, or ‘props’, as possessing an excess or surplus in relation to their function. 
An example of this is the copper cup that is used to ‘disappear’ a crochet ball (in 
the cups and balls routine): this cup already causes the ball to disappear in a 
certain obvious sense, in that it covers the ball—once covered, we can no longer 
see the ball (although our—rational—sense of object permanence tells us it is still 
there).349  When the cup is lifted and the ball is no longer there, the cup has 
effectively collapsed the distinction between an object that disappears from our 
sensory awareness (is ‘hidden’), and one that disappears in that it ‘ceases to be’.350  
This idea of a magic prop or object having its magical capacity somehow already 
embedded within it echoes Tim Dant’s assertion, in Materiality and Society, that 
human interaction with objects exceeds its symbolic meaning: ‘as the social 
human being interacts with an object, she or he must take account of what the 
object is doing or is about to do and must fit their line of activity to the intentions 
embedded in the object.’351  The cup (which already has a ‘disappearing intention’ 
embedded in it) therefore becomes a kind of super-charged agent-for-
disappearing-things.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 27.  Jonathan Gilhooly, Cup and Ball (2003). 
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351 Tim Dant, Materiality and Society, (Maidenhead: Open University Press, 2005), p. 111. 
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 There are many such disappearing-agents in magic but—whether curtains, 
cloaks, screens or boxes—they are normally already the kinds of objects that 
vanish other objects in this more normative sense of ‘hiding them from view’, and 
of having a concealing intention embedded within them, with which the magician 
interacts.352  At other times magic objects deploy their material specificity as a 
means of simultaneously denying it, as with the linking ‘Chinese’ rings illusion.  
This consists of a number (usually between three and eight) of large solid metal 
rings, which are made mysteriously to link and unlink in a sequence of highly 
choreographed moves.  In appearance, the linking rings illusion is not unlike the 
cups and balls, but this time it is the solid materiality of the rings that is thrown 
into doubt; this is achieved, in large part, by the performer repeatedly drawing 
attention to the solidity of the rings by, for example, audibly clanking them 
together, in such a way that the resulting metallic sound becomes metonymic of 
their rigidity, imperviousness, and strength. 
 So the notion of ‘different worlds’ put forward by Henare, Holbraad and 
Wastell, might clearly be conceptualized within the magic act, for here the 
concept of, for example, invisibility and the vanished object become one and the 
same thing.  The authors posit an (multiply) ontological approach to the material 
world, such that might allow us to ‘treat meaning and thing as an identity’.353  
This proposition is, however, conceptual rather than perceptual, conception as a 
‘mode of disclosure’.354 
 
 The very notion of perception simply reiterates the distinction that ‘different 
 worlds’ collapses.  The point about different worlds is that they cannot be ‘seen’ 
 in a visualist sense.  They are, as it were, a-visible.  In other words, collapsing the 
 distinction between concepts and things (appearance and reality) forces us to 
 conceive of a different mode of disclosure altogether.355 (italics added) 
 
Art objects can clearly be thought of as problematic and resistant to interpretation 
in a similar sense. The postmodern art object is (since Duchamp) often an object 
                                                 
352 Sometimes these objects are ‘gimmicked’, at other times sleight of hand is used. The magician’s working 
environment and ultimate success as a performer also relies upon a different kind of concealment, that of 
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353Henare, Holbraad and Wastell, Introduction: Thinking through things, in Thinking through Things, ed. 
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reconfigured conceptually, whereby its visual similarity to something 
recognizable may not aid disclosure of ‘meaning’.356  Returning to Mirror Ball, 
the ball of paper in the piece might be construed, for example, as ‘hovering’ 
between different states (that of rejuvenated art object and banal detritus), in that 
it might be perceived as having these meanings, as it were, attached to it.  
However, it must also be conceived of as an object that actually hovers, albeit 
inexplicably, in and of itself.  In other words, if this object is to be understood 
through what is, effectively, a process of de-familiarization, then it must first be 
accounted for as ‘ball of paper that floats’, in so far as that is the function it 
performs within an apparatus (the mirrored cube) that has been constructed 
specifically in order to reveal this.  In another piece, this idea was made explicit in 
the title of the work, which changed from Table to be Levitated to Levitated 
Table, after the table in question was caused to levitate during a performance.  
This was presented, not as a magic illusion, but as a ritualized event, the purpose 
of which was to enact the transformative potential of objects; my role—as 
artist/facilitator—was to oversee the event.  At the opening of an exhibition of my 
work at Grey Area, Brighton, six volunteers were self-selected (by handing out 
randomly-marked envelopes), and then positioned themselves around the table 
with their hands on its surface; after a brief pause, it slowly rose off the ground.  
Levitated Table embodies the argument at the heart of Martin Holbraad’s essay 
that ‘concepts and things can […] be each other’.357   For even if we might ‘know’ 
that, rationally, the table cannot float unaided, it is possible to configure and to 
conceive of it as ‘table that floats’ within a particular, circumscribed setting.358   
 
 
Summary 
 
In this chapter I have attempted to incorporate two approaches to an analysis of 
the magic object and the art object.  I do not think, however, that these two 
methods have to be thought of as being mutually exclusive or even contradictory.  
                                                 
356 In this interpretation Duchamp’s Fountain, for example, ‘looks like’ a urinal. 
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On the contrary, it seems to me that Gell’s notion of enchanted objects, from 
which agency can be abducted, but which resist this abduction, can usefully be 
aligned with the ‘thinking through things’ approach of Henare, Holbraad, Wastell 
and Pedersen.  In a way, Gell sidesteps the issue of the specificity of the art object 
in Art and Agency, by dealing with artworks as collectivities, or at least as 
members of familial groups, embedded in networks of social relations.359  He goes 
on to equate these collectivities of artworks with a far more conventional mode of 
critical analysis, the concept of style.  Although perfectly serviceable, this method 
arguably avoids a head-on engagement with the material and conceptual 
specificities of art objects, in favour of a ‘horizontal’ dispersal of stylistic 
principles, as a means of identifying artworks collectively.  What Leach is arguing 
for, and what Henare, Holbraad, Wastell (in their introduction), and Pedersen 
demonstrate, is that in order to address the particularities of objects (art objects or 
otherwise), a somewhat different register is required—one that allows objects 
their own agency, distinct from (but not necessarily exclusive of) their role as 
indexes of (human) agency; it is this notion of inherent agency (and thereby 
inherent meaning) that the magic object implicitly illuminates. 
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Conclusion 
 
 
 
In Ceal Floyer’s slide installation Double Act, the image of a red curtain is 
projected onto the end wall of the gallery space; the circularly masked slide 
mimics the function of a theatre spotlight, and is split between wall and floor by 
the angling of its projection.  The light both illuminates and embodies the 
image—part of its ‘doubling’ function—its ambience illuminating the remainder 
of the wall, thus affirming the curtain’s duplicity.  Nothing is concealed in this 
work, both image and apparatus are on display, and in this sense it embodies the 
disclosure of method and effect previously discussed in relation to the magic act, 
a characteristic alluded to in the title itself.  If Double Act is a trick then we are 
being shown how it is done, yet this does not seem to diminish its effect.  In his 
essay on Floyer, Jeremy Millar draws a parallel between the mechanisms within 
her work and those of Raymond Roussel, whose book How I Wrote Certain of my 
Books functions as a kind of meta-text, simultaneously supplying a narrative 
whilst revealing its own methods. 
 
 ‘The greater the accumulation of precise minutiae, of details of form and 
 dimension, the more the object loses its depth. So this is an opacity without 
 mystery, just as there is nothing behind the surfaces of a backcloth, no inside, no 
 secret, no ulterior motive.’360 
 
Floyer’s work is replete with puns both visual and verbal, and Double Act refers 
both to the enactment of apparatus (projector) and image (projection), as well as 
conveying theatrical connotations—the double act of the straight man / funny 
man.  By referencing theatrical (and cinematic) tropes, Double Act also activates 
the space in which it is situated: the closed, spotlit curtain creates a sense of 
anticipation (although the image is pure surface—there is nothing behind the 
depicted curtain), whilst its ‘closed’ state suggests the possibility of motion.  
Instead of simply being a projected image on a gallery wall, the room itself is 
                                                 
360 Alain Robbe-Grillet, ‘Énigmes et transparence chez Raymond Roussel’, (1963), trans. Barbara Wright as 
‘Riddles and Transparencies in Raymond Roussel’, in Atlas Anthology 4: Raymond Roussel Life, Death and 
Works, (London: Atlas Press, 1987), p. 101. 
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transformed and activated into a theatre or auditorium—within which the 
spectator is engaged as potential actor—but a theatre whose purpose is its own 
self-revelation. 
 This enactment, of Floyer’s raw material—apparatus and image—is not 
symbolic or passive, but active and present.  We have seen that in Art and Agency, 
Alfred Gell deliberately avoids a symbolic approach to artworks, favouring 
instead one that is ‘action’-centred, privileging the ‘practical, mediatory role of art 
objects in the social process’.361  In another sense, Double Act could be said to 
represent a kind of synopsis of the various sections of my thesis: it stages a space 
for an imaginary (or actual) performer; it represents both a conundrum and a form 
of mimicry (a beam of light that is both the source of the image and the image 
itself); and it embodies the phantasmatic doubling at the heart of cinematic 
technology.362  In Gell’s terms, Double Act is cognitively ‘sticky’, it holds the 
viewer in a theatrically captivating space whose commencement (or conclusion) is 
constantly deferred. 
 
 
 
        
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 10.  Ceal Floyer, Double Act (2006). 
                                                 
361 Gell, Art and Agency, p. 6. 
362 Whilst viewing Double Act at Tate Britain in 2007, I found that my mental and bodily disposition became 
‘theatricalized’—there was a strong inclination to perform within the space.   
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 Gell’s concept of agency therefore provides  a way of resituating the art 
object within contemporary art practice, but it has also provided a nexus about 
which my thesis could develop.  The chief significance of Gell’s theory lies in its 
positioning of the artwork within a network of relations, a conception of art as 
labile, and whose status and identity is insecure.  Gell’s nexus configures the 
artwork as productive of meaning according to this shifting network: that different 
agents or types of agencies will become visible within different contexts.  Using 
this concept I have been able to adapt it in order to examine different, interrelated 
strands of my practice, and to reflect on a body of (mainly 20th century and 
contemporary) artworks that seemed to occupy similar territory to my own.  
Although my thesis takes a distinct theme as a starting point for each of the four 
main chapters, there is a thread that links them and that runs through the body of 
the work.  This can be characterized as a sense of uncertainty and instability, 
whether that be the liminal zone in which the performer operates, the 
phantasmatic nature of the cinematic image, or the contradictory and intractable 
character of the art object/cognitive trap; I have attempted to use the magic act as 
a means of isolating and crystallizing this sense of fickleness and unpredictability 
 This notion of the artwork as uncertain and changeable removes it from 
the more orthodox critical arena whereby it might be treated as either a ‘sign-
vehicle’—a generator of meaning—or as an object made for the purposes of 
provoking ‘a culturally endorsed aesthetic response’.363  Instead, the artwork is 
repositioned as something that motivates a response within a particular network of 
social (or cultural) relations—it is the object around which these responses 
materialize, circulate and evolve.  This effectively constitutes a shift away from 
the purely visual towards a more complex agentive formulation, one that elides 
usefully with the plural forms of contemporary art practice.   What is offered 
therefore is a fresh and recalibrated model of contemporary art—one that 
relocates attention away from spectatorship (in its narrow visual sense) towards a 
dynamic and shifting set of relationships.   
 Gell’s ideas have facilitated this shift, but it goes beyond Gell in alerting 
us to ways in which artworks might be addressed in an increasingly non-white 
cube context.  More broadly then, I have attempted to show the ways in which 
                                                 
363 Gell, Art and Agency, p. 5. 
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certain forms of modern and postmodern art have positioned themselves at the 
boundaries of practice, straddling disciplinary borders.  I have argued that magic 
offers a model for examining these practices from the point of view of both a 
critical engagement with what I have shown are parallel concerns, and from the 
position of practitioner, whereby the role of the magician chimes with that of the 
artist as someone who revels in adopting an essentially ludic, sceptical and 
transgressive perspective upon the world.  Artists and magicians operate as 
‘border prospectors’ who make the most of our willingness to suspend disbelief, 
as well as ‘holding a mirror up to a world that is fractured and ambiguous, where 
meaning is conditional and up for debate.’364  These overlapping concerns are 
encapsulated in my piece Levitated Table, where the work functions ambiguously 
as both art and magic performance, drawing attention to the shared space of both 
practices as well as to the power and lability of objects. Throughout my research 
project I have not sought to use magic simply as a means of illustrating or 
expounding particular ideas, preferring instead to adopt and inhabit aspects of the 
magician’s role as playful and transgressive presence. 
 Conventionally, Western art has resisted notions of theatricality, preferring 
instead a more distanced model in which the spectator is cast as a neutral or 
passive onlooker of an artwork that is paradigmatically self-sufficient.  Recent art 
forms and practices, at least during the last fifty years or so, have continually 
reinstated the theatrical (in the widest sense of the word), partly in an attempt to 
incorporate and include the observer, but also as a means of removing art from a 
limiting and reductive ‘white cube’ context.  They have achieved this often 
through a blending and cross-pollination of disciplines and practices previously 
considered inviolably distinct—practices and strategies taken from theatre, film 
and television, advertising, language, the natural and social sciences—as a means 
of bringing into sharper focus the relationship of art with areas of daily life.  
Rather than obeying the inherent ordering principles of these disciplines however, 
artists deploy disruptive strategies in order to divest them of authority and expose 
the structures that render them ‘natural’.  In a catalogue essay for a recent touring 
exhibition, Magic Show, Sally O’Reilly draws attention to the strategic 
                                                 
364 Sally O’Reilly, Bewildering Logic, catalogue essay for Magic Show, A Hayward Touring Exhibition, 
curated by Jonathan Allen and Sally O’Reilly (2009-2010), p. 13 
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deployment of non-rational impulses on the part of contemporary artists, equating 
it with that of the magician: 
 
 If we think of the Enlightenment as the advancement of knowledge by rational 
 means and an attempt to purge the world of chaotic elements, both art and stage 
 magic can be thought of as performing a counter-Enlightenment stance.365 
 
Rather than suggesting some didactic or crudely instrumental function for art (or 
magic) what O’Reilly is alluding to here is the propensity for artists to take a 
broadly sceptical view towards our rationally ordered environment, for generally 
disruptive purposes, or, as she suggests, ‘to take delight in confusion and 
disarray.’366  It requires only a cursory glance at our daily newspapers to discover 
how, everywhere, irrationality provides an ever-present corollary to the rational: 
an outright dismissal of the potential efficaciousness of homeopathic remedies, 
might, for example, coexist with the expression of scepticism towards an issue 
such as global warming; but it is just as easy to imagine these positions being 
reversed.  Guardian columnist and campaigner George Monbiot has in the past 
expressed frustration and bewilderment at the inability of some of his readers to 
accept the scientific evidence for climate change.  Yet, as he himself recently 
conceded, there is an inherent contradiction to scientific certainty:  
 
 ‘The detail of modern science is incomprehensible to almost everyone, which 
 means that we have to take what scientists say on trust. Yet science tells us to 
 trust nothing, to believe only what can be demonstrated.’ 367 
 
Referencing Arthur C. Clarke’s dictum that ‘any sufficiently advanced technology 
is indistinguishable from magic’, Monbiot’s reflections echo implicitly the 
sceptical thinking of Bruno Latour who, in We Have Never Been Modern, 
identified a ‘proliferation of hybrids’ that results from an attempt to purify the 
human and the natural, one from the other. 368  Latour specifically cites a variety 
of examples from newspaper articles that attest to the virtual impossibility of 
                                                 
365 Ibid, p.11 
366 George Monbiot, The trouble with trusting complex science, (The Guardian, 8th March, 2010) 
367 O’Reilly, Bewildering Logic, p. 11 
368 Bruno Latour, We Have Never Been Modern, (Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1993), p. 1 
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distinguishing ‘supposed hard facts from supposed social constructions or 
projections of value’.369  In a similar, somewhat banal example from the world of 
magic itself, there were cries of foul play from internet bloggers at the revelation 
that magician David Blaine had used simple editing techniques in order to realize 
a levitation trick on TV; yet comparable, technologically driven illusions are 
regularly passed off as real in a plethora of television ‘reality’ shows.370  The 
relevance of magic today passes far beyond the confines of the theatre or the art 
gallery, for, as the examples above show, the modern world is far from 
disenchanted.  
 The range of methods and theoretical concepts utilized throughout the 
thesis emerged organically from the multifarious practices of magic itself.  
Traditionally, four main areas of enquiry underpin the magician’s art:  the mutable 
potential of matter (causing objects to transform, vanish, become permeable); the 
psychology of perception, representation, memory, and attention; the illusionistic 
possibilities of optical and other technologies; the charismatic and indeterminate 
nature of performance.  Each of these four categories enabled, in the first instance, 
a particular strand of my practice to reflect and embody the concepts, materials, 
and strategies of the magician, as well as providing foundations from which 
theoretical investigations could proceed.  So the role of the magician as performer 
suggested an exploration through theories of performance, and in particular the 
concept of liminal zones of engagement.  Likewise, the magician’s workaday 
familiarity with, and manipulation of, psychological aspects of perception evinced 
a deployment of (through Gell’s concept of ‘cognitive stickiness’) recent theories 
in the field of cognitive neuroscience.  The figure of the magician was 
instrumental as an experimental pioneer of early cinema, and a recent body of film 
theory has drawn upon notions of enchantment, forging connections with ludic 
and phantasmatic dimensions of moving image technology.  Lastly, the position 
within the magic act of a miscellaneous collective of arcane and disreputable 
objects elicited the concept, based on theories of material culture, of the magic 
‘prop’ as ontologically problematic and indeterminate object.  These distinct but 
overlapping concerns have provided a foundation for future practice, especially 
where, as in Zeno’s Oak Tree, they coalesce within a single work—a work which 
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by no means demands a strict gallery setting, functioning ambiguously, as it does, 
as illustrated lecture, performance, conundrum, and magic act. 
  
 As a final coda, a theme that has been repeatedly returned to throughout 
the thesis is the potential conflict between concealment and revelation that much 
of the work elicits.  Gell’s theory positions the observer (or recipient) not as one 
who infers agency, but as one who infers what he believes to be agency; this is an 
important distinction, and means that the theory must allow for mistaken or 
misguided inferences (Gell talks about inferences of, for example, supernatural 
agents).  These are, of course, the very inferences upon which magic thrives.  The 
notion of abduction of agency (in Gell’s terms) as a kind of inference that is 
probabilistic and unstable rather than fixed and certain, can be brought to bear 
upon the magic act, which seeks to manipulate and exploit intuitive inferential 
‘systems’; in a sense then, magic abducts the abduction of agency itself.  If, as 
Gell says, artworks represent a particular category of psychologically salient 
objects, from which agency can be inferred, then the magic act seeks to exploit, 
disrupt and contaminate that saliency.  What I suggest throughout the thesis is that 
the magician does not set out solely to deceive, but that deception is part of a 
technology of enchantment—that the spectator only becomes captivated if a 
particularly fine balance between deception and enchantment is achieved.  To this 
end, the work I have produced as part of my research can be seen as situated along 
a spectrum, running from ‘open’ to ‘closed’.  In other words, some works rely 
upon a transparency of means: in SFX-1, all of the various components—foil, 
lamp, fan—are visible and nothing remains ‘hidden’; in other pieces, such as 
Mirror Ball, it is possible for the viewer to deduce the means by which the 
illusion has been achieved.  However, there is another category of works that 
represent the ‘hidden’ end of the spectrum, whereby revelation of the method 
would lead to a complete breakdown of the effect produced.  This is singularly the 
case with Levitated Table, where the entire presentation is set up in order to 
preclude the possibility of such a revelation.  Even the writing of the thesis has 
necessitated the revealing of the covert aspects of some of the works, and this has 
exposed an uneasy yet compelling potential breach between the theoretical and 
practical aspects of my research: the notion that part of the analysis and 
explication of aspects of my practice might lead to a kind of surrendering of some 
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of the very components that make it effective.  With this in mind it therefore 
seemed significant—productive even—to hold back and preserve the secret of 
Levitated Table, if only as a means of activating or at least acknowledging the 
necessity of this lacuna. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 29. Jonathan Gilhooly, Levitating table (2007). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
150 
 
Bibliography 
 
 
 
Abel, Richard, Silent Film (London: Athlone, 1996). 
Benjamin, Walter, Arendt, Hannah, and Zohn, Harry, Illuminations. Edited and 
with an Introduction by Hannah Arendt. Translated by Harry 
ZohnLondon: Fontana, 1973). 
Bennett, Jane, The Enchantment of Modern Life: Attachments, Crossings, and 
Ethics (Princeton, N.J. ; Chichester: Princeton University Press, 2001). 
Boyer, Pascal, Religion Explained: The Human Instincts That Fashion Gods, 
Spirits and Ancestors (London: Heinemann, 2001). 
Breton, Andre Robert, Lane, Helen R., and Seaver, Richard, Manifestoes of 
Surrealism. Translated from the French by Richard Seaver and Helen R. 
Lane. (Second Printing.), (Ann Arbor Paperback. Aa No. 182.)[Ann 
Arbor:] University of Michigan Press, 1974). 
Carlson, Marvin A., Performance: A Critical Introduction. 2nd ed. edn (New 
York ; London: Routledge, 2004). 
Castle, Terry, 'Phantasmagoria: Spectral Technology and the Metaphorics of 
Modern Reverie', Critical Inquiry, 15 (1988), 26-61. 
Chéroux, Clément, The Perfect Medium: Photography and the Occult (New 
Haven, Conn. ; London: Yale University Press, 2005). 
Clark, Andy, Supersizing the Mind: Embodiment, Action, and Cognitive Extension 
(New York ; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008). 
Cook, James W., The Arts of Deception: Playing with Fraud in the Age of 
Barnum (Cambridge, Mass. ; London: Harvard University Press, 2001). 
Cork, Richard, Craig-Martin, Michael, and Juncosa, Enrique, Michael Craig-
Martin (London: Thames & Hudson, in association with the Irish Museum 
of Modern Art, 2006). 
Corris, Michael, Conceptual Art: Theory, Myth, and Practice (Cambridge ; New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2003). 
Craig-Martin, Michael, Michael Craig-Martin: A Retrospective : 1968-1989 
(London: Whitechapel Art Gallery, 1989). 
  
151 
———, Michael Craig-Martin: Paintings (London: Waddington Galleries, 1992). 
Crary, Jonathan, Techniques of the observer: on vision and modernity in the 
nineteenth century (MIT Press, 1990) 
D'Harnoncourt, Anne and M. A. C. Shine, Duchamp, Marcel, and Macshine, 
Kynaston, Marcel Duchamp. Edited by Anne D'harnoncourt and Kynaston 
McshineLondon: Thames and Hudson, 1974). 
Dant, Tim, Materiality and Society (Maidenhead: Open University Press, 2005). 
Dennett, Daniel Clement, Kinds of Minds: Towards an Understanding of 
Consciousness, Science Masters (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1996). 
Dinstein, Ilan, Gardner, Justin L., Jazayeri, Mehrdad, and Heeger, David J., 
'Executed and Observed Movements Have Different Distributed 
Representations in Human Aips', J. Neurosci., 28 (2008), 11231-39. 
Doane, Mary Ann, The Emergence of Cinematic Time: Modernity, Contingency, 
the Archive (Cambridge, Mass. ; London: Harvard University Press, 
2002). 
During, Simon, Modern Enchantments: The Cultural Power of Secular Magic 
(Cambridge, Mass. ; London: Harvard University Press, 2002). 
During, Sina Najafi and Simon, 'Modern Enchantments: An Interview with Simon 
During', Cabinet, 26 (2007), 88-95. 
During, Simon (ed) The Cultural Studies Reader (Routledge, 1993) 
Duve, Thierry de, Kant after Duchamp (Cambridge, Mass. ; London: MIT Press, 
1996). 
———, Pictorial Nominalism on Marcel Duchamp's Passage from Painting to 
the Readymade, Theory and History of Literature ; V. 51 (Minneapolis ; 
Oxford: University of Minnesota Press, 1991). 
Elsaesser, Thomas, and Barker, Adam, Early Cinema: Space-Frame-Narrative 
(London: BFI Publishing, 1990). 
Foster, Hal, Vision and Visuality (New Press, New York, 1988) 
Freedberg, David, The Power of Images: Studies in the History and Theory of 
Response (Chicago; London: University of Chicago Press, 1989). 
Freud, Sigmund, and McLintock, David, The Uncanny, Penguin Classics 
(London: Penguin, 2003). 
  
152 
Freud, Sigmund, Strachey, James, and Richards, Angela, On Metapsychology: 
The Theory of Psychoanalysis: 'Beyond the Pleasure Principle', 'the Ego 
and the Id', and Other Works (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1984). 
Frith, Christopher D., Making up the Mind: How the Brain Creates Our Mental 
World (Oxford: Blackwell, 2007). 
Frize, Bernard, Aplat: Bernard Frize: Musée D'art Moderne De La Ville De 
Paris, 06.06-28.09.2003 (Paris: Paris musées, 2003). 
Gaudreault, André, 'Meliés the Magician: the Magical Magic of the Magic 
Image', Early Popular Visual Culture, 5 (2007), 167 - 74. 
Gaudreault, Andre, and Barnard, Timothy, From Plato to Lumiere: Narration and 
Monstration in Literature and Cinema (Toronto: University of Toronto 
Press, 2009). 
Gell, Alfred, Art and Agency: An Anthropological Theory (Oxford: Clarendon, 
1998). 
———, 'Technology and Magic', Anthropology Today, 4 (1988), 6-9. 
Gell, Alfred, and Hirsch, Eric, The Art of Anthropology: Essay and Diagrams, 
London School of Economics Monographs on Social Anthropology; V.67 
(New Brunswick, N.J. ; London: Athlone Press, 1999). 
Green, David, PhotoWorks., and PhotoForum Inc., Where Is the Photograph? 
(Maidstone: Photoworks, 2003). 
Gumbrecht, Hans Ulrich, and Marrinan, Michael, Mapping Benjamin: The Work 
of Art in the Digital Age, Writing Science, (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford 
University Press, 2003). 
———, 'Mapping Benjamin: The Work of Art in the Digital Age', in Writing 
science, (Stanford, Calif. ; [Great Britain]: Stanford University Press, 
2003), pp. xvi, 349 p. ; 24 cm. 
Gustav Kuhn, Alym A. Amlani and Ronald A. Rensink, 'Towards a Science of 
Magic', Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 12 (2008), 349-54. 
Harman, Graham, Prince of Networks: Bruno Latour and Metaphysics  
 (re.Press, 2009) 
Harman, Graham, Tool-Being: Heidegger and the Metaphyics of Objects 
(Chicago: Open Court, 2002). 
Haxthausen, Charles W., 'Reproduction/Repetition: Walter Benjamin/Carl 
Einstein', October, - (2004), 47-74. 
  
153 
Henare, Amiria J. M., Holbraad, Martin, and Wastell, Sari, Thinking through 
Things: Theorising Artefacts Ethnographically (London: Routledge, 
2007). 
Henderson, Linda Dalrymple, Duchamp in Context: Science and Technology in 
the Large Glass and Related Works (Princeton N.J.: Princeton University 
Press, 1998). 
Hirschfeld, Lawrence A. Ed, and Gelman, Susan A. Ed, 'Mapping the Mind : 
Domain Specificity in Cognition and Culture: Conference Entitled 
"Cultural Knowledge and Domain Specificity": Papers',  (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1994), pp. xiv, 516p. 
Hirschfeld, Lawrence A., and Gelman, Susan A., 'Mapping the Mind',  
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), pp. xiv, 516p. 
Hofstadter, Douglas R., Gödel, Escher, Bach: An Eternal Golden Braid ([S.l.]: 
Harvester Press, 1979). 
Horkheimer, Max, Adorno, Theodor W., and Schmid Noerr, Gunzelin, Dialectic 
of Enlightenment: Philosophical Fragments, Cultural Memory in the 
Present ([Stanford, Calif.]: Stanford University Press, 2002). 
Humphrey, Nicholas, The Mind Made Flesh: Essays from the Frontiers of 
Psychology and Evolution (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002). 
Jay, Martin, Downcast eyes: the denigration of vision in twentieth-century French 
thought (University of California Press, 1993) 
Lamont, Peter, and Wiseman, Richard, Magic in Theory: An Introduction to the 
Theoretical and Psychological Elements of Conjuring (Hatfield: 
University of Hertfordshire Press, 1999). 
Landy, Joshua, and Saler, Michael T., The Re-Enchantment of the World: Secular 
Magic in a Rational Age (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford General, 2009). 
Latour, Bruno, The Pasteurization of France (Cambridge, Mass. ; London: 
Harvard University Press, 1988). 
Latour, Bruno, We Have Never Been Modern, (Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1993) 
Mangan, Michael, Performing Dark Arts: A Cultural History of Conjuring, 
Theatre and Consciousness, 1753-3058 (Bristol: Intellect Books, 2007). 
  
154 
Mannoni, Laurent, Nekes, Werner, and Warner, Marina, Eyes, Lies and Illusions: 
The Art of Deception. Laurent Mannoni, Werner Nekes, Marina Warner 
(London: Haywood Gallery, 2004). 
Mannoni, Laurent, Nekes, Werner, Warner, Marina, and Hayward Gallery, Eyes, 
Lies and Illusions: The Art of Deception (Aldershot: Lund Humphries, 
2004). 
Milner, Max, La Fantasmagorie: Essai Sur L'optique Fantastique (Paris: Presses 
universitaires de France, 1982). 
Minca, Claudio, Postmodern Geography: Theory and Praxis (Oxford ; Malden, 
Mass.: Blackwell, 2001). 
Mitchell, W. J. T., Picture Theory : Essays on Verbal and Visual Representation 
(Chicago ; London: University of Chicago Press, 1994). 
Moore, Rachel O., Savage Theory: Cinema as Modern Magic (Durham: Duke 
University Press, 2000). 
Neale, Eugene Burger and Robert E., Magic and Meaning (Seattle: Hermetic 
Press, Inc, 1995). 
North, Dan, Performing Illusions: Cinema, Special Effects and the Virtual Actor 
(London: Wallflower, 2008). 
O'Brien, Flann, The Third Policeman (London: Folio Society, 2006). 
Ortiz, Darwin, Designing Miracles: Creating the Illusion of Impossibility (El 
Dorado Hills: A-1 Magicalmedia, 2006). 
Osborne, Robin, and Tanner, Jeremy, Art's Agency and Art History, New 
Interventions in Art History (Oxford: Blackwell, 2007). 
Paul, William, Laughing, Screaming: Modern Hollywood Horror and Comedy, 
Film and Culture (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994). 
Petro, Patrice, Fugitive Images: From Photography to Video, Theories of 
Contemporary Culture; V.16 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 
1995). 
Priest, Christopher, The Prestige, St. Martin's Press, 1996). 
Ramachandran, VS, 'A Journey to the Centre of Your Mind', in TED: ideas worth 
spreading, ed. by TED (USA, 2007). 
Rampley, Matthew, 'Art History and Cultural Difference: Alfred Gell's 
Anthropology of Art', Art History, v. 28  (2005), p. 524-51. 
  
155 
Roussel, Raymond, Foord, Lindy, and Heppenstall, Rayner, Impressions of 
Africa: Translated by Lindy Foord and Rayner Heppenstall, (French 
Surrealism.)London: Calder & Boyars, 1969). 
Saler, Michael T., 'Modernity and Enchantment: A Historiographic Review', The 
American Historical Review 111 (2006), 26. 
Schechner, Richard, Essays on Performance Theory, 1970-1976. 1st ed. edn (New 
York: Drama Book Specialists, 1977). 
———, Performance Studies: An Introduction (London: Routledge, 2002). 
Shepherd, Simon, and Wallis, Mick, Drama/Theatre/Performance, The New 
Critical Idiom (London: Routledge, 2004). 
Stafford, Barbara Maria, Artful Science: enlightenment, entertainment and the 
eclipse of visual education (MIT Press, 1994) 
Stafford, Barbara Maria, Echo Objects: The Cognitive Work of Images (Chicago; 
London: University of Chicago Press, 2007). 
Steinmeyer, Jim, Hiding the Elephant: How Magicians Invented the Impossible 
(London: Arrow, 2004). 
Strauven, Wanda, The Cinema of Attractions Reloaded (Amsterdam: Amsterdam 
University Press, 2006). 
Styers, Randall, Making Magic: Religion, Magic, and Science in the Modern 
World, Reflection and Theory in the Study of Religion (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2004). 
Thorburn, David Ph D., Jenkins, Henry, and Seawell, Brad, Rethinking Media 
Change: The Aesthetics of Transition, Media in Transition (Cambridge, 
Mass. ; London: MIT Press, 2003). 
Turner, Victor Witter, From Ritual to Theatre: The Human Seriousness of Play 
(New York: performing Arts Journal Publications, 1982). 
Varola, H., Maund, C., and Varola, P. G., Con Art (Sheffield: Site Gallery, 2002). 
Wagner, Roy, Invention of Culture. Rev. & Exp. Ed. edn (Chicago: Chicago U P, 
1981). 
Wegner, Daniel M., The Illusion of Conscious Will (Cambridge, Mass. ; London: 
MIT Press, 2002). 
Wheeler, Michael, Reconstructing the Cognitive World: The Next Step 
(Cambridge, Mass. ; London: MIT, 2005). 
  
156 
Williams, Linda, Viewing Positions: Ways of Seeing Film, Rutgers Depth of Field 
Series (New Brunswick, N.J. ; [Great Britain]: Rutgers University Press, 
1995). 
 
 Conversations with Contemporary Artists: Martin Creed.  From Think Modern: 
Conversations with Contemporary Artists recorded at MoMA, The Museum of 
Modern Art, New York. March 21, 2008  
http://www.moma.org/visit_moma/audio/2008/pub_prog/downloadAAPAA_2008
.html 
 
Michael Craig-Martin, in conversation with John Tusa, BBC Radio 3, 2003. 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/radio3/johntusainterview/craig_transcript.shtml 
 
Bell, Karl, Remaking Magic: The “Wizard of the North” and Contested Magical 
Mentalities in the Mid-Nineteenth Century Magic Show, Magic, Ritual and 
Witchcraft, Vol 4, No. 1 (2009) 
 
‘David Blaine, Street Magic’ (ABC TV network, 1997) 
 
Freedberg, David and Gallese, Vittorio, Motion, emotion and empathy in esthetic 
experience, in Trends in Cognitive Sciences (Volume 11, Issue 5, May 2007), 
Pages 197-203, (p. 202) 
 
Michael Fried, Art and Objecthood.  Artforum, (summer 1967), pp 12-23 
 
Gaudreault, André, Meliés the magician: the magical magic of the magic image, 
Early Popular Visual Culture, vol 5 no. 2, (2007), p. 167-174 (p. 167). 
 
Gunning, Tom, Illusions Past and Future: The Phantasmagoria and its Specters 
(2004), p. 14. (Text originally placed on www.MediaArtHistory.org as a 
PROGRAMMATIC KEY TEXT in preparation for Refresh! The First 
International Conference on the Histories of Art, Science and Technology. This 
text may have been or will be published and/or presented elsewhere by the 
author). 
  
157 
 
Heathfield, Adrian, Last Laughs, Performance Research journal, vol. 9 no. 1. 
(2004), 60-66 (p. 62) 
 
Leckey, Mark, Cinema in the Round (2008), Tate Britain 
 
McFarland, Dale, Don’t Worry: the art of Martin Creed Frieze, 52 (2000), pp. 66-
69. 
 
Monbiot, George, The trouble with trusting complex science, (The Guardian, 8th 
March, 2010) 
 
The Mysteries of Magic, Discovery Channel (2002). Mysteries of Magic, 
3 x 1 hour Documentary Series1998 - The Learning Channel, Discovery. 
Communications USA 
 
Mules, Warwick, Aura as Productive Loss, Transformations, Issue no. 15, 2007, 
http://www.transformationsjournal.org/journal/issue_15/article_05.shtml 
[accessed 12 April 2009] 
 
Ndalianis, Angela, The Frenzy of the Visible: Spectacle and Motion in the Era of 
the Digital, in Senses of Cinema 3 (2000), p. 1 
http://archive.sensesofcinema.com/contents/00/3/matrix.html [accessed 1 April 
2009] 
 
O’Reilly, Sally Bewildering Logic, catalogue essay for Magic Show, A Hayward 
Touring Exhibition, curated by Jonathan Allen and Sally O’Reilly (2009-2010) 
 
Phillips, David, Modern Vision (book review) Oxford Art Journal, 16, 1 (1993) 
 
St. John, Graham, Alternative Cultural Heterotopia: ConFest as Australia's 
Marginal Centre (Unpublished 
Doctoral thesis, La Trobe University, Melbourne, Australia, 2000) 
 
  
158 
Schuster, Aaron, The Cosmonaut of the Erotic Future, Cabinet, Issue 32 Fire 
(2008/09), pp. 23-31, (p. 27) 
 
Stafford, Barbara Maria, Conjuring: How the Virtuoso Romantic learned from the 
Enlightened Charlatan, Art Journal, 52, 2 (1993), pp. 22-30 
 
Creed, Martin, Time and Motion, interviewed by David Trigg, Art Monthly 
(November 2008), pp. 1-4 (p. 4) 
 
 
 
Supplementary reading 
 
 
Barnouw, Erik, The Magician and the Cinema (New York ; Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1981). 
Doane, Mary Ann, The Emergence of Cinematic Time: Modernity, Contingency, 
the Archive (Cambridge, Mass. ; London: Harvard University Press, 
2002). 
Foster, Hal, The Anti-Aesthetic: Essays on Postmodern Culture (New York: New 
Press, 2002). 
Gombrich, E. H., Art and Illusion: A Study in the Psychology of Pictorial 
Representation ... 4th EdLondon: Phaidon, 1972). 
Graves-Brown, Paul, Matter, Materiality and Modern Culture (London: 
Routledge, 2000). 
Greenwood, Susan, The Anthropology of Magic (Berg, Oxford, 2009) 
Gregory, R. L., Mirrors in Mind (London: Penguin, 1998). 
Hamlyn, Nicky, Film Art Phenomena (London: British Film Institute, 2003). 
Harman, Graham, Prince of Networks: Bruno Latour and Metaphysics (Seddon ; 
London: re.press, 2009). 
Ingold, Tim, Companion Encyclopedia of Anthropology (London: Routledge, 
1994). 
  
159 
Kris, Ernst, Kurz, Otto, Laing, Alastair Aug, and Newman, Lottie Maury, Legend, 
Myth and Magic in the Image of the Artist : A Historical Experiment (New 
Haven; London: Yale University Press, 1979). 
Latour, Bruno, Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network-
Theory, Clarendon Lectures in Management Studies (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2005). 
Metz, Christian, Film Language: A Semiotics of the Cinema (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1974). 
Metzinger, Thomas, Being No One: The Self-Model Theory of Subjectivity, A 
Bradford Book (Cambridge, Mass. ; London: MIT, 2003). 
Meyer, Birgit, and Pels, Peter, Magic and Modernity: Interfaces of Revelation and 
Concealment (Stanford, Calif. ; [Great Britain] 
 Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, Stanford University Press, 
2003). 
Michaud, Philippe-Alain, Le Mouvement Des Images = the Movement of Images 
(Paris: Centre Pompidou, 2006). 
Miller, Daniel, Materiality (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press ; Chesham : 
Combined Academic [distributor], 2005). 
Mitchell, W. J. T., Picture Theory: Essays on Verbal and Visual Representation 
(Chicago ; London: University of Chicago Press, 1994). 
O'Doherty, Brian, Inside the White Cube: The Ideology of the Gallery Space. 
Expanded ed. edn (Berkeley, Calif. ; London: University of California 
Press, 1999). 
Pattison, Stephen, Seeing Things: Deepening Relations with Visual Artefacts 
(London: SCM Press, 2007). 
Pinney, Christopher, and Thomas, Nicholas, Beyond Aesthetics : Art and the 
Technologies of Enchantment (Oxford: Berg, 2001). 
Robert-Houdin, Jean Eugene, and Hoffmann, Louis Professor pseud, The Secrets 
of Conjuring and Magic; or, How to Become a Wizard ... Translated and 
Edited, with Notes, by Professor Hoffmann [Pseud., I.E. Angelo John 
Lewis]. ... With Illustrationspp. xix. 373. George Routledge & Sons: 
London, 1878). 
  
160 
Schaeffer, Jean-Marie, Art of the Modern Age: Philosophy of Art from Kant to 
Heidegger, New French Thought (Princeton, N.J. ; Chichester: Princeton 
University Press, 2000). 
Schneider, Arnd, and Wright, Christopher, Contemporary Art and Anthropology 
(Oxford: Berg, 2006). 
Schneider, Mark A., Culture and Enchantment (Chicago ; London: University of 
Chicago Press, 1993). 
Sobchack, Vivian Carol, Meta-Morphing: Visual Transformation and the Culture 
of Quick-Change (Minneapolis ; London: University of Minnesota Press, 
2000). 
Stafford, Barbara Maria, and Terpak, Frances, Devices of Wonder: From the 
World in a Box to Images on a Screen (Los Angeles, Calif.: Getty 
Research Institute for the History of Art & the Humanities ; Garsington : 
Windsor, 2002). 
Standage, Tom, The Mechanical Turk: The True Story of the Chess-Playing 
Machine That Fooled the World (London: Allen Lane The Penguin Press, 
2002). 
Tambiah, S. J., Magic, Science, Religion, and the Scope of Rationality, The Lewis 
Henry Morgan Lectures ; 1981 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1990). 
Taussig, Michael T., Mimesis and Alterity: A Particular History of the Senses 
(New York ; London: Routlege, 1993). 
Thomas, Keith, Religion and the Decline of Magic: Studies in Popular Beliefs in 
Sixteenth- and Seventeenth-Century England, Peregrine Books 
(Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1978). 
Warner, Marina, Phantasmagoria: Spirit Visions, Metaphors, and Media (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2006). 
Weiner, James F., Tree Leaf Talk: A Heideggerian Anthropology (Oxford: Berg, 
2003). 
Williams, Linda, Viewing Positions: Ways of Seeing Film, Rutgers Depth of Field 
Series (New Brunswick, N.J. ; [Great Britain]: Rutgers University Press, 
1995). 
Young, Julian, Heidegger's Philosophy of Art (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2001). 
  
161 
 
Other supplementary research 
 
Interview with Gustav Kuhn, Durham University, 22nd January, 2007 
Interview with Paul Zenon, Brighton, 2nd January, 2007 
Interview with Roy Davenport, West Sussex, 14th January, 2007 
Visit to Maison de la Magie, Blois, France, and Musée de la Magie, Paris, France, 
11-14th June, 2008. (Funded by UCA). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
162 
Appendix – Methodology and list of works 
 
 
 
Methodology 
 
My research question emerged initially from an engagement with some of the 
tropes and strategies of theatrical magic, or conjuring.  Some elementary general 
research of the subject preceded the commencement of my PhD: I had attended 
magic workshops, theatrical shows, and had done some background reading in the 
form of magician’s biographies and instruction books.  What fascinated me 
initially about this as an artist was the possibility of transposing some of these 
ideas into an art arena, in such a way that they might illuminate and conjoin 
different areas of interest that already existed within my practice.  Thus my point 
of departure was (broadly) the establishment of a question concerning the 
relationship between the magician and his audience, who I conceptualized as 
having entered into a (tacit) mutual contract—a contract of deception.  The first 
six to eight months of the research therefore focused upon an enquiry into 
different potential theoretical perspectives, from which the subject could be 
scrutinized, as well as the construction of a practical framework within which 
studio-based work could proceed. 
 During this initial period the emphasis of my research shifted from a 
broadly psychological perspective, to one in which the notion of agency began to 
be foregrounded.  Discovering the writings of Alfred Gell enabled me to 
reconceptualize the magic object (and thereby, the art object) as, in Gell’s terms, 
an index that motivated the abduction of agency.  Gell’s concept of ‘enchantment’ 
clearly chimed with the nomenclature of magic, and from this point I was able to 
formulate a theoretical framework that emphasized the tenuous and mutable status 
of the artwork, within a network of relations that incorporated the artist and the 
spectator.  Meanwhile the studio-based work commenced with a focus upon 
ordinary objects that could be manipulated in some way in order to extract a 
‘magical’ potential.  I became interested in creating what I later referred to as 
‘muted spectacles’—scenarios or ‘happenings’ whereby any action was motivated 
solely by the objects themselves, and in which these objects might somehow 
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transcend their prosaic qualities.  The best single example of this is SFX-1 (see 
appendix), referred to in my introduction, and in which a collection of ordinary 
objects—coloured paper, foil, fan and lamp—were integrated in such a way that a 
putative sunset effect might be discerned by the viewer.  Paralleling this, works 
such as Gravitation Effect presented a more straightforward illusion and 
challenged the viewer to uncover its method.  Together, these approaches 
produced a sense of illusions barely sustained, so that, whilst captivating the 
viewer they did not overwhelm.  
 In tandem with these works I began to produce a series of pieces in which 
similarly banal objects were the subject, but this time mediated through the 
agency of film.  It began to become clear to me that these video pieces, usually 
brief and often looped to play continuously, represented a different facet of my 
practice, but one that was able to complement the (three-dimensional) ‘object’ 
works.  The use of film/video was such that it was not intended to be merely a 
transparent vehicle of these effects, but that the technology itself could somehow 
be—or could be seen as—complicit in their construction.  I became increasingly 
interested in early cinema, in particular the films of Meliés and R.W. Paul, and in 
the writings of film theorists such as Tom Gunning, who focused on this early 
period of film history.  Rather than exploiting modern, digital software, I became 
more interested in revisiting some of the more prosaic parameters of the medium, 
such as the frame, the position and angle of the camera, the relation between 
filmic and real time.  Balloon Head, for example, is an attempt to represent the 
concealing nature of that which lies within the frame (in that we are unable to see 
what happens ‘off-screen’), and thereby emphasizes the magical or enchanting 
dimension of film.  The intention therefore was to suppress overtly narrative 
elements in favour of short, sensational and inexplicable episodes, for which the 
viewer might infer some form of technological agency. 
 Previously I had produced works that were performative in nature and I 
wanted to pursue this further, again partly as a means of interrogating a particular 
object or objects.  I was also interested in the role of the magician as performer, 
and had actually made works that had been performed by a magician.  The 
incorporation of video into some of these works led me to think about ways that I 
might combine performance with video, objects, and text.  The culmination of this 
approach was Zeno’s Oak Tree, in which I took a pre-existing (art) object 
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(Michael Craig-Martin’s An Oak Tree) and made it the starting point for a new 
work. 
 Finally, I had also been making drawings that centred around magic 
phrases or incantations.  These developed out of a fascination with the 
contradictory nature of the magic act, the way in which it seemed to revolve 
around a series of opposing concepts (such as appear/vanish); this led to the 
production of a group of text pieces which in turn caused me to revisit the 
theoretical ideas of Alfred Gell, in particular in relation to the concept of the 
cognitive ‘trap’.  Thus the work I produced during this eighteen month period fell 
into one of these four discrete, overlapping areas of practice.  I was then able to 
locate fresh theoretical bodies of work that helped support these four interlinked 
areas of research, and which simultaneously reinforced and complemented Gell’s 
ideas of agency. 
 
The following list of works are therefore divided into these four categories, which 
also parallel the sequence of the thematic material in my thesis.  Beginning with 
the performance pieces, then moving image works, text drawings (cognitive traps) 
and finally the (enchanted) object/installation works. 
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>  Never Odd or Even
>  Performance with video projection
>  2006
>  Performed at De La Warr Pavilion, 
Bexhill, and Nightingale Theatre, Brighton, 
2006
>  Duration: 23 mins
>  With music composed and performed by 
Glen Capra
In Never Odd or Even the performer interacts
with his own filmed double in front of an audi-
ence.  The performance begins with a
sequence of formal moves in which sheets of
primary coloured paper are repositioned by
each actor, so that the resulting overlaps create
a geometric grid of primary and secondary
hues.  Eventually the two ‘performers’
acknowledge one another’s existence resulting
in a sequence of exchanges incorporating real
objects, slapstick comedy and sleight of hand
magic. The climax of the piece sees one of the
actors dramatically shrink in size in relation to
his twin.  Never Odd or Even creates a zone of
uncertainty for the viewer, who begins to lose
track of the distinction between the filmic and
the real.  The piece features magician and 
circus performer Fred Delius in both roles.
>  Zeno’s Oak Tree (Proposition for a Miracle)
>  performance with installation, video 
and text 
>  2008
>  Performed at Grey Area, Brighton
>  Duration: 18 mins
Taking as its starting point an artwork from
1974 called An Oak Tree, by Michael Craig-
Martin, Zeno’s Oak Tree develops the meta-
physical dialogue at the heart of the original
work, in an attempt to locate the exact point at
which a glass of water is transformed into an
oak tree.  This notionally absurd proposition is
played out via the agency of a slowed-down
video recording of the water being poured into
the glass.
>  Phantasmagoria
>  performance
>  2007
>  Performed at Grey Area, Brighton
>  Duration: 12 mins
A silent performance in which various’pow-
ers’ - gravity, fire, magnetism, mind control -
are tested out using a variety of common-
place objects.  A soft-boiled egg is sucked
into the neck of a bottle, water remains in an
upturned glass, and a severed hand suddenly
and gruesomely comes to life.
> Prestidigitales
> Performance reading
>  2008
>  Performed at Grey Area, Brighton
Prestidigitales is a short collection of twelve
pithy anecdotal tales produced specifically
for performance; the central premise for each
is that an object takes on magical signifi-
cance in the mind of the listener, and pro-
vides the fulcrum around which the story is
hinged.  Read out to an audience, the prove-
nance and authenticity of these stories is
uncertain, and actual objects—matchbox,
magnifying glass, playing card—feature as
part of the narrative.
>  Hat
>  Performance
>  2008
>  Performed at Grey Area, Brighton
>  Duration: 15 mins
Hat is a free association of tropes and gestures
associated with magic performance; it centres
around the story of Mary Tofts, an 18th centu-
ry woman who claimed to have given birth to
rabbits, apparently giving rise to the rabbit-
out-of-a-hat cliché of modern magic.  The per-
formance is executed without recourse to nar-
rative, resolution or, for the most part, the pay-
off of a conventional magical effect.
Appendix - list of works: performer
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Appendix - list of works: moving image
>  Balloon Head (Homage to Meliés)
>  video projection
>  2007
>  Shown at Portsmouth Film Festival, 2007, 
and Visual Deflections, London, 2009
>  Duration: 59 secs
In Balloon Head a balloon with a face drawn
on it is inflated until it obscures the protago-
nist’s head, and fills the screen.  Extreme ten-
sion is built up until the balloon inevitably
bursts and, briefly, a black space is left where
the real head used to be.  The balloon itself
has obscured the covering of the head with
black material that matches the background.
>  Spinning Playing Card
>  video projection
>  2008
>  shown at
>  Duration: 2 mins (looped)
A card appears to spin in mid-air via the agency
of a small fan sitting on a shelf.  In fact the
video has been inverted and all the components
(including the ceiling coving) are positioned on
or close to the floor, the card therefore hangs
from a thread, hovering just above the ground.
> Crumpled Ball of Paper floating on the 
Breath of the Artist
> video projection
>  2008
>  Shown at
>  Duration: 2 mins (looped)
As with Spinning Playing Card, this piece
exploits an assumption (that the figure is lying
on the floor) on the part of the viewer.  In fact
the figure is seated (the camera having been
rotated 90 degrees, and the ball of paper hangs
in front of his face.  Other objects (including
the plug), have been positioned specifically in
order to reinforce this reading.
>  Spoon-Jar/Jar-Spoon
>  video
>  2007
>  Shown at Grey Area, Brighton
>  Duration: 30 mins (looped)
A pair of TV monitors face each at head-
height, inviting the viewer to stand in between
them.  Each displays the image of a glass jar
(one against a white, and one a black back-
ground) containing a teaspoon, which, periodi-
cally becomes animate and rises, falls, or rat-
tles in its container, in an apparent attempt to
escape.  Only the sound alerts the viewer to
the unfolding of this futile exchange.
>  Light House
>  video installation
>  2005
>  Performed at Grey Area, Brighton
>  Duration: continuous loop
A small room contains the projected image of
a magician holding a light bulb which he
magically turns on and off.  But the light in
the room itself also goes on and off at ran-
dom, and, finally, a mysterious phantom bulb
occasionally hangs in mid-air in front of the
magician, apparently occupying a space
between the filmic and the real.
>  Metamorphosis
>  video projection
>  2008
>  Shown at Cinecity 2009, Phoenix Gallery,
Brighton
>  Duration: 6 mins (looped)
A video piece focusing on the brief instant at
which the transformation effect of a stage illu-
sion takes place: this is both a substitution of
one performer for another and, effectively, a
gender transmutation. The clip is itself subject-
ed to various transformations, including slow-
ing down and speeding up, mirroring and dou-
bling, as a means of locating and illuminating
the exact moment of transfiguration.
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>  Belief System
>  pastel on paper
>  2008
The words ‘belief’ and ‘system’ each have par-
ticular connotations that might be thought of as
mutually opposed.   ‘System’, and the back-
ground grid pattern, are also intended to recall
the systems artists of the 1970s; however this
particular grid is taken from a well-known
optical illusion called ‘café wall’, in which
rows of black and white tiles are arranged in
such a way that they no longer seem parallel,
but wedge-shaped.
>  now you don’t
>  strobe light with text
>  2007
>  shown at Grey Area Brighton, 2007
A strobe light is set to flash every 5 seconds,
revealing the phrase ‘now you don’t’.  The
flash leaves an impression of the phrase on
the viewer’s retina, reinforcing the idea of
absence, and simultaneously evoking the first
part of the rubric: ‘now you see it; now you
don’t’.
>  View from other side
>  tracing paper, cut-out text
>  2008
A large sheet of transluscent draughting
paper, has the words ‘view from other side’
cut out in stencil form.  However the letters
making up the phrase are reversed, suggest-
ing the need to move round to the other side
in order to view it correctly.  But although
the letters are reversed, the phrase is not,
making it strictly illegible from either side,
and frustrating the viewers attempts at a
solution.
>  View from other side
>  paper, cut-out text, mirror
>  2008
Again the phrase ‘view from other side’
is presented in cut-out, stencil form.
This time the small strip of card is sited
infront of a mirror and, contrary to
expectations, the phrase is not reversed
but persists in being legible via its
reflected image.
> Disclaimer
> text (mock-up)
>  2008
Disclaimer functions as a threshold device,
informing the visitor to an exhibition of the
mutable and unreliable status of the objects
contained therein.  In this sense it mimics
the introduction to a magic performance -
‘welcome to the show’ - which itself creates
a conceptual frame within which miracles
might be experienced.  The original drawing
was in the form of a poster; the mock-up is
for a large wall-drawing.
>  Here/Gone
>  pastel on paper
>  2008
One of series of works in which, like
‘Belief System’, words are implicitly set
in opposition to each other.  This time the
word ‘gone’ appears in the negative
space left by the cut-out word ‘here’ - a
sculptural contradiction of the words’
semantic definitions.  The piece echoes
the strategy of the strobe work, ‘now you
don’t’.
Appendix - list of works: text works (cognitive traps)
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>  Gravitation Effect
>  parlour table, balloons, ribbon, metal rod
>  2007
>  shown at Grey Area, Brighton, 2007
An inverted table is supported by a central
metal pole; the pole itself is concealed by the
cluster of balloons and the white ribbons from
which they hang, giving the appearance that
the table is floating.  The counter-intuitive
aspect of the piece is that the concept of a
floating object - supported aloft by a bunch of
balloons - is itself inverted.  The magical con-
cept of a levitation effect produces its oppo-
site: Gravitation Effect.
>  SFX-1
>  foil, shelf, paper, lamp, fan
>  2006
>  shown at Grey Area, Brighton, 2007
A desk fan and table lamp (with orange bulb)
point towards a sheet of foil suspended from
a shelf.  The noise of the foil being blown by
the fan, together with the colours reflected on
its surface (created through a combination of
the orange light and two sheets of blue paper
on the floor), create the tentative impression
of a sunset over the sea. 
>  Double Bind
>  glass tumblers, balls, limes, shelf, black 
velvet, glass and mirrors
>  2007
>  shown at Grey Area, Brighton, 2007
Based on the Cups and Balls illusion, Double
Bind positions three pairs of glass tumblers
on a shelf, in such a way that they are physi-
cally supported by three sheets of either mir-
rored, or ordinary, glass. The glasses them-
selves contain objects which, because of the
45 degree angle of the mirrors, seem to disap-
pear and reappear according to the spectator’s
viewing position.
> Mirror Ball
> installation with mirrors, ball of paper and 
plinth
>  2008
Mirror Ball is viewed through a small hole in
the wall of the gallery.  What appears to be a
plinth supporting an open, mirrored cube,
reveals a crumpled ball of white paper floating
apparently unaided.  In fact the viewer is,
unwittingly, looking at an inverted mirror
image - the plinth and cube are actually lying
on the floor.  This piece echoes the strategy,
and is a companion piece to, the video work,
Crumpled Ball of Paper Floating on the
Breath of the Artist.
>  Levitating Table/Levitated Table
>  Round dining table, tin box, volunteers
>  2007
>  shown at Grey Area, Brighton, 2007
The Levitating Table was demonstrated once
only at the opening of my exhibition Now
You Don’t, at Grey Area Gallery, Brighton,
on Friday 29th June, 2007.  The table itself
had already been installed as part of the
exhibition, and as visitors arrived they were
each given a plain white envelope.  At a pre-
determined time during the evening the
envelopes were opened: six of these con-
tained a slip of paper with the image of a
table printed on it.  These six individuals
became the volunteers and, by extension,
agents in realizing the levitation of the table.
A round metal box (which produced a hum-
ming noise from within) was placed in the
centre of the table, and the volunteers spaced
themselves around its perimeter.  After one
failed attempt, the table was clearly levitated
so that it completely left the ground for a
period of approximately six seconds.  For
the remaining period of the exhibition the
table was displayed with the label ‘Levitated
Table’.  Although various explanations for
the effect have been offered, none has been
confirmed or denied.
Appendix - list of works:’enchanted’ objects
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>  Cup and Ball
>  Wooden shelf, black velvet, copper ‘chop’
cup, (ball?).
>  2003.
>  Shown at the Gardner Arts Centre,
University of Sussex, 2004.
Cup and Ball features a copper cup atop a
shelf.  The viewer infers that the ball is under-
neath the cup, but can only confirm this suspi-
cion by lifting the cup, thereby breaking a car-
dinal rule about touching artworks.
>  Empyrean Speculum
>  Outdoor installation/performance.
>  2009.
>  Pavilion Gardens, Brighton Festival, 2009.
>  (Photograph by Stig Evans).
An impromptu response to the outdoor instal-
lation of a work by Anish Kapoor, Sky Mirror.
The miniature replica was sited close to the
original, and included its own security fence
and guard, thereby mimicking the conditions
and circumstances of Sky Mirror’s installation.
> Untitled
> Pastel drawing on large, free-standing
white display board.
>  2003
>  shown at Phoenix Gallery, Brighton.
A response to the difficulties of negotiating a
glass door with the words ‘push’ and ‘pull’
printed on each side.  The work itself revers-
es the word ‘push’ and cast it as a negative
of its own shadow.  The spectator has to
negotiate the work itself, which partially
blocks their access to the space.
Appendix - other referenced works.
